Four essays on the 1994 Mexican crisis by Gonzalez-Garcia, Jesus R.







A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/111013 
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 




























Four Essays on the 1994 M exican Crisis
by
Jesus R. Gonzalez-Garcia
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics






2 Review of the Literature on Currency Crises 15
2.1 Models of speculative attacks .................................................................  15
2.2 New approaches to currency crises........................................................... 17
2.2.1 Second-generation models of currency c r i s e s ..........................  17
2.2.2 Third-generation models for financial and currency crises . . 22
2.3 Review of the empirical literature........................................................... 23
2.4 Summary and com m en ts ...........................................................................  34
3 Realignment Expectations, Macroeconomic Fundamentals and the
Collapse of the Peso 36
3.1 Introduction..................................................................................................  36
3.2 Measuring realignment expectations.......................................................  38
3.3 Realignment expectations and macroeconomic fundamentals . . . .  44
3.4 A Markov-switching model of realignment expectations.................... 53
3.5 Discussion of results .................................................................................  59
3.6 Conclusions..................................................................................................  61
4 Government Finance, Multiple Equilibria and Currency Crises 64
4.1 Introduction..................................................................................................  64
4.2 The m odel...................................................................................................... 65
4.3 Equilibria and self-fulfilling c r is e s ........................................................... 71
4.4 Means to avoid self-fulfilling crises........................................................... 72
4.5 Some specific features of the Mexican experience.................................  76
4.6 Conclusions and com m ents........................................................................  80
1
CONTENTS 2
5 Pressure in the Foreign Exchange Market and the Collapse of the
Peso 89
5.1 Introduction..................................................................................................  89
5.2 Pressure in the foreign exchange market and interest r a t e s ....................91
5.3 The index of pressure in the foreign exchange m a rk e t ............................93
5.4 Markov-switching models and regime sh ifts ............................................... 96
5.4.1 Models with time-varying transition p robab ilities ........................ 97
5.4.2 A two step approach to model regime s h i f t s ................................ 107
Models with constant transition probabilities............................. 107
Modelling the shifts between reg im es .......................................... 113
5.5 Conclusions and com m ents...........................................................................119
6 The 1989-94 Consumption Boom in Mexico: An analysis of Coin­
tegration using Regime Shifts 122
6.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................122
6.2 Income, consumption and structural breaks..............................................124
6.3 Preliminary analysis of the s e r ie s ..............................................................130
6.4 Stability of the cointegration v e c to r ...........................................................132
6.5 Cointegration and regime s h i f t s ................................................................. 135
6.6 C onclusions.....................................................................................................142
7 Conclusions 145
7.1 Prospective future research..........................................................................149
List of Figures
3.1 Exchange rate bands (weeks 91.46 - 9 4 .5 1 ) ...........................................  41
3.2 Expected realignment (three month h orizon )........................................ 44
3.3 Rolling constant coefficient........................................................................ 50
3.4 Rolling coefficient of R E R (-2 ) .................................................................  51
3.5 Rolling coefficient of RES(-l) .................................................................  51
3.6 Rolling coefficient of B L ( -2 ) ....................................................................  52
3.7 Rolling coefficient of B L ( -3 ) ....................................................................  52
3.8 Regime 1. Filter and smoothed probabilities...............................................57
3.9 Monetary base (billions of p e s o s ) ...........................................................  60
3.10 Share of short-term bonds indexed to the d o l l a r ................................. 61
4.1 Multiple e q u ilib r ia ....................................................................................  83
4.2 Government loss .......................................................................................  83
4.3 Unique equilibrium ....................................................................................  84
4.4 Unique equilibrium. Government lo s s ..................................................... 84
4.5 Debt reduction ........................................................................................... 85
4.6 Debt reduction. Government l o s s ...........................................................  85
4.7 Increase of average m aturity..................................................................... 86
4.8 Increase of average maturity. Government l o s s ....................................  86
4.9 Increase of domestic cred it ........................................................................ 87
4.10 Increase of domestic credit. Government lo s s ........................................ 87
4.11 Increase of indexed b o n d s ........................................................................ 88
4.12 Increase of indexed bonds. Government l o s s ........................................ 88
5.1 Input series for PC a n a ly sis ..................................................................... 94
5.2 Index of pressure in the foreign exchange m arket................................. 96
3
5.3 MS-AR(O). Filter and smoothed probabilités............................................110
5.4 MS-AR(3). Filter and smoothed probabilities.......................................... 110
5.5 Andrews test of parameter stability.............................................................I l l
5.6 Changes in debt-output ratio and political n e w s ................................... 117
5.7 Annual changes of the real exchange r a t e ................................................ 117
5.8 Reduced model. Probability e stim a ted ................................................... 119
6.1 Logs of per capita GDP and consumption expenditure.......................... 130
6.2 Filter and smoothed probabilities................................................................ 139
6.3 Fully modified residuals..................................................................................139
6.4 Filter and smoothed probabilités. Seasonally adjusted data................. 141
6.5 Standardized residuals of regime switching models..................................142
LIST OF FIGURES 4
List of Tables
3.1 Exchange rate regimes 1988-1994 ..........................................................  40
3.2 Estimated expected depreciation within the band ................................ 42
3.3 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root t e s t s ................................................. 46
3.4 Cumulated effects on realignment expectations........................................48
3.5 Determinants of realignment expectations .............................................. 49
3.6 Estimates of Markov-switching regression................................................. 56
3.7 Specification te s ts .......................................................................................  58
4.1 Summary of resu lts....................................................................................  73
5.1 Basic statistics for PC analysis .............................................................  94
5.2 Principal components .............................................................................. 95
5.3 MS-TVTP. 1st lag ...................................................................................... 100
5.4 MS-TVTP. 2nd l a g ...................................................................................... 101
5.5 MS-TVTP. 3rd l a g ...................................................................................... 102
5.6 MS-TVTP. Effects of political events......................................................... 103
5.7 MS-TVTP. 3 lags simultaneously (first p a r t ) ......................................... 104
5.8 MS-TVTP. 3 lags simultaneously (second part) .................................. 105
5.9 Markov-switching AR(p) models .............................................................108
5.10 Specification tests ...................................................................................... 112
5.11 Robust standard errors of the MS-AR(O) model .................................. 112
5.12 Unit root tests for the transformed probability...................................... 114
5.13 Estimation of the probability of the crisis state .................................. 115
5.14 Reduced model with T V T P ...................................................................... 118
6.1 Unit root tests .............................................................................................131
6.2 Seasonal unit root tests with breaks..........................................................133
5
6.3 FM estimators and tests................................................................................ 134
6.4 FM estimators and tests. Seasonally adjusted data ..............................136
6.5 Markov-switching co in tegration ................................................................ 138
6.6 Markov-switching cointegration. Seasonally adjusted data .....................141
6.7 Unit root tests for weighted residuals.......................................................143
LIST O F  TABLES 6
7Acknowledgements
I am grateful to my supervisors Jennifer Smith and Marcus Miller for the 
continuous and patient guidance they have provided during the elaboration of this 
work.
I am very grateful to the people that have given me invaluable personal support 
to complete this project. First of all, to my family, and also to Cecilia Barra, 
Andres Flores, Alejandro Garcia, Omar Loaeza, Jorge Martinez, Silvia Sgherri 
and Lama Villar.
The financial support of Banco de Mexico and the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia 
y Tecnologia (CONACYT) is kindly acknowledged.
Declaration
All the material in this thesis is my own work. The thesis has not been sub­
mitted for a degree at another university, and no part of it has been published or 
used in other academic or professional project.
Summary
8
Most o f the thesis is devoted to studying the collapse of the Mexican peso in December 
1994 using empirical methods that allow shifts in regimes, as well as a small theoretical 
model based on the escape clause approach. Also, we present a study o f the consumption 
boom  observed in Mexico in the period 1989-1994 to highlight the im portance o f taking 
into account structural breaks in cointegration modelling.
W e use a series o f realignment expectations, as well as linear and non-linear methods, to 
look for evidence that helps to characterise the Mexican crisis. Contrary to the 
predictions o f first-generation models o f currency crises, we find that the credibility o f the 
peso did not experience any steady deterioration before its devaluation, and there was no 
stable relationship between realignment expectations and economic fundamentals. By 
using a Markov-switching regression model, we show that realignment expectations 
shifted over time between regimes o f relatively high and low credibility, and that these 
shifts were more frequent during the troubled 1994. This evidence makes it problematic 
to endorse explanations o f the collapse o f  the peso based on models o f  speculative 
attacks, and suggests using the approach o f second-generation models o f  currency crises 
to study the Mexican experience.
The theoretical model is designed to illustrate some specific features o f  the Mexican 
experience. W e argue that the substitution of peso denominated assets for dollar 
denominated and indexed assets in investors’ portfolios helped policymakers to resist 
recurrent periods o f confidence crisis during 1994, but it also made it more difficult to 
eliminate a potential self-fulfilling devaluation. In particular, the sterilisation of reserve 
losses during 1994 seems to be more important in the onset o f the devaluation of the peso 
than the increase in the stock of dollar indexed bonds.
We use an index o f pressure in the foreign exchange market and mean-variance Markov- 
switching models to study the timing and causes of the shifts of the Mexican economy 
between states o f  calm and crisis. M odels with time-varying transition probabilities do 
not yield conclusive results. Hence, we adopt a two step approach to  obtain the 
probability o f the state of crisis at each date in the sample, and then model this series as 
a function o f economic fundamentals and political events. W e find that the reduction of 
the debt-output ratio and positive political events maintained the econom y in the state of 
calm up to 1994, despite a continuous real appreciation of the peso. However, the end of 
the declining path o f the debt-output ratio and negative political shocks produced a shift 
towards the state o f crisis for most o f 1994 that finally led to the collapse o f  the peso.
The study o f  the consumption boom  observed in Mexico in the period 1989-1994 
illustrates that structural breaks in long run relationships can be dated and evaluated if 
we allow regime shifts in cointegration modelling. The available data rejects a stable 
cointegration relationship between consum ption and income. Meanwhile, using Markov- 
switching models, we find that there was a marked shift in the cointegration vector after 
the implementation o f the program for stabilisation and economic reform in December 
1987. The program caused the former unitary income elasticity o f  consumption to 
increase by almost 30 per cent, but later the shift was reversed when the currency and 
financial crisis erupted at the end o f  1994.
Chapter 1 
Introduction
In December 1987 the Mexican government implemented a program whose aim was 
stabilisation and economic reform. This program seemed to be very successful, 
and was praised by many institutions and scholars. The exchange rate-based 
stabilisation program reduced the inflation rate from 159 per cent in 1987 to 7 
per cent in 1994. And the economic reform led to a considerable reduction in the 
government’s participation in the economy, the privatisation o f the banking system, 
and was crowned with the North American Free TVade Agreement (NAFTA).1 
However, during 1994 the peso became under pressure and collapsed in December 
21st.
The Mexican currency crisis and the financial crisis that followed confronted 
many investors, officials and academics with an enormous surprise that gained 
instantaneous attention around the world and motivated a massive, unprecedented 
international loan package backed by the US government and the IMF worth 48 
billion dollars. In academic circles, the collapse of the peso called for a better 
understanding o f sudden currency crises that has continued growing due to the 
turmoil in Latin America that followed the Mexican crisis, and more recently due 
to the chain o f devaluations and financial crises in East Asia.
The recent precedent for sudden, strong currency crises was the experience of 
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in the fall of 1992, whose effects con­
tinued until 1993, and led to the widening of the currency bands. The crisis of




the ERM encouraged new hypotheses and explanations for currency crises and a 
new generation of models started to develop. The development of new models 
resulted primarily from the fact that this experience did not fit with the exist­
ing paradigm used to study balance of payments crises, which was based on the 
seminal contribution o f Krugman (1979).
Obstfeld (1997b, 1996, 1995, 1994, and 1986) pioneered a new strand of the 
theoretical literature of currency crises that explicitly incorporates the strategic 
interplay o f speculators and economic authorities. Obstfeld postulates that un­
der some conditions, determined by macroeconomic fundamentals, there may be 
multiple equilibria in foreign exchange markets and self-fulfilling currency crises. 
The theoretical literature based on the escape clause approach, also called second- 
generation models for currency crises, grew rapidly in the mid 1990s and is now 
part of the indispensable knowledge for studying currency crises. However, the 
empirical analysis of the currency crises of the 1990s is still insufficient.
Most o f the literature based on second-generation models has been theoretically 
oriented and the discussion of real events is somewhat tentative, and restricted to 
qualitative reviews of the conditions and variables that were the likely causes of 
crises. While the implementation of econometric models to discern the nature of 
recent devaluations (due to bad fundamentals, as in Krugman’s mode, or with self- 
fulfilling elements, as with Obstfeld) and able to study systematically the effects of 
sudden shifts in speculators’ expectations has lagged behind a large collection of 
theoretical propositions. Modern econometric studies of recent currency crises are 
scarce, and the best-known papers have focused on the experience of the French 
franc in 1992-93 (Jeanne and Masson (2000), Jeanne (1997)) and the crisis of the 
ERM (Dahlquist and Gray (2000) and Gomez-Puig and Montalvo (1997)).
Most of the present study is a contribution to the empirical literature on cur­
rency crises that focuses on the nature and causes of the collapse of the Mexican 
peso in December 1994. The purpose of this work is to offer, at least, a partial 
answer to a key issue raised by Garber and Svensson (1994) some time ago: ” It is 
widely understood [...] that it is difficult to distinguish between situations in which 
multiple equilibria may be present and situations in which exogenous policies in­
evitably lead to a collapse of a fixed exchange rate. The development of methods 
to distinguish between these two models of speculative attacks in the data is an
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important open issue of the field” (page 1901).
On the theoretical side, we present a small model based on the escape clause 
approach, the purpose of which is to illustrate some specific features of the Mexican 
crisis. The model considers the financing needs of a consolidated government (that 
includes the central government and the Central Bank) and the effects of investors’ 
expectations on the decision of policymakers whether to devalue or not. We use this 
model to illustrate the policies pursued in Mexico dining 1994 to resist recurrent 
confidence crises, and their role in the onset of the devaluation at the end of that 
year.
The thesis also includes an analysis of one of the most noticeable effects of the 
program for stabilisation and economic reform implemented in Mexico at the end 
of 1987: the boom in private consumption observed in the period 1989-1994. In 
this work we argue that long run relationships can be subject to regime shifts that 
can be accurately identified and evaluated if we allow shifts in the parameters of 
cointegration relationships. With this work we aim to contribute to the growing 
literature on modelling structural breaks in cointegration relationships.
Throughout the thesis, intensive use is made of the Markov-switching models 
introduced in the econometric literature by Hamilton (1996, 1994, 1989) which en­
able us to analyse shifts in regimes by allowing changes over time in the parameters 
governing stochastic processes.
The plan of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the 
theoretical and empirical literature relating to currency crises. We review the dif­
ferent theoretical approaches existing in the literature, and stress the mechanisms 
that can lead to devaluations and their implications for the analysis of data. For 
obvious reasons, we give considerable attention to the empirical studies of the de­
valuations of the Mexican peso that occurred in the past three decades. And, in 
contrast to other surveys, we include in our review papers that have used the drift 
adjustment method of Bertola and Svensson (1993) to construct a series of realign­
ment expectations that are used as indicator of the credibility of target zones, as 
well as empirical works that are close in spirit to the so-called second generation 
models of currency crises.
In Chapter 3 we make use of empirical techniques to discern whether the col­
lapse of the Mexican peso was a conventional currency crisis caused by erroneous
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macroeconomic management, or rather, a sudden crisis in which self-fulfilling ele­
ments were present. We construct a series of realignment expectations using the 
drift adjustment method and analyse their relationship to macroeconomic funda­
mentals using linear methods and a non-linear Markov-switching regression model. 
This model generalises the one used by Jeanne and Masson (2000) since we con­
sider shifts not only in the constant term but also in all the remaining coefficients. 
This is so because we are interested not only in shifts in the level of realignment 
expectations over time, but also in the changes of the relationship between those 
expectations and macroeconomic fundamentals.
We find that neither the path nor the relationship of realignment expectations 
with macroeconomic fundamentals predicted by first generation models o f currency 
crises was present before the devaluation of the peso. Using a Markov-switching 
regression model we show that the credibility of the Mexican peso shifted between 
states of relatively low and high credibility in the period 1988-1993 but tended 
to stay in one regime or another for long periods. And these shifts in credibility 
became erratic during 1994, a year marked by recurrent political and financial 
turmoil. Also, we also find that in the months immediately before the devaluation 
of the peso the expectations of a realignment were relatively low, and linked only 
to the changes in the Central Bank’s international reserves.
In view of these results, we suggest that it is hard to endorse explanations of the 
Mexican crisis that attribute the collapse of the peso to imbalances resulting from 
persistent macroeconomic mismanagement. Rather, we advance the hypothesis 
that to understand the Mexican experience in 1994 and the collapse of the peso at 
the end of that year, we have to consider shifts in speculators’ expectations and 
the reaction of policymakers.
In Chapter 4 we present a model inspired by the escape clause approach to il­
lustrate our ideas regarding the Mexican experience in 1994. This is a model with 
two periods in which under certain conditions, determined by macroeconomic fun­
damentals, the effects of speculators’ expectations on interest rates and the govern­
ment’s financing needs can produce more than one equilibrium, and a self-fulfilling 
currency crisis may occur as the result of changes in investors’ expectations.
This model allows us to discuss the mechanisms used by policymakers to cope 
with the recurrent confidence crises observed in 1994. In particular, we advance
Introduction 13
the view that policymakers resisted periods of confidence crises by encouraging 
investors to substitute assets denominated in pesos for assets denominated in or 
indexed to the dollar, and in this way promoted the coordination of speculators’ 
expectations in the no-devaluation equilibrium. However, this did not eliminate 
completely the possibility of a self-fulfilling devaluation. Indeed, we argue that the 
government may have contributed to open the possibility of a self-fulfilling crisis 
by following a policy of sterilisation of reserve losses.
Based on our model, we suggest that some macroeconomic fundamentals and 
political factors may have put the Mexican economy in a situation in which a 
self-fulfilling crisis was a possibility, and the periods of confidence crisis observed 
during 1994 were successfully confronted thanks to massive substitutions of assets 
in investors’ portfolios. Recurrent confidence shocks, however, had the effect of 
exhausting this mechanism of defence and the final round of financial turmoil 
resulted in the devaluation of the peso at the end of the year.
Chapter 5 presents an empirical investigation of the origins of the devaluation 
of the peso, which is designed to be close in spirit to the approach o f  second- 
generation models of currency crisis. An index of pressure in the foreign exchange 
market is used to measure the credibility of the peso over time and mean-variance 
Markov-switching models are employed to identify both the timing and causes of 
confidence crises. We find that the Mexican economy shifted over time between a 
state of calm -  with a slight pressure for peso depreciation -  and a state of crisis 
with stronger and more volatile pressure for peso depreciation. And these shifts 
were related to some macroeconomic fundamentals and political events.
Markov-switching models with time-varying transition probabilities suggest 
that fiscal matters and political events caused the shifts of the economy between 
the periods of calm and crisis but these results are not conclusive. This is why we 
adopt an alternative approach, using a model with constant transition probabil­
ities to obtain the probability of the crisis state at each date in the sample and 
model this series as a function of macroeconomic fundamentals and political news.
The two step approach yielded robust results. These indicate that despite a 
real appreciation of the peso, the continuous reduction of the debt to output ratio 
and positive political news helped to maintain the economy in the state of calm 
until the end of 1993. However, the definitive change in the path of the public debt
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relative to output and an unprecedented series of negative political shocks shifted 
the economy towards the state of crisis during most 1994, in spite of a modest real 
depreciation of the peso. In such a state of crisis, reserve losses accumulated over 
the year, leading finally to the collapse of the peso. These results are confirmed 
when we estimate a model in which the transition probabilities depend on the 
variables mentioned.
Chapter 6 focuses on one of the most noticeable consequences of the program 
for stabilisation and economic reform introduced in Mexico in December 1987: 
the boom in private consumption observed in the period 1989-1994. Here, we 
highlight the importance of taking structural breaks into account, not only when 
testing for unit roots but also when modelling long run relationships. Specifically, 
we argue that structural breaks in long run relationships can be accurately dated 
and evaluated if we allow regime shifts in cointegration modelling.
Using standard cointegration modelling procedures, we find that a long run 
relationship with stable parameters between private consumption and income is 
rejected by the available data. Hence, we propose modelling the long run relation­
ship taking into account shifts in regime.
Our estimates show that the implementation of the stabilisation and economic 
reform program at the end of 1987 led to a sharp change in consumption be­
haviour. Such a change implied a shift from a cointegration vector with unitary 
income elasticity to another with a much larger elasticity: during the boom, pri­
vate consumption was growing 30 per cent faster that income. And later, when the 
currency and financial crises erupted at the end of 1994, the vector with unitary 
elasticity was re-established.
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of our work and discusses prospective future 
research. The Appendix details the series used.
Chapter 2
Review of the Literature on 
Currency Crises
2.1 Models of speculative attacks
First generation models of currency crises explain these events as the result of 
the maintenance of fiscal and monetary policies that are inconsistent with a fixed 
exchange rate regime. The seminal contribution of Krugman (1979) portrays a 
small open economy in which a speculative attack against the currency is pre­
ceded by a period of money creation, needed to monetize persistent fiscal deficits, 
that exceeds the growth of money demand and produces continuous reserve losses 
which will inevitably deplete reserves at some future date. The speculative attack 
occurs before reserves have been totally exhausted and consists of a massive ex­
change of domestic money for the remaining international reserves in the Central 
Bank. Without reserves to maintain the official rate, the Central Bank allows the 
exchange rate to float and the nominal interest rate adjusts upwards to a level 
consistent with a continuous depreciation of the domestic currency because the 
monetization of fiscal deficits will continue. The timing of the attack cannot be 
determined using Krugman’s model due to non-linearities but the log-linear ver­
sion of Flood and Garber (1984) allows the exact determination of the time of the 
attack. This occurs when the shadow exchange rate, the one that is consistent 
with the path of money supply, is equal to the fixed exchange rate.
Extensions o f the basic speculative attack model have made it more realistic
15
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and permitted the identification of some general features of the behaviour of the 
economy in the run up to a currency crisis. In what follows, we present a re­
view that focuses on some features that have been stressed in interpretations of 
the Mexican crisis based on the speculative attack approach, such as Dornbusch 
and Werner (1994), Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1996), Edwards (1997), and 
Warner (1997). Other reviews of those extensions can be found in Agenor and 
Flood (1994) and Blackburn and Sola (1993).
Flood and Garber (1984) and Dornbusch (1987) present versions of the spec­
ulative attack model that incorporate uncertainty about the growth of domestic 
credit and show that there is an upward trend in domestic nominal interest rates 
prior to the speculative attack due to an increasing probability of devaluation, and 
also increasing rates of reserve losses that exceed the growth of domestic credit 
because money demand decreases. Also, Willman (1989) has shown that a pattern 
of rising interest rates will emerge if there is uncertainty about the reserve limit 
that triggers the abandonment of the fixed parity.
A very complete account of the empirical regularities that we should expect to 
observe before a currency crisis is obtained in a model that incorporates sticky 
prices and predetermined but forward looking wages. According to Willman 
(1988), an anticipated collapse affects current wages because o f its forward look­
ing nature, and this in turn affects prices (which are determined as a mark-up on 
wages), the real exchange rate, the trade balance and output. The rise of wages 
and prices lowers the real interest rate, which exerts an expansionary effect on out­
put, and the trade balance deteriorates continuously before the official exchange 
rate is abandoned due to the loss of competitiveness. However, the steady rise in 
domestic prices results in real appreciation of the domestic currency, which damp­
ens the initial expansive effect of the real interest rate. When the abandonment 
of the fixed exchange rate occurs, the real interest rate falls because the expected 
rate of depreciation jumps upwards in order to be consistent with the persistent 
creation of money in a floating regime, which makes output increase, and there is 
a further deterioration of the trade balance. Later, the trade balance will return 
gradually to its steady state level due to the continuous depreciation of the domes­
tic currency. These stylised facts can also be found in the extensions of Krugman’s 
model suggested in Flood and Hodrick (1986) and Conolly and Taylor (1984).
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This general description of the regularities we should expect to find in the 
run up to a currency crisis is compatible with two other central notions about 
rational responses to an anticipated devaluation. Vegh (1992) and Calvo (1996b) 
use models in which money demand is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint 
to show that a large current account deficit emerges in anticipation of a future 
balance of payments crisis because agents reallocate future consumption to the 
present. And Penati and Pennacchi (1989) show that the growth of the current 
account deficit is reinforced when private agents hedge themselves against the risk 
of devaluation by accumulating assets denominated in foreign currency.
In sum, according to the approach of models of currency crises a la Krugman, 
a general syndrome in the economy prior to a crisis should be identifiable: expan­
sionary fiscal policy, fast output growth, overvaluation of the domestic currency, 
large trade and current account deficits, rapid money creation and continuous re­
serve losses. And this should be accompanied by a steady increase in realignment 
expectations, expressed as a rising pattern of interest rate differentials. In the 
empirical analysis of Chapter 3, we will investigate whether these implications of 
the speculative attack approach were present in the collapse of the Mexican peso 
in December 1994.
2.2 New approaches to currency crises
2.2.1 Second-generation models of currency crises
Largely because the predictions and implications of the speculative attack ap­
proach did not fit with the crisis of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism of 
1992-93, models using the escape clause approach, or second-generation models of 
currency crises, have been proposed. The main principles guiding these models 
are: a) the abandonment of an exchange rate parity is not necessarily the result of 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies, but a decision taken by an optimizing poli­
cymaker that weiglis the costs and benefits of such a decision; b) the expectations 
of speculators affect the decision of the government to exercise the escape clause 
and abandon the parity; and c) due to the circularity implied above, there can be 
multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling currency crises.
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In second-generation models of currency crises, there is no need for fiscal, mon­
etary or external imbalances to accumulate over time and hence no evident reason 
for the eventual abandonment of the exchange rate regime. However, currency 
crises may happen as one of the outcomes of multiple equilibria, which arises be­
cause economic policy is contingent on speculators’ expectations. The government 
has to weigh the cost of abandoning the exchange rate regime and the cost of 
defending the actual parity, and it may be forced to opt out if devaluation expec­
tations feed into interest rates, prices and wages in order to pursue some other 
policy objectives such as the growth of output, the level of employment, the size 
and cost of public debt, the competitiveness in international trade or the health 
of the domestic financial system (Obstfeld, 1996, 1994). In models with multiple 
equilibria, the key component of the dynamics is the set of beliefs of investors, 
which may synchronize in a way that makes it preferable for the government to 
abandon the parity. That is, a change in market sentiment may trigger the aban­
donment of the exchange rate parity, and hence, the expectation of a devaluation 
becomes self-fulfilling.
It is important to state clearly some ideas concerning second-generation models. 
First, on the one hand, there are models of currency crises with an optimizing 
policymaker and escape clauses that do not involve the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, as the one by Isard (1995, chapter 9). We can label his model a pure 
escape clause model since the decision to abandon the parity cannot be due to 
changes in market sentiment. There is the need for a strong enough shock to 
provoke the conditions that make preferable for the government to abandon the 
exchange rate parity. On the other hand, there are models in which the role of 
self-fulfilling expectations is stressed. For instance, the early work of Obstfeld 
(1986) presents a model of pure self-fulfilling balance of payments crises in which 
the currency crisis can occur if monetary policy is expected to be looser after the 
abandonment of a fixed exchange rate, and such an expectation may itself push 
the government to relax monetary discipline. In the review o f second-generation 
models presented below we stress the role of multiple equilibria.
Second, in models with multiple equilibria, the timing of the speculative attack 
is rather arbitrary because of the sunspot nature of the equilibria, but it does 
not mean that a crisis can occur at any moment or under any circumstance. For
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subjective changes in market sentiment to provoke a self-fulfilling currency crisis, 
certain conditions on the fundamentals of the economy are necessary. In other 
words, shifts in market sentiment cannot produce a crisis in an economy with 
strong fundamentals. This is a very important point that has been stressed in 
Obstfeld (1997b, 1996, 1994), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Jeanne (1999, 1997) 
and Jeanne and Masson (2000).
Third, in accordance with the above, we may expect the concerns of investors 
about the likelihood o f a potential currency crisis to have some effect on domestic 
interest rates when fundamentals deteriorate. Krugman (1996) and Sutherland 
(1997) have suggested that the mere possibility of a sudden crisis affects interest 
rates.
In what follows we review several second-generation models of currency crises 
and stress the mechanisms and macroeconomic fundamentals that can make a 
self-fulfilling crisis possible.
Drazen and Masson (1994) and Masson (1995) have suggested that the rate 
of unemployment may play a dual role in a country with a fixed or semi-fixed 
exchange rate parity. Increasing unemployment may enhance the reputation of 
the government by signalling its commitment to incur output and employment 
losses when the objective is to maintain the exchange rate parity, but it may also 
raise doubts about the ability of the government to defend the domestic currency 
since there should be some limit to the level of unemployment that can be tolerated. 
That is, increasing rates of unemployment may end up damaging the credibility 
of the exchange rate regime. Unemployment also plays a key role in the model of 
Ozkan and Sutherland (1998), who show that a government may find it optimal 
to renege on the exchange rate parity in order to boost aggregate demand, output 
and employment. Since investors are aware of this temptation, they incorporate 
the expectations of a devaluation into interest rate differentials when economic 
activity slows down, which may bring forward the abandonment of the parity by 
depressing economic activity further. Therefore, we should expect to find a positive 
relationship between realignment expectations and the rate of unemployment, as 
did Drazen and Masson (1994) and Masson (1995) in their empirical analysis.
The level of international reserves available to defend the domestic currency 
has been postulated as a variable linked to the likelihood of a sudden speculative
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attack. In the model for the Mexican crisis of Sachs et al (1996a) and that of 
Velasco (1996), a reduction of international reserves increases the net debt of the 
consolidated government (the federal government and the Central Bank), which 
produces a temptation to abandon the current parity and deflate the portion of 
gross debt denominated in domestic currency. Hence, when the net government 
debt is in a certain critical range, the expectation of a devaluation produces higher 
interest rates and can make the devaluation happen. Also, it can be argued that 
the lower the amount of reserves the higher the probability that a negative shock 
to competitiveness will exhaust the remaining reserves, and hence, a small amount 
of reserves may trigger strategic behaviour by speculators, making it optimal for 
each of them to acquire as many international reserves as possible, which unchains 
the speculative attack. Therefore, increases in the stock of international reserves 
should decrease the likelihood of a sudden crisis.
The level o f public debt has been indicated as fertile ground for self-fulfilling 
speculative attacks and debt crisis by Calvo and Mendoza (1996), Sachs et al 
(1996a,b), Velasco (1996), and Cole and Kehoe (1996), because, as mentioned 
above, the higher the government debt the greater the temptation to deflate the 
portion of debt denominated in domestic currency. Also, Obstfeld (1994) has 
shown that the higher the level of public debt, the higher the costs in terms of 
interest payments when the domestic currency is attacked and hence the greater 
the probability that the government will prefer to renege on the existing exchange 
rate parity and relax its budget constraint by deflating the real debt service in order 
to avoid further increases of public debt and higher costs of financing. Therefore, 
we should expect a positive effect of increases in the ratio of public debt to GDP 
on the likelihood of a self-fulfilling devaluation.
A short maturity of public debt has been proposed by Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990) as a potential cause of sudden speculative attacks. These authors stress the 
fact that shorter maturities imply increasing borrowing needs in the near future 
that should be faced by either rolling over the existing debt at increasing interest 
rates or by expanding the domestic credit of the Central Bank, which implies 
the abandonment of the exchange rate parity. In their model, the interaction 
between the private sector’s expectations and the reaction of the government can 
lead to a self-fulfilling crisis by increasing the costs of rolling over public debt and
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forcing the government to resort to financing from the Central Bank. Therefore, 
we should expect a reduction in the average maturity of public debt to increase 
the probability of a crisis.
Calvo (1996c) and Calvo and Mendoza (1996) have argued that a precarious 
financial position of the banking system can make a sudden crisis more likely. The 
argument is that if the currency crisis passes through a bank run, in the sense 
that the domestic money that is exchanged for international reserves is withdrawn 
from the banking system, the expectation of domestic credit creation by the Cen­
tral Bank to support commercial banks produces the conditions for a self-fulfilling 
currency crisis. In this case, the abandonment of monetary discipline occurs be­
cause the Central Bank tries to avoid the credit squeeze and bankruptcies that 
would occur if the domestic credit to the banking system were not expanded. 
Hence, a precarious financial position of the banking system should increase the 
likelihood of a self-fulfilling crisis.1
The increase in the share of short term debt indexed to foreign currency has 
been suggested by many authors as one of the causes of the Mexican currency 
crisis. This argument has been best portrayed by Calvo and Mendoza (1996). 
They suggest that the increase of dollar indexed debt during 1994 reduced the net 
availability of reserves because in case o f a run on Mexican bonds, the Central Bank 
would need to spend international reserves to repurchase such a debt. Then, as 
the share of short term debt indexed to the dollar increased rapidly during 1994, 
the credibility of the peso came under serious doubts and this helped prepare 
the ground for a sudden crisis. Following their argument, we should expect to 
find a positive relationship between realignment expectations and the fraction of 
government debt indexed to the dollar.
Finally, it has been argued that the position o f the exchange rate within a 
currency band can reinforce speculative behaviour and increase the likelihood of 
a devaluation. Carainazza (1993) argues that the position of the exchange rate 
in the band may be interpreted as capturing the actual market sentiment or the 
credibility of the target zone -  this interpretation can be derived also from Bertola 
and Caballero (1992). Hence, the closer the exchange rate to the upper limit of
'This argument is similar to the central hypothesis of the so-called third-generation models 
for financial and currency crises that are commented below.
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the band the higher the probability of a realignment. Another reason to consider a 
positive effect of the position of the exchange rate within the band on realignment 
expectations is that since intervention is costly for the Central Bank in the sense 
of using a scarce resource to defend the parity, the prospect of costly intervention 
when the exchange rate is close to the upper limit may reinforce speculation -  
see Chen and Giovannini (1997). Hence, the higher the position of the nominal 
exchange rate in a currency band, the more likely should be a sudden speculative 
attack.
2.2.2 Third-generation models for financial and currency 
crises
The recent crises in East Asia have stressed the connection between banking and 
currency crises and the contagion of crises between countries (see, for instance, the 
collective volume edited by Agenor et al (1999)). And following these experiences, 
a third-generation of models for financial and currency crises has started to develop. 
These models are often based on the literature on bank runs initiated by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) and consider currency crises as part of broader crises rooted 
in the financial fragility of domestic financial systems. That is, third-generation 
models are not focused on speculative attacks, currency crises are considered a by­
product of a massive run of investors and creditors away from domestic financial 
assets, both financial and real estate. In the words of Paul Krugman (1998, p. 
73): ’’ The Asian story is really about a bubble in -  and subsequent collapse of 
-  asset values in general, with currency crises more a symptom than a cause” . 
Examples of this recent literature are: Chang and Velasco (1998), Goldfjan and 
Valdes (1997), Corsetti et al (1998) and Edison et al (2000).
This literature often focuses on the conditions that generate financial fragility, 
such as the mismatch of maturities, riskiness and currency denomination of the 
financial intermediaries’ assets and liabilities (especially the banking system), the 
problem of moral hazard in banking that emerges because of (explicit or implicit) 
deposit guarantees extended by governments, and the poor regulation of banking 
activities.
The economy portrayed in third-generation models is one in which an exag-
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gerated expansion of risky credit supported by capital inflows generates a phase 
of accelerated growth and a self-sustaining bubble in the prices of financial and 
housing assets that make the conditions of the economy appear sounder than it 
actually is. However, when a negative shock or contagion from another economy in 
trouble stops the flow of resources, the asset price bubble bursts, and a run away 
from the financial assets of the country is initiated and produces a currency crisis.
It is worth mentioning that some authors, as Jeanne (1999) and Chang and 
Velasco (1998), have suggested that existing second-generation models of currency 
crises can be extended to model the banking sector and, hence, there is no real 
need for a third-generation o f models. This idea can be illustrated with the models 
of Calvo (1996c) and Calvo and Mendoza (1996) mentioned above. These models 
have the same basic logic o f third-generation models in the sense that a fragile 
financial position of the banking system can result in a sudden self-fulfilling cur­
rency crisis because the bank run is transformed into a run away from the domestic 
currency when investors withdraw their resources.
In the empirical analysis of Chapters 3 and 5 we will consider a key variable 
reflecting the degree of fragility of the banking system. We use the share of non­
performing loans to total loans as a measure of the health o f the banking system 
and examine its relationship with the credibility of the peso. We expect to find a 
negative relationship between the fraction of non-performing loans to total loans 
and investors’ confidence on the peso, since, according to the arguments above, 
the more fragile the banking system the more likely a potential currency crisis.
2.3 Review of the empirical literature
We classify the empirical literature on currency crises into five categories. Our 
classification contrasts with the one contained in the extensive review of Kaminsky 
et al (1997) because they include papers presenting informal evidence to argue for 
the likely causes of some crises and ignore most recent papers that use the drift 
adjustment method to measure the credibility of currency bands, papers in the vein 
of second-generation models and other original works. We include these works and 
constrain the review only to papers containing econometric analysis.
The first category considers papers containing explorations of the behaviour of
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several economies before and after realignments and periods o f extreme pressure 
in the foreign exchange market that are aimed towards the identification of early 
warning signals of crises. The second category includes empirical applications of 
the conventional model o f balance of payments crisis in which the estimation of 
the probability of a devaluation plays the central role. The third category includes 
papers that use the so-called drift adjustment method to construct an indicator of 
realignment expectations for currency bands and relate them to the behaviour of 
macroeconomic fundamentals in order to look for the likely causes of realignments. 
The fourth category includes works that are close in spirit to second-generation 
models of currency crises and allow regime shifts in order to capture sudden changes 
in market sentiment. Finally, a less well-defined category includes studies that do 
not share a specific method but contain original approaches and interesting results.
Broad data explorations. In this category, we include the work of Eichengreen 
et al (1995)2 which uses macroeconomic data from 20 industrialized countries for 
the period 1959-1993 and an approach based on the event studies methodology 
to identify empirical regularities before and after crises, devaluations and other 
changes of exchange rate regimes. The final objective of their analysis is to look 
for early warning signals o f crises and devaluations by comparing the behaviour 
of a large set of macroeconomic variables two years before and after crises and 
devaluations with the one observed in periods of ‘tranquillity’ in which no changes 
in regime took place or there was no pressure in the foreign exchange market. The 
empirical regularities identified by the authors are that devaluations tend to occur 
after periods of expansionary monetary policy, wage and price inflation, deteriorat­
ing competitiveness, weak external accounts and increasing unemployment. The 
authors considered not only episodes of devaluation but also periods of confidence 
crisis that did not end in realignments, so they propose the construction of an index 
of pressure in the foreign exchange market. Their index is the weighted sum o f the 
changes in international reserves as a proportion of the monetary base, changes 
in the domestic-foreign interest rate differential and the rate of depreciation of 
the domestic currency. The weights given make equal the individual conditional 
volatilities of the three summed series, and reserve changes enter the index with a 
negative sign. Increases of the interest rate differential, reserve losses and a higher
2 A very similar analysis is found in Eichengreen et al (1994).
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price of the foreign currency produce increases of the index .Crises are identified as 
periods in which the index is above its mean by two or more standard deviations. 
The authors found that the signals before crises are similar to those of devaluations 
but the empirical regularities are weaker. Therefore, they find it more difficult to 
establish generalized facts about confidence crises.
The study of Kaminsky et al (1997) is also aimed at the identification of early 
warning signals of currency crises and considers both industrialized and developing 
countries. They propose monitoring several macroeconomic variables that tend to 
exhibit unusual behaviour (exceed a certain threshold) in a two-year period before 
currency crises. They also use an index of foreign exchange market pressure but 
this involves only the changes in reserves and the nominal depreciation of the 
domestic currency. Crises are identified as positive deviations of the index o f 
at least three standard deviations from its mean value. And signals of currency 
crises are identified as variations of macroeconomic variables that belong to the 
extreme percentiles of the individual distributions. For instance, if an observation 
of the rate o f growth of domestic credit inside the two years window is in the 
upper ten or twenty percent of its distribution, it is considered to be a signal. The 
optimal percentile fractions used to establish the thresholds for the macroeconomic 
variables considered were those rendering the lowest noise-to-signal ratio, that is 
the ones that minimize the fraction of misleading signals (those that were not 
followed by a crisis in the following two years) as a proportion of total signals. The 
results of their study indicate that real appreciation of the domestic currency is the 
most common and reliable signal of crises, followed at some distance by changes 
in the ratios of domestic credit and monetary aggregates to output, reductions in 
the rates of growth of output and exports, reserve losses, increases in the interest 
rate of domestic deposits and reductions in the ratio of international reserves to 
monetary aggregates such as M2.
The work of Frankel and Rose (1996) uses annual data for over a hundred 
developing countries and defines currency crashes as episodes in which there are 
depreciations of the domestic currency of at least 25 percent and the rate of de­
preciation increased at least 10 percent when compared to the one observed in 
the previous year.a First, they analysed the behaviour o f a set of macroeconomic
■‘The second criteria was introduced because there are some countries that suffered hyperin-
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variables in a period of three years before and after currency crashes using an event 
study methodology similar to the two papers mentioned above and then corrob­
orate their main results using a Probit model in which the data for all countries 
and periods was pooled and the regressand was a bivariate series indicating crises. 
Their results indicate that currency crashes tend to occur when there are reductions 
of foreign direct investment and reserves, the growth of domestic credit acceler­
ates, the domestic currency appreciates, interest rates in industrialized countries 
increase and output growth slows down.
Empirical works based on Krugman’s approach. The second category of em­
pirical literature includes works that have implemented the approach of first- 
generation models of currency crises and focus on modelling the shadow exchange 
rate in order to estimate the probability of this rate being equal to or above the 
official rate in the next period, which is equal to the probability of a speculative 
attack. Since the Mexican experience in recent decades has been a fertile ground 
for empirical applications o f this model, we consider here these studies.4
Blanco and Garber (1986) analysed the recurrent devaluations of the Mexi­
can peso in the period 1973-1982. The fundamental determining the path of the 
shadow exchange rate was modelled as a composite variable involving estimates of 
the money demand equation, and estimated paths for real income and domestic 
credit creation. They assumed a fixed devaluation rule (the theoretical floating 
exchange rate was multiplied by an arbitrary constant) and estimated the trigger 
level of reserves at which the fixed rate would be abandoned. The objective was 
to calculate three-month ahead expected exchange rates and the probability of a 
devaluation. Their work delivered probabilities o f devaluation that increased in 
advance of the major devaluations of September 1976, February and December 
1982. The probabilities estimated reached levels between 20 and 30 percent on the 
dates o f the devaluations and then vanished. Remarkably, the last two devaluations 
were out of the sample used to estimate the model. Also, their estimated expected 
exchange rates conditional on devaluation were close to the values observed.
flation and hence the first criteria was commonly met.
4Conolly and Fernandez (1987) used Mexican data as well but with a very short sample period 
in which no major devaluation ocurred. Conolly (1986) and Cumby and van Wijnbergen (1989) 
focus on Argentina and Otker and Pazarbasioglu (1997) present an application for European
currencies.
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Goldberg (1994) applied a similar model to Mexican data for the period 1980- 
1986. She expanded the list of determinants of the shadow exchange rate by 
including real exchange rate movements and foreign credit disturbances, and esti­
mated the model for a range of different threshold levels of international reserves. 
The computed one month ahead probabilities of devaluation reached very high 
levels in the months in which devaluations occurred, although some false signals 
were also produced. According to this study, domestic fiscal and monetary shocks 
determined the timing of speculative attacks on the Mexican peso in this period.
The application of the traditional model of balance of payments crises to Mex­
ican data of Melick (1996) covers the period 1975-1994 using monthly data and 
compares the ability of the model to predict earlier crises and the one of December 
1994. The results show probabilities of speculative attacks that track closely actual 
realignments in part of the sample. The model performs well up to the devaluation 
of July 1985, then shows a modest increase in the probability of realignment for 
the one observed in November 1987, and offers no signal for the devaluation of 
December 1994.
The author’s explanation for the failure of the model to predict the most recent 
crisis is that this experience differs in several aspects from the case portrayed in 
first-generation models of currency crises. First, the mechanism of reserve exhaus­
tion postulated in Krugman’s model was not present in the Mexican case since 
there was not a persistent fiscal deficit needing to be monetized and no continu­
ous reserve losses. Second, the conventional model does not take into account the 
possibility of sterilization of reserve losses and its effects in the case of an attack, 
something observed in Mexico during 1994. Third, the log-linear structure of the 
conventional model does not allow domestic credit to be negative, and in Mexico 
domestic credit was negative prior to the devaluation o f the peso. Hence, the au­
thor used a broader measure of ‘domestic credit’ that included the credit extended 
by official development banks to the private sector. And fourth, the conventional 
model is not able to take into account the effects of factors that played an im­
portant role in the Mexican crisis, such as the financial position of the banking 
system and unprecedented political instability. In sum, Melick concluded that the 
conventional model failed to predict the crisis of December 1994 because this was 
not a typical situation of inconsistent fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies.
Review o f the empirical literature 28
Otker and Pazarbasioglu (1997) also estimated a model with a sample contain­
ing the devaluation of December 1994. They estimated one-month ahead proba­
bilities of crises as a function economic fundamentals, and also made an analysis 
of the likely determinants of the timing of crises, which was represented by the 
length of the periods between devaluations. The method used incorporated an 
estimation of the probability of crises and survival analysis. Their results suggest 
that the level of international reserves in the Central Bank, output growth, real 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, inflation differentials and fiscal deficits or 
the expansion of domestic credit to the banking system significantly affected the 
likelihood of crises.5 And, on the other hand, they found that reductions in foreign 
reserves and increases in the share of dollar indexed debt as a fraction of short term 
debt were significant determinants of the timing of crises.6
Empirical studies on the credibility of currency bands. As a result of the pro­
liferation of currency bands in Europe and the wave of crises in 1992-93 it was 
necessary to design a method aimed at capturing the credibility of target zones. 
Bertola and Svensson (1993) and Svensson (1993) amended the original target zone 
model of Krugman (1991) and proposed such a method. The essence of the so- 
called drift adjustment method consists of subtracting the expected depreciation 
of the exchange rate inside the band from the domestic-foreign interest rate differ­
ential in order to obtain a series of the expected realignment of the central parity, 
which is used as the indicator of the credibility of the currency band. The drift 
adjustment method can be used with a double objective. On the one hand, the 
path of realignment expectations gives an account of the credibility o f the regime 
through time and allows us to identify if credibility was gradually eroded or sud­
denly lost (this is the only objective in Rose (1993) and Svensson (1993)). And, on 
the other hand, an investigation of the likely causes of crises can be conducted by
5 It is worth noting that the positive sign of the parameter corresponding to output growth is 
contrary to the one predicted by traditional models, so the authors argue that perhaps external 
balance considerations dominated the traditional money demand argument.
“Note that neither the share of dollar indexed debt nor the credit to the banking system are 
variables suggested by traditional models of currency crises, but they have been widely mentioned 
as particular features of the Mexican 1994 crisis. Hence, it seems that Otker and Pazarbasioglu 
introduced to obtain better results for the crisis of December 1994. These issues will be discussed 
in length in Section 3.5, where we compare their results with the evidence obtained in this work.
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studying the relationship between realignment expectations and macroeconomic 
fundamentals using econometric methods.
The most well known empirical analysis of the credibility of the currency bands 
of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism before its crisis is the one by Rose and 
Svensson (1994). They calculated realignment expectations for a set of European 
currencies and tried to relate them to the behaviour of macroeconomic fundamen­
tals in order to look for the causes of the crisis. Their results indicate that the 
credibility of the system varied considerably over time but there was no clear loss of 
confidence before the crisis of September 1992. They used both vector autoregres­
sion and regression analysis and found it difficult to identify significant and mean­
ingful relationships between realignment expectations and economic fundamentals. 
Among a large set of macroeconomic variables (all measured as differences with 
respect to Germany) only inflation, reserve changes and a measure of monetary 
independence (the standard deviation of the exchange rate within each month) 
showed a significant relationship with realignment expectations. These findings 
and the difficulties in finding meaningful relationships between fundamentals and 
realignment expectations carries on in others papers.7
Caramazza (1993) found that in addition to inflation differentials and changes 
in international reserves, export price competitiveness, unemployment, the govern­
ment financing requirements as fraction of GDP and the position o f the exchange 
rate inside the band have a significant relationship with realignment expectations 
in the case of the French franc. The role of the position of the exchange rate 
inside the band is confirmed by Thomas (1994) whose results render the unem­
ployment rate as not significant, although he found that labour costs relative to 
Germany are significant in the case of France and the ratio of public debt to GDP 
for Italy. The position of the exchange rate in the band is significant as well in the 
work of Chen and Giovannini (1997) who also found significant effects from other 
variables, such as the length of time since last realignment (the longer the period 
of time the less the expected realignment due to improved reputation) and the 
Basle-Nyborg agreements, which involved the establishment of a financial facility 
to support countries facing liquidity squeezes in the short term.
7 Except for the measure of monetary independence, which is commonly not considered in 
other papers.
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In sum, the empirical analysis of realignment expectations has found it difficult 
to unveil signals for incoming crises and a clear relationship between realignment 
expectations with macroeconomic fundamentals. Apart from inflation differentials, 
reserve changes and the position of the exchange rate inside the band, the set of 
significant variables seems to vary across countries and even across periods -  see 
Thomas (1994).
Empirical studies based on the approach of second-generation models. In the 
category of empirical works that are close in spirit to second-generation models of 
currency crises and allow shifts in regimes in order to capture sudden changes in 
investors’ expectations, we include the following.
Jeanne and Masson (2000) propose a model that explicitly allows for multiple 
equilibria in order to test for self-fulfilling elements in the episodes of speculation 
against the French franc in the period February 1987 - July 1993. They estimated 
a Markov-switching regression with constant transition probabilities in which the 
constant term, but not the slope coefficients, is allowed to change between two 
regimes, and the dependent variable is the probability of a realignment.8 The 
changes of the constant term are interpreted as shifts in market sentiment and the 
fundamentals they considered are the real exchange rate, the rate of unemploy­
ment and the trade balance. The results of the model with regime shifts yielded 
a better account of the episodes of speculation against the franc than a linear 
regression. Also, they found that the effects of the real exchange rate, the rate 
of unemployment and the trade balance as fraction of GDP on the probability of 
devaluation have the wrong signs and are not significant in the linear regression, 
but in the model with a switching constant term the same variables take the right 
sign and the rate of unemployment is significantly different from zero.
Jeanne (1997) presents a general theoretical model in which both fundamentals 
and changes in market sentiment have a role in the onset of a crisis and tests its 
implications using French data. In his model, the possibility of multiple equilibria 
arises due to bifurcation in the paths of fundamentals. The model is estimated 
using a Markov switching model with constant transition probabilities and some 
restrictions on the transition probabilities are imposed a priori in order to ensure
“The probability of a realignment was obtained using a series of expected realignment, ob­
tained using the drift-adjustment method, and assuming a constant rate of devaluation.
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sensible results. The dependent variable is the probability of devaluation (obtained 
as in Jeanne and Masson (2000)) and the macroeconomic fundamentals considered 
are the real exchange rate, the trade balance to GDP ratio and the rate of unem­
ployment. In order to test for self-fulfilling elements, he calculated a composite 
fundamental and the threshold level after which the fundamental produces mul­
tiple equilibria. According to his results, after 1992 there was a bifurcation of 
fundamentals and self-fulfilling elements in the periods of speculation against the 
franc. His estimation with regime shifts also describes better the credibility of the 
franc in the period 1992 than a linear regression.
Gomez-Puig and Montalvo (1997) applied the switching-regimes model to in­
terest rate differentials to obtain an alternative indicator of the credibility of the 
EMS. The authors estimated interest rate differentials of various European coun­
tries with respect to Germany as autoregressive processes of order one and allow 
the mean and the variance to shift between two alternative regimes. The au­
toregressive term is the same in both regimes and the transitions are governed 
by a Markov chain with constant transition probabilities. The authors interpret 
the prevalence of the regime with higher mean and variance as indicating lack of 
credibility, but did not attempt to relate interest rate differentials to macroeco­
nomic fundamentals. Their results show that few months before the realignments 
in the fall of 1992 the probability of the volatile regime increased considerably in 
the case of the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo and the Italian lira, and 
that for most European currencies the volatile regime prevailed after September 
1992 and disappeared after August 1993, when the width of the ERM bands were 
increased.
The work of Dahlquist and Gray (2000) presents a description of the behaviour 
of the short term interest rates of EMS currencies. They found that the volatility, 
the level and the speed of adjustment of the mean-re verting process generating 
short term rates were higher in periods of speculative attacks and crises. And 
when the transitions between regimes are modelled as depending on the interest 
rate differential with Germany and the position of the exchange rates inside their 
bands, the weight given to these series are larger in the regime of crisis.
Martinez-Peria (1999) also focused on the crises of the European Monetary 
System using switching-regime models. She pooled the data of various countries
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and estimated an autoregressive model of the percentage deviations of European 
currencies with respect to the German Mark, as well as a vector autoregressive 
model with regime switches for those deviations, changes in reserves and interest 
rates. Both models involved time-varying transition probabilities that depend on 
the growth of domestic credit, the ratio of imports to exports, the unemployment 
rate, the fiscal deficit, the reed exchange rate and expectations of exchange rates 
and interest rate differentials. Her estimations serve to identify the periods of tran­
quillity and crises, but are less successful in identifying the causes of shifts between 
regimes. According to her results, macroeconomic fundamentals and expectations 
determine jointly the likelihood of shifts the state of tranquillity to the state of 
crisis, but no single variable is individually significant, except for the fiscal deficit 
when dummies for country fixed effects are included.
Finally, Piard (1998) used an index o f pressure in the French foreign exchange 
market as the dependent variable and estimated Markov-switching models in which 
the transitions between the states of calm and crisis depend on macroeconomic 
fundamentals. She found that the effects of macroeconomic fundamentals on the 
transitions between regimes are asymmetric. The transition from the stable regime 
to the crisis regime was affected by unemployment, domestic inflation, competi­
tiveness, the trade balance and domestic industrial production, but the probability 
of staying in the crisis state appears to be insensitive to macroeconomic funda­
mentals.
Other interesting empirical works. In this category we include original works 
that do not share a common approach but present interesting results.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1997) start from the observation that many countries 
have had banking crises around the time of currency crises and hence their work 
investigates if these crises have common causes, and if they precede each other 
with a regular pattern. They analyse data for 6  industrialized countries and 15 
developing countries in a sample period including the beginning of the 1990s and 
the previous two decades. Currency crises are identified using an index of pressure 
in the foreign exchange market, and banking crises are identified on the basis of 
reports found in other studies or the specialized press about bank closures, mergers, 
and governmental takeovers, interventions and support programs in the banking 
industry. The method of analysis is similar to the event study methodology and
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signals approach used in Kaminsky et al (1997). The authors found that the set of 
empirical regularities observed before the two types of crises is rather similar: crises 
occur as the economy enters a recession after a boom in economic activity that 
was accompanied by real exchange rate appreciation, large capital inflows, slow 
export growth, worsening trade terms, reserve losses and expansion of monetary 
aggregates. Perhaps the most interesting results of their work are that, using 
probit models, they show that banking crises are significant in predicting balance of 
payments crisis and that financial liberalization helps to predict banking problems. 
They also identified a change in the profile o f currency crises over time: in the 
1970s, current account problems (real exchange rate overvaluation, worsening trade 
terms and low export growth) played the main role in predicting currency crises, 
while in the 1980s and 1990s capital account variables (mainly reserve losses) 
played the central role. Also, they found that the pattern o f precedence is more 
pronounced in recent times.
Another original work is that of Sachs et al (1996b) who focused on the effects 
of the Mexican crisis on other 20 emerging markets. The authors constructed an 
index of pressure in the foreign exchange market for several emerging countries 
and used panel data analysis to investigate the characteristics of the countries 
that suffered most the so-called Tequila effect. The index used is a weighted 
sum of nominal exchange rate and reserve changes between November 1994 and 
each month in the first half of 1995, and the weights in the index were given 
by the inverse of their respective standard deviations in the last 10 years. The 
fundamentals used to explain the strength o f the Tequila effect in each country are 
the real appreciation of the domestic currency and the growth of credit observed in 
the recent past. In order to allow for differentiated effects of those fundamentals in 
different countries, the authors attached dummy variables to those countries whose 
fundamentals were ‘weak’ (that is, the appreciation of their real exchange rates 
and the growth of the ratio of claims by banks and the monetary authorities on the 
private sector as fraction of GDP were in the extreme quartiles of the sample) and 
to those that showed the lowest ratios of international reserves to M2 in November 
1994 (a measure of reserve adequacy) .9 Their results show that countries with
IJThe growth of credit was taken as a proxy for the weakness the banking system under the 
argument that the higher the growth, the less able are the banks to monitor the quality of their
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overvalued currencies, weak banking systems and low reserve availability suffered 
more in the turmoil generated by the Mexican crisis. 10
Finally, Esquivel and Larrain (1998) estimated a Probit model with random 
effects using annual data of 30 countries for the period 1975-1996. Their results 
indicate that high rates of seigniorage, current account imbalances, real exchange 
rate appreciation, negative trade shocks, low output growth, low levels of reserves 
relative to monetary aggregates and a measure of regional contagion explain and 
predict well most o f the currency crises in the sample.
2.4 Summary and comments
In a very brief summary of the literature on currency crises, we can say that there 
are two main theoretical positions. The one associated to Krugman treats currency 
crises as the result of macroeconomic mismanagement, and the one associated 
to Obstfeld puts forward the idea of sudden shifts in speculators’ expectations 
that may result in a devaluation of an otherwise viable exchange rate parity. In 
the empirical field, there are many works and of most of them seem to adopt 
(explicitly or implicitly) the approach of first-generation models. Few empirical 
works are close in spirit to the approach of second-generation models, and these 
have focused on European experiences.
Our analysis of the collapse of the peso will share some features of the works 
just reviewed, but it will also present some new elements. We present an analysis 
of the credibility of the peso using a series of realignment expectations based on 
the drift adjustment method, linear methods and a non-linear Markov-switching 
regression in which we are interested not only in the shifts of credibility over time 
but also in the changes of the relationship between realignment expectations and 
macroeconomic fundamentals. We use a small theoretical model based on the 
escape clause approach to study some specific features of the Mexican experience
portfolios, and hence the weaker their financial situation.
"'The role of the financial position of the banking system is not a feature exclusive to emerging 
markets. The survey among foreign traders reported in Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1995) shows 
that around 69 percent of the traders surveyed considered the destabilizing effects of high interest 
rates on the banking system as important or very important factors in the decisions of some 
European central banks to stop defending their currencies in the crisis of September 1992.
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that, in contrast to other works, considers a consolidated government (involving 
the federal government and the Central Bank) and the effects of the currency 
composition of the public debt and the sources of the monetary base. And finally, 
we use mean-variance Markov-switching models to investigate the causes of the 
shifts of the Mexican economy between states of calm and crisis. In this work, we 
consider the effects of political factors, and also we present a two step approach 
aimed at overcoming some difficulties that may be found when using Markov- 




and the Collapse of the Peso
3.1 Introduction
This chapter participates in the debate about the characterization of the Mexican 
currency crisis of December 1994 as either a conventional currency crisis caused 
by bad fundamentals or a sudden crisis with self-fulfilling features.
More specifically, the issue we study is the following. On the one hand, if 
devaluation expectations were increasing gradually before the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso and their behaviour can be explained by the macroeconomic fun­
damentals that play the central role in first-generation models currency crises, 
interpretations of the devaluation of the peso a la Krugman can be preferred. On 
the other hand, if there was not a continuous loss of credibility of the exchange 
rate regime before its abandonment and the behaviour of realignment expectations 
show marked changes in credibility that can be related to variables of theoreti­
cal models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features, interpretations based on 
second-generation models may be preferred. We address this issue by means of 
the empirical analysis of realignment expectations and their relationship with the 
macroeconomic fundamentals that according to the theoretical models reviewed in 
Chapter 2 play the central role in the generation of currency crises.
36
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Our empirical analysis shares the features of some of the categories considered 
in the review of the empirical literature above. First, the credibility of the exchange 
rate regime in Mexico is measured using a series of realignment expectations based 
on the drift adjustment method because the exchange rate-based stabilisation pro­
gram implemented at the end of 1987 involved currency bands in certain periods. 
Second, we are interested in the relationship between realignment expectations and 
the macroeconomic fundamentals considered in models of currency crises in order 
to shed some light on the causes of the collapse of the peso. And third, we use 
a non-linear Markov switching model to study the shifts of credibility of the peso 
over time, and also the shifts in the relationship between realignment expectations 
and macroeconomic fundamentals. This Markov-switching regression with regime 
shifts encompasses the approach of first-generation models o f currency crises as a 
special case of no changes in regimes, and it also generalizes the model postulated 
by Jeanne and Masson (2000) because we allow not only the constant term, but 
also all the remaining coefficients to shift over time.
We find that before the collapse of the peso, the series o f realignment expecta­
tions does not show an upward trend and their relationship with macroeconomic 
fundamentals is not stable over time, which contradicts the predictions of the tra­
ditional speculative attack approach a la Krugman. Hence, we estimate a Markov- 
switching regression that allows for regime shifts in order to have a more detailed 
account of the credibility o f the peso and its relationship with other macroeconomic 
variables over time.
The results of the model with regime shifts shows that in the period 1988-1993 
the credibility o f the peso shifted between two equally persistent regimes of high 
and low credibility but tended to stay in one regime or another for long periods. 
And this alternation became erratic during 1994, a year marked by a series of 
political shocks and turmoil in the financial and foreign exchange markets. Sur­
prisingly, the period immediately before the devaluation o f the peso in December 
1994 belongs to the regime of relatively low realignment expectations and their 
behaviour was affected only by the changes in the international reserves held by 
the Central Bank.
Since neither the upward trend of realignment expectations before the deval­
uation of December 1994 nor the close relationship with economic fundamentals
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predicted by first-generation models of currency crisis is found to be present, we 
consider our evidence as counting against interpretations of the Mexican currency 
crisis based on the traditional speculative attack approach. Also, although our re­
sults do not constitute conclusive support an explanation o f the collapse of the peso 
based on the approach of second-generation models of currency crises, we consider 
the evidence of shifts in credibility over time as a suggestion that a framework 
that considers the interaction of speculators and economic authorities in an envi­
ronment marked by unpredictable shocks and changes in market sentiment may 
be more appropriate to explain the collapse of the peso.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the con­
struction o f the series of realignment expectations used, which is based on the drift 
adjustment method. Section 3.3 identifies the determinants of realignment expec­
tations. Section 3.4 presents a Markov-switching regression model that allows the 
construction of a detailed account of the behaviour o f realignment expectations 
over time, and the changes in their relationship with macroeconomic fundamen­
tals. Section 3.5 discusses the results obtained and compares them with those of 
other studies. Section 3.6 summarizes and concludes.
3.2 Measuring realignment expectations
A common measure o f the total expected depreciation o f the currency in a fixed 
or seini-fixed exchange rate regime is, under the assumption of uncovered inter­
est rate parity, the difference between the interest rates of financial instruments 
that differ only in their currency of denomination. For instance, in the case of 
European currencies the difference between the interest rates of eurodeposits or 
government bonds o f any country and Germany is commonly used. For Mexico, it 
would tempting to measure the expected depreciation o f the peso as the difference 
between the interest rates of peso denominated discount bonds issued by the Mex­
ican government and instruments issued by the US government denominated in 
dollars with similar maturity and characteristics. However, such a measure can be 
misleading since the Mexican debt is subject to a non-zero risk of repudiation and 
hence the interest rate differential involves both the expected rate of depreciation 
of the Mexican peso and a premium due to repudiation risk. Nevertheless, we can
Measuring realignment expectations 39
take advantage of the variety of instruments issued by the Mexican government in 
order to construct a measure of the expected depreciation of the peso that avoids 
such a problem.
The total expected depreciation of the Mexican peso will be identified ¿is the 
difference between the interest rates of Cetes, discount bonds issued by the Mexican 
government denominated in pesos, and other discount bonds issued by the Mexican 
government denominated in pesos as well but indexed to the dollar. Using this 
indicator and assuming that both instruments are subject to the same risk of 
repudiation we eliminate the default risk premium. 1
The dollar-indexed bonds ¿ire Pag¿lfes and Tesobonos. Pag¿lfes were indexed to 
the controlled exchange rate and Tesobonos were indexed to the market exchange 
rate. Nevertheless, the interest rates of Pagafes axe used in order to increase the 
sample considered and to take advantage of the fact that the controlled and market 
exchange rates deviated only slightly from €¿1011 other in the period in which the 
interest rates o f Pagafes ¿ire used (this is shown in Hoe and Rojas-Suaxez (1991)). 
The interest rate differential is calculated with annutil rates of three-month bonds 
divided by four, which yields the expected depreciation o f the peso in the following 
quarter. As explained below, these interest rate differentials will be adjusted in 
order to obtain the expected realignment of the peso, that is, the unannounced or 
unplanned expected change of the exchange rate in the next quarter.
We will correct the interest rate differential because of the different exchange 
rate regimes that prevailed in Mexico in the period studied, which covers the 
stabilisation program initiated in December 1987 and abandoned in December
1994. As shown in Table 3.1, there was a fixed exchange rate between weeks 10 
and 52 o f 1988, and three regimes of preannounced rates from week 1 of 1989 to 
week 45 of 1991. From week 46 of 1991 to week 51 of 1994 two peculiar exchange 
rate bands were announced, which involved a fixed floor and a crawling ceiling, 
but there w¿ls systematic intramarginal intervention.
For the periods of fixed and crawling rates, the expected realignment is ob-
'Both bonds are denominated in pesos, so there is no reason in principle to attach different 
default risks to them. That would not be case if instead of being indexed to the dollar, these 
instruments were denominated in dollars, in which case there could be a default risk related to 
the availability of reserves for repayment. Tesobonos were not paid in dollars until February
1995.
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Regime
Table 3.1: Exchange rate regimes 1988-1994 
Characteristics Period (weeks)
Fixed rate 88.10 - 88.52
Crawling peg Crawl: 0.001 pesos daily 89.01 - 90.21
Crawling peg Crawl: 0.0008 pesos daily 90.22 - 90.45
Crawling peg Crawl: 0.0004 pesos daily 90.46 - 91.45
Target Zone Fixed floor. Ceiling crawl: 0.0002 pesos daily 91.46 - 92.43
Target Zone Fixed floor. Ceiling crawl: 0.0004 pesos daily 92.44 - 94.51
Sources: Aspe (1993) and Schwartz (1994).
tained by subtracting the announced rate of depreciation from the interest rate 
differential.2
In the period of target zones there was systematic intramarginal intervention, as 
documented in Schwartz (1994). This is shown in Figure 3.1, which contains daily 
observations of the nominal exchange rate, the limits of the announced bands and 
the limits resulting from intramarginal intervention. As the policy of systematic 
intramarginal intervention was easily identified, in what follows the exchange rate 
bands resulting from such intervention are considered the relevant ones.
To calculate realignment expectations for the periods of exchange rate bands 
we use the drift adjustment method suggested in Svensson (1993) and Bertola and 
Svensson (1993) and decompose the total expected rate of change of the exchange 
rate into two terms, the expected depreciation within the band and the expected 
realignment of the central parity. We can express the log of the exchange rate 
within the band as st =  x t +  c(, where x t denotes the deviation of the log of 
the spot rate from the central parity and ct the log of the central parity. Hence, 
the expectation made at time t of the rate of change of the exchange rate in the 
following m periods is, assuming uncovered interest rate parity,
2This period includes 192 weekly observations; auctions of government bonds take place 
weekly. In this period there are 52 rates corresponding to three-month Tesobonos and 62 
rates of three-month Pagafes. For 78 observations the three-month interest rates of dollar 
indexed bonds were obtained by calculating an equivalent interest rate using the formula: 
im~12 =  (1 +  jm=“, )(>2/4) _  where m represents maturity in weeks, and tm=4 the available 
annual rate of one-month bonds divided by twelve; 25 of these 78 observations involve one-month 
Tesobonos.
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Figure 3.1: Exchange rate bands (weeks 91.46 - 94.51)
ip(m) -  id(m) =  Et [A *+m] =  Et [Act+m] +  Et [A*i+m] (3.1)
where is the interest rate of peso denominated bonds and id<-Tn^ is the interest 
rate o f dollar indexed bonds, both with maturity of m periods.
The expected realignment is obtained by subtracting from the interest rate dif­
ferential the expected depreciation of the exchange rate within the band, Et [Axi+m], 
which in turn is estimated using equation (3.2), where j  denotes the different target 
zones implemented, so that using this equation is tantamount to fitting individual 
regressions for each target zone.
x t + m  ~ x t =  a , +  7  ^ • x t +  6 j  ■ (ip(m) -  ¿d(m)) +  e t+ m  (3.2)
Three currency bands resulting from intramarginal intervention are identified 
in Figure 3.1: a band following the movements o f the exchange rate; a horizontal 
band; and a band with a fixed floor and a crawling ceiling. The database consists of 
163 weekly observations of the spot exchange rate, the centre of the intramarginal
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bands and the interest rate differential.3 Since the expected depreciation within 
the band is estimated under the assumption of no realignment, the weeks in which 
changes in the characteristics of the bands took place were eliminated, as well as 
the previous twelve observations, hence, 124 observations were available for the 
estimation o f equation (3.2) .4
The results of the estimation of the expected depreciation within the band are 
shown in Table 3.2 (after the elimination of insignificant variables) and indicate 
that there was strong mean reversion of the exchange rate in the three periods 
considered (7 i, 7 2 , 7 3 <  0 ), that in the period of the horizontal band higher interest 
rate differentials were associated with an appreciation of the peso (¿2  < 0 ), and 
that there is a positive constant in the period of the widening band (a3 > 0 ) .5
Finally, for the period in which the ceiling and the centre of the band were 
crawling, the announced rate of depreciation of the central parity is subtracted as 
well. That is, the expected realignment is:
Et [Act+m] =  -  id<"*>) -  A x t+m -  A c“+m (3.3)
where A xt+m denotes the estimated depreciation within the band and Ac“+mthe 
announced depreciation of the central parity.6
Joining the expected realignment for the crawling peg periods and the result of 
equation (3.3) for the periods of currency bands, we obtain the series of realignment 
expectations shown in Figure 3.2, in which we can observe the following features.
3Since the frequency of the data (weekly) is higher than the time horizon of the expectation 
(three months), the error term in (3.2) is correlated, so we used the the Newey-West (1987) 
method with truncation lag equal to 12 to obtain robust standard errors.
4 The additional twelve observations were eliminated in order to avoid using observations of 
the deviation of the exchange rate from the center of the band that belong to different target 
zones.
5 Note that the positive constant in the third period cannot be interpreted as due to the 
gradual depreciation of the central parity since we are estimating the expected change of the 
deviation with respect to the central parity. Also, note that we do not use a recursive estimation 
of the expected depreciation within the band, but we allow for different parameters in each band. 
This is, we assume that agents obtained a clear idea about the bahaviour of the exchange rate 
inside the band as soon as the central parity and the limits of the bands were identified.
6Bufman et al (1994) suggest this further correction for the case of bands with a crawling 
central parity.
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Table 3.2: Estimated expected depreciation within the band
Parameter Coefficient Standard errors and p-values
a  3 0.02718 0.00619 (0.000)
7 i -1.42872 0.18749 (0.000)
72 -1.27709 0.19221 (0.000)
73 -0.62005 0.15947 (0.000)
¿2 -0.08985 0.03043 (0.003)
124 Observations Adjusted R 2 0.678
Mean of dependent variable 0.007424 
Standard Error of Regression 0.011073 
F-Statistic 61.74 (0.000)
Standard errors obtained with the Newey-West (1987) method.
There was a considerable reduction of realignment expectations during 1988, which 
means that the stabilisation program and the exchange rate regime gained credi­
bility relatively quickly after its introduction. FYom the end of 1988 and until the 
end of 1993, there were periodic gains and losses of credibility. Realignment ex­
pectations varied considerably during 1989 and later credibility improved between 
1990 and until mid-1991. In the second half of 1992 and 1993 the credibility of 
the peso decreased. And at the end of 1993 and the beginning o f 1994 there were 
expectations of an appreciation of the peso. Realignment expectations became 
negative in this period because the exchange rate was on the floor o f the band and 
the interest rate differential decreased considerably. This unique and short episode 
was due to the effects of the approval of the North American Free Trade Agree­
ment (NAFTA) by the US Congress, which unchained a flow of foreign investment 
that was waiting for the approval. Finally, during 1994 realignment expectations 
varied considerably but, surprisingly, remained at low levels.
As it is evident from the plot of the series, the first important observation to 
be made is that the pattern of increasing realignment expectations predicted by 
first-generation models of currency crises is absent, and there seems to be marked 
changes in credibility during 1994, although this year shows mainly low realignment 
expectations.
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Figure 3.2: Expected realignment (three month horizon)
3.3 Realignment expectations and macroeconomic 
fundamentals
Once the measure o f realignment expectations has been constructed, our task is to 
identify the macroeconomic fundamentals determining their behaviour. The fre­
quency of the fundamentals that potentially determine realignment expectations is 
monthly, so the weekly observations in Figure 3.2 were averaged over each month. 
The fundamentals considered are those appearing in models o f exchange rate de­
termination, conventional models of speculative attacks and models for currency 
crises with self-fulfilling elements.7 The sample used contains monthly observations 
for the period May 1988 to November 1994.
The group o f variables associated with first-generation models includes the 
monthly rates o f growth of the monetary aggregate M2; output (approximated by
7In empirical applications of first generation models the probability of a devaluation is equal 
to the probability that the theoretical exchange rate under floating is equal to or exceeds the 
fixed rate. Hence, the list of potential determinants from models of exchange rate determina­
tion and conventional models is basically the same. Classical papers focusing on exchange rate 
determination are: Meese and Rogoff (1983), Meese (1990), and Meese and Rose (1991).
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the growth of the index of industrial production), OUT; the real exchange rate, 
RER;S monthly changes in the ratio of the six-month cumulated trade balance 
to industrial production, CTBO; the interest rate on three-month certificates of 
deposit in the US, CDUS; and the monthly changes in the ratio of public sector 
borrowing requirement to industrial production, PSBRO.
And the variables associated with models of self-fulfilling crises are the monthly 
changes in the rate of unemployment, UNE; the monthly rate of change of inter­
national reserves in the Central Bank, RES; monthly changes of the ratio of public 
debt to industrial production, PDO; monthly changes in the log of the average 
maturity of public debt, MAT; and the monthly changes of the share of short term 
government debt indexed to the dollar, SH. Finally, as a measure of the health of 
the banking system, we use the monthly changes in the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans, BL
The econometric methods used require the series to be stationary, hence, unit 
root tests were applied to the variables following the testing strategy proposed in 
Perron (1988). The model of equation (3.4), which contains a deterministic trend 
and p lags, was estimated for each series, and the hypothesis Ht : (pt — 1) =  0 was 
tested (test statistic r t ) . 9 The rejection of this hypothesis meant that there is not 
a unit root in the series. That was the case for most of the variables. And when 
the hypothesis Ht was not rejected, the hypothesis / / 3 : 7 , =  (pt — 1 ) =  0  was 
tested to check the validity of using a model without trend (test statistic 4>3).
p
AU( =  p t +  t'yt -I- (pt — l)K(-i -I- ^ 2  AVt-i +  £( (3.4)
t = i
As H3 was not rejected in any case, the hypothesis H? : pt =  7 ( =  (pt — 1) =  0 
was tested to check the validity of testing for a unit root in a model without 
trend term (test statistic <1*2), and provided H2 was not rejected, the hypothesis 
H,t : (pb — 1) =  0 was tested in model (3.5) (test statistic r M).ln
“The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the product of the price of dollars in terms of 
pesos and the index of consumer prices in the US on the index corresponding to Mexico. Hence, 
negative rates of growth denote appreciation of the peso.
IJThe number of lags was determined according to the minimum Akaike information criteria.
‘ "Testing H i  in model (3.4) is necessary because the critical values to test in model (3.5) 
are generated assuming that the constant term is zero.
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Table 3.3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
Test statistics
Variable Lags r t $ 3 <J>2 T n
Realignment expectations ER 15 -4.13**
Monetary aggregate M2 17 -3.05 4.89 3.34 -1.00
Output OUT 10 -4.36**
Real exchange rate RER 0 -6.58**
Trade Balance CTBO 8 -4.37**
Foreign interest rate CDUS 12 -0.78 5.58 3.76 -3.31*
Public deficit PSBRO 3 -8.78**
Unemployment UNE 10 -4.95**
International reserves RES 7 -2.71 5.80 3.93 -2.96*
Public debt PDO 0 -13.52**
Average maturity M AT 20 -3.55*
Non-performing loans BL 16 -3.51*
Dollar-indexed debt SH 5 -0.58 1.56 1.33 -0.32
* and ** denote significance at 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
AT) — pb +  (pb — 1 )V,_ 1  -l- y  '  AVi-j +  e t (3.5)
1=1
Table 3.3 shows that realignment expectations and their potential determinants 
are stationary series, with the exception of the rate o f growth of the monetary ag­
gregate (M2) and the share of indexed debt (SH) . 11 However, we will still consider 
M2 and SH in the empirical analysis since M2 has been found relevant in some 
of the papers reviewed in Chapter 2, and the share of short term debt indexed to 
the dollar has attracted considerable attention in the debate about the causes of 
the Mexican crisis (see, Calvo and Mendoza (1996) and Otker and Pazarbasioglu 
(1997)).
11 The presence of unit roots was also found in the rates of growth of the monetary base and 
Ml.
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The identification of the determinants of realignment expectations was con­
ducted by initially estimating a very general specification and then reducing it 
to obtain a parsimonious model. The initial regression considered three lags of 
the potential determinants and tests of zero cumulated effects were applied. As 
noted above, in the period November 1993 - March 1994, realignment expectations 
show negative values due to the approval of the NAFTA by the US Congress in 
November 1993, hence, five dummy variables were included in order to capture 
this unique one-off effect.
The time horizon of the expected realignment is one quarter and the frequency 
of the data is monthly, so the error term of the regression is serially correlated. 
For this reason the standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West (1987) 
method with three lags. The tests for cumulated effects are Wald tests, and the test 
statistics are distributed as a \2 with 1 degree o f freedom. Table 3.4 shows that 
the null of no cumulated effects is strongly rejected for the case of the changes 
in non-performing loans in the banking system and the sign of the effect is as 
expected. The hypothesis o f no cumulated effects is also rejected in the case of the 
fraction of short term debt denominated in dollars and changes in international 
reserves, but the sign of the cumulated effect of the fraction of indexed debt is 
contrary to expected. The hypothesis is not rejected for the case of changes of the 
real exchange rate and the foreign interest rate but the cumulated effects have the 
correct sign.
After insignificant variables were eliminated, we obtained a much more par­
simonious model in which the determinants of realignment expectations are the 
second lag of the changes in the real exchange rate, the first lag of the changes in 
international reserves and the second and third lags of the changes in the ratio of 
non-performing loans in the banking system, see Table 3.5. 12 That is, realignment 
expectations increased when there were problems in the banking system, when the 
peso appreciated in real terms and there were less international reserves to defend 
the peso.
The inclusion of the position of the exchange rate inside the band as an addi­
tional explanatory variable was attempted in this final model without good results.
12In the initial estimation, the variables with associated p-values of 10% or less were: R E R t - i ,  
P S B R O t - i ,  R E S t - i ,  M A T t - a ,  B L t —2,t—3 and S 2.
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M2 + 0.016 (0.898)
OUT + 0.074 (0.785)
RER - 1.728 (0.189)
CTBO + 1.197 (0.274)
CDUS + 1.776 (0.183)
PSBRO + 1.335 (0.248)
UNE - 0.181 (0.671)
RES - 3.106 (0.078)
PDO + 0.054 (0.816)
MAT + 0.012 (0.913)
BL + 6.606 (0 .0 1 0 )
SH - 2.830 (0.093)
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Table 3.5: Determinants of realignment expectations
Variable Coefficient Standard errors and p-values
Constant 0.02155 0.00222 (0.000)
RERf_2 -0.37727 0.15609 (0.018)
RES(_i -0.02022 0.01068 (0.063)
BL(_2 0.56668 0.22830 (0.015)
BL(_3 0.80334 0.28358 (0.006)
Nafta 93.11 -0.03115 0.00227 (0.000)
Nafta 93.12 -0.06085 0.00288 (0.000)
Nafta 93.01 -0.05844 0.00398 (0.000)
Nafta 94.02 -0.06653 0.00277 (0.000)
Nafta 94.03 -0.03146 0.00310 (0.000)
79 Observations R ?  0.630 Adjusted R 2 0.581
Mean of dependent variable 0.021081 
Standard error o f  regression 0.011608 
Log likelihood -245.28 F-Statistic 13.026 (0.000)
Test of functional form F (l, 68) 0.118 (0.732)
Test of normality o f  errors X2(2) 2.325 (0.313)
Test of parameter stability X2(5) 3.102 (0.684)
Tests of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of errors are redundant 
due to the use of Newey-West robust standard errors.
The series of the position o f the exchange rate inside the band contained the devi­
ation of the spot exchange rate from the central parity as a fraction of the width 
of the band for the periods o f  currency bands and zeros in the periods of predeter­
mined exchange rates. The ¿-ratio and p-value associated with contemporaneous 
observations of this variable were 0.662 and 0.42 respectively, and when one lag is 
used the values obtained were -0.495 and 0.66.
The significant effects o f the changes in the real exchange rate and international 
reserves is similar to that obtained by Rose and Svensson (1994) and others for the 
case of European currencies. The difference being that instead of real exchange 
rate appreciation, those authors identified inflation differentials as a significant
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Figure 3.3: Rolling constant coefficient
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determinant of realignment expectations. However, such a difference is immaterial 
if we consider that in our work the changes in the real exchange rate reflect mainly 
inflation differentials since the nominal exchange rate had only small variations.
The role of the changes in the ratio of non-performing loans in the bank­
ing system is something relatively innovative since only a few empirical exercises 
have considered this variable. The significant positive effect of the ratio of non­
performing loans to total loans on realignment expectations means that when the 
banking system is in trouble, the stability of the exchange rate may be in doubt 
because of the potential need of the Central Bank to abandon monetary discipline 
and expand domestic credit in order to support the banking system. As men­
tioned in the survey of the literature, the study of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1997) 
found that problems in the banking system help to predict balance of payments 
crises, and the work of Sachs et al (1996b) shows that countries with weak banking 
systems are more likely to succumb in periods of stress in their foreign exchange 
markets. 13
The test of parameter stability did not reject the null when the last 20 observa-
13 Moreover, the results in Table 3.5 are in general similar to the findings of these authors for 
the case of other emerging markets.
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Figure 3.4: Rolling coefficient of RER(-2)
Figure 3.5: Rolling coefficient of RES(-l)
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Figure 3.6: Rolling coefficient of BL(-2)
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tions were left out of the sample. However, the coefficients of the macroeconomic 
fundamentals seem to vary over time. This is shown in Figures 3.3 -  3.7 which con­
tain the plots of the rolling coefficients obtained with a window size of 12  months. 
As can be observed, the coefficients seem to experience changes at the beginning 
of 1991, in mid-1992 and at the end of 1993. And these variations seem to coincide 
with the changes in the level of realignment expectations observed in Figure 3.2 
above.
Given the changes of credibility over time and the instability of the regression 
coefficients, the next section is devoted to obtain a more accurate description of 
the changes in realignment expectations and the shifts in the relationship between 
realignment expectations and macroeconomic fundamentals.
3.4 A  Markov-switching model of realignment 
expectations
The analysis of the last section has permitted the identification of the determinants 
of realignment expectations using a linear model. And in this section, a further 
step is taken to analyse the behaviour of these expectations and their relationship 
with macroeconomic fundamentals by means of a non-linear Markov-switching 
regression model that allows shifts in regimes.
Regime-switching models have been applied in various fields of the economet­
ric literature, for instance, Dagsvik and Jovanovic (1994) used this approach to 
investigate if the Great Depression was the result of multiple equilibria and a 
coordination failure; Ruge-Murcia (1995) studied the changes in credibility after 
the introduction of stabilisation programs in Israel; Akram (1998) investigated if 
unemployment in Norway has shifted between multiple equilibria over time; and 
Driffill and Sola have applied models with regime shifts to study the deviations 
of stock prices from what is dictated by fundamentals (1998) and to test some 
hypotheses about the term structure of interest rates (1994).
However, although the number of empirical studies of currency crises using the 
approach of regime shifts has been growing recently, the literature is still scarce. 
Gomez-Puig and Montalvo (1997) applied the Markov-switching model to interest 
rate differentials in EMS countries with the only objective of obtaining an indicator
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of credibility, Dahlquist and Gray (2000) present a description of the behaviour of 
short term interest rates in EMS countries, and the works of Jeanne and Masson 
(2000), Piard (1998) and Jeanne (1997) have focused on the episodes of speculation 
against the French franc during the crisis o f the ERM in 1992-93.
We propose a Markov-switching regression to identify the dates of the shifts in 
the credibility of the peso and also the shifts in the parameters relating macroeco­
nomic fundamentals and realignment expectations. This model encompasses the 
analysis of the previous section as the special case of no shifts in regimes and gen­
eralizes the model of Jeanne and Masson (2000) by allowing not only the constant 
term but all the parameters of the regression to shift over time because we want 
to evaluate the effects of macroeconomic fundamentals on realignment expecta­
tions in the different regimes. Also, the model with regime shifts allows us to 
capture appropriately non-linear relations between realignment expectations and 
their determinants.
The method of estimation is the one pioneered by Hamilton (1996, 1994, 1993, 
and 1989), in which the transition between different regimes is assumed to be gov­
erned by a first order Markov chain and the transition probabilities are constant. 
We will allow the level of realignment expectations and their relationship with 
macroeconomic fundamentals to shift between two possible regimes or states over 
time. The regime prevailing at each date is not observable but can be inferred,
A Markov-switching regression model is characterized by the following param­
eters:
\Pij] =  [p(«t =  3 I st-1  =  »)]
Pu Pji =  1 ~ Pjj 
Pij =  1 — Pit Pjj
(3.6)
where yt represents the series of realignment expectations, x( is the vector of ex­
planatory variables (and includes a constant), is the vector of coefficients, st 14
14Detailed expositions of Markov-switching models can be found in Kim and Nelson (1999), 
Krolzig (1997) and Hamilton (1994).
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denotes the state prevailing at each date t, rr j is the variance of the error term of 
the regression in regime s, and is the matrix containing the probabilities of 
transition between regimes. The estimation is conducted using the EM algorithm, 
and the set of explanatory variables used is the same as in the previous section. 
The estimation and reduction of a general model containing all the potential deter­
minants of realignment expectations cannot be performed due to the large number 
of parameters that would be involved and the size of the sample.
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 3.6, and Figure 3.8 shows 
the filter and smoothed probabilities of Regime 1 prevailing at each date of the 
sample. The filter probability at date t is calculated using information up to that 
date, while the series of smoothed probabilities is calculated using the information 
of the entire sample. 15
Regime 1 corresponds to periods of relatively high realignment expectations, 
or low credibility, and the set of determinants in this regime is the same as in the 
linear regression. In this regime investors evaluated their prospects of a realignment 
taking into account the real appreciation of the peso observed in the recent past, the 
financial health of the banking system and the availability of reserves to defend the 
peso. Regime 2 corresponds to periods of high credibility. In this regime only the 
availability of international reserves matters when determining the expectations 
of a realignment. The error term in the regime o f high credibility shows a higher 
variance, meaning that this regime was more volatile. The two regimes are almost 
equally persistent according to the estimated transition probabilities. The period 
of time the economy was expected to stay in the regime of low credibility is ( 1 /( 1  — 
0.863)) =  7 months, and the average time spent in the regime of high credibility 
is (1/(1 — 0.876)) =  8  months. And given that the inferred transition probabilities 
are very similar, the unconditional probabilities o f finding each regime in any date 
in the sample are similar as well: 7ri =  0.475, and rr2 =  0.525.
In order to test the validity of the estimation assuming two regimes, some 
specification tests were conducted, as recommended in Hamilton (1996). The
15 In the estimation of the regression with regime shifts the dummy variables for the outliers 
related to the approval of NAFTA cannot be series valued only in a single observation since in 
that case the standard errors (calculated with the average outer product estimator) could not be 
calculated. Hence the variable Nafta refers to a dummy with value of one in the period 1993.11
- 1994.03 and zeros elsewhere.
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Table 3.6: Estimates of Markov-switching regression
Regime 1 Regime 2
Standard errors Standard errors
Coefficient and p-values Coefficient and p-values
Constant 0.02751 0.00144 [0.00096] 0.01880 0.00183 [0.00201]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RER(_2 -0.64741 0.06798 [0.08428] 0.21715 0.19393 [0.13778]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.267) (0.119)
RES(_! -0.01478 0.00817 [0.00532] -0.05637 0.01163 [0.02097]
(0.075) (0.007) (0.000) (0.009)
BL(_2 0.55530 0.23092 [0.25265] -0.53057 0.75995 [0.44277]
(0.019) (0.031) (0.487) (0.234)
BLì-3 0.55532 0.30245 [0.20974] -0.03781 0.70769 [0.24141]
(0.071) (0.010) (0.957) (0.873)
Nafta -0.06946 0.00553 [0.00257] -0.02213 0.01581 [0.00248]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.000)
0.00004 0.00001 [0.00001] 0.00006 0.00001 [0.00002]
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Pu 0.863 0.072 [0.048] 0.876 0.078 [0.038]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log likelihood -113.09
The vector of coefficients, rrf and p „  are as in (6.1).
White (1982) robust standard errors in brackets.
Nafta refers to a dummy unit value in the period 1993.11 - 1994.03.
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Figure 3.8: Regime 1. Filter and smoothed probabilities.
results are found in Table 3.7. To test if a specification with three regimes instead 
of two is needed, the Andrews (1993) test for parameter stability was performed. 
This test is nonstandard since the potentially missing parameters are present only 
under the alternative hypothesis. The number o f potentially missing parameters 
is at least six: four transition probabilities, a coefficient for the recursive dummy 
variable involved in the test and the variance of the error term in the third regime. 
Critical values for this test can be found in Andrews (1993), and the p-value is 
obtained as proposed by Hansen (1997).16 According to this test, there is no 
evidence that a third regime is needed. The other specification tests indicate 
that there is no serial correlation in the residual, but there is evidence of ARCH 
effects, and a closer look reveals that these effects are present in the error term of 
regime 2. The rejection of the null of no ARCH effects make it necessary to use 
standard errors that are robust to specification problems. Hence, robust standard 
errors were calculated as proposed by White (1982), and they are shown in square 
brackets in Table 3.6. The results of the estimation do not change when the robust
" ’ In Andrews (1993), use Table I, entries p  =  6, 7To =  0.15. And for the p-value use formula 
(8) and the values in Table 2 of Hansen (1997) corresponding to m =  6 and rro =  0.15; r/ was 
taken as 10.
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Table 3.7: Specification tests
Andrews test 11.278 (0.617)
X2 (l)  F (l,64 )
Correlated errors 0.068 (0.794) 0.054 (0.823)
ARCH effects:
in both regimes 








standard errors are used to judge the significance of the parameters estimated.
Figure 3.8 shows the filter and smoothed probabilities o f Regime 1 prevailing at 
each date in the sample. We can observe that the period 1988-1993 was character­
ized by an alternation between periods of low and high credibility, but the regimes 
were quite persistent. Realignment expectations fell from very high levels after the 
introduction of the stabilisation plan at the end of 1987. Nevertheless, confidence 
was rapidly eroded and from mid 1989 and until the end of 1990 the regime of low 
credibility prevailed. Credibility was recovered between the end of 1990 and mid 
1992, but afterwards realignment expectations returned to relatively high levels 
during most of 1993. The year 1994 shows quite dramatic changes in credibility. 
And, although the effects of the approval of the NAFTA and its modelling with a 
dummy variable may have produced probabilities for the last two months of 1993 
and the first quarter of 1994 that do not support an interpretation, it is clear that 
the alternation of the two regimes was much more frequent in this year, which 
reflects the political and financial turbulence observed.
The probability of the volatile regime jumps upwards in April and May, then 
drops in June, reaches a peak in August and falls again. At the end of the sample, 
the probability of the regime of high realignment expectations takes negligible 
values. That is, the regime of relative high credibility was prevailing in the months 
immediately before the collapse of the peso, and realignment expectations were 
affected only by the changes in the international reserves held by the Central 
Bank.
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3.5 Discussion of results
The results obtained in the previous section point in the same direction as those 
obtained by Melick (1996) in terms of the ability of the speculative attack approach 
to explain the collapse of the peso. As mentioned in section 2.3, this author 
found that his application of the traditional model of balance of payments crisis to 
Mexican data is not able to predict the crisis of December 1994. In contrast, we find 
no evidence of an upward trend of realignment expectations before the devaluation 
of the peso and they are not closely linked to the economic fundamentals stressed 
in traditional models of speculative attacks.
The results of Otker and Pazarbasioglu (1997), at first glance, appear to con­
tradict the evidence of both Melick (1996) and sections 3.3 and 3.4, however, a 
closer look at their results reveals points of coincidence. Otker and Pazarbasioglu 
report that when the fiscal deficit is used as one of the determinants of the like­
lihood of crises, their results are rather poor for the crisis of December 1994 (the 
probability of a crisis is only 1 0  percent), but if the fiscal variable is substituted by 
the Central Bank’s domestic credit to the banking system, the performance of the 
model is much better (the probability of a devaluation increases to 70 percent). 
Hence, t aking into account the policy of sterilisation of reserve changes followed by 
the Mexican Central Bank during 1994 (see Banco de Mexico (1995) and Mancera 
(1995)) we can argue that the extension of domestic credit to the banking system 
in 1994 may be considered a variable reflecting shocks to reserves instead of de­
liberate increases of domestic credit to finance fiscal deficits. Figure 3.9 shows the 
policy of sterilization followed by the Mexican Central Bank. As can be observed, 
the accumulation of international reserves that began in early 1990 was accompa­
nied by a reduction of the domestic credit of the Central Bank, and the sudden 
reserve losses observed after March 1994 were accompanied by equivalent changes 
in domestic credit. 17 That is, the significance of the credit to the banking system 
in the work of Otker and Pazarbasioglu can be interpreted as the counterpart of 
the significant effects of the changes in international reserves in determining the 
likelihood of a crisis. In fact, this argument can explain why the estimated coef-
17 Sterilization during 1994 took the form of credit to the banking system and the credit to the 
public sector remained almost unchanged.
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ficient for international reserves decreased by about 2 0  percent when the authors 
used the credit to the banking system in place of the public sector deficit.
Figure 3.9: Monetary base (billions of pesos)
With respect to the significance of the share of dollar indexed debt in total 
short term government debt as a determinant of the timing of crises (the length 
of the period since the last devaluation), we can consider that it is likely that 
this variable is acting as a sort o f dummy for the devaluation of 1994. As can be 
observed in Figure 3.10, during 1994 the share of short-term debt indexed to the 
dollar (one and three month government bonds) increased considerably and it was 
negligible in previous years. It shows a sustained upward trend in 1994 and hence 
it is likely to be significant in duration models. In our estimations, changes in the 
share of dollar indexed government bonds did not affect realignment expectations 
or have an effect contrary to expected.
Therefore, if we disregard the significance of output growth in the results of 
Ot.ker and Pazarbasioglu (because it has a sign contrary to expected), if we consider 
the significance of the domestic credit extended to the banking system as the 
counterpart of the significance o f the changes in international reserves, and consider 
the inclusion of the share of dollar indexed debt as an ad-hoc modification, we are 
left with the conclusion that the determinants of the probability of a currency crisis
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Figure 3.10: Share of short-term bonds indexed to the dollar
in Mexico after 1991 were the real appreciation of the peso and the availability 
of international reserves. This is compatible with the empirical evidence we have 
found.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have constructed a measure of realignment expectations based on 
the drift adjustment method, analysed its behaviour over time, and investigated 
its relationship with the macroeconomic fundamentals considered in models of 
currency crises.
Contrary to the predictions of first-generation models, we found that credibility 
did not deteriorate steadily before the collapse of the peso in December 1994. 
Actually, the level of realignment expectations in the montlis immediately before 
the devaluation was relatively low when compared to that observed in previous 
periods.
Using linear methods, the set of variables determining realignment expecta­
tions in the period considered was found to be similar to those identified for other 
countries with respect to the real exchange rate (which reflects mainly inflation
Conclusions 62
differentials) and the changes in international reserves held by the Central Bank. 
An innovative finding is that the health of the banking system was a significant 
determinant of realignment expectations. However, the relationship between re­
alignment expectations and its determinants is not stable, according to the results 
of rolling estimations. Hence, we postulated a Markov-switching regression model 
that allows shifts in regimes.
We found that the credibility of the peso shifted between two equally persistent 
regimes of high and low credibility, and before 1994 it tended to stay in one regime 
or another for long periods. However, in 1994 the turbulence in Mexican financial 
markets resulted in dramatic regime shifts. The credibility of the peso varied 
markedly during 1994, but in the months immediately before the devaluation of the 
peso, realignment expectations belonged to the regime of relatively high credibility. 
In the periods of low credibility, realignment expectations were determined by the 
changes in the international reserves available to defend the exchange rate, the 
real appreciation of the peso observed in the recent past, and the conditions of the 
banking system. And in periods of relatively high credibility the expectations of 
a realignment were linked only to changes in international reserves.
The instability of the relationship between realignment expectations and their 
determinants, and the results of the Markov-switching model indicate that the 
pattern of a tight relationship between realignment expectations and the macros 
conomic fundamentals predicted by first-generation models of currency crises is 
absent. FYom the set of economic fundamentals stressed by those models, only the 
real exchange rate plays a role in the determination of realignment expectations 
in certain periods, but fiscal deficits, money supply, output growth and the trade 
balance do not show a systematic relation with realignment expectations.
Since neither the pattern nor the relationship of realignment expectations with 
the macroeconomic variables stressed by first-generation models of currency crises 
is present, we consider that there is no empirical support for an interpretation of 
the collapse of the peso based on the traditional model of balance of payments 
crises a la Krugman.
The results of the Markov-switching regression show that the credibility of the 
peso shifted over time between regimes of high and low high credibility and that 
during 1994 those shifts in credibility were much more marked. We consider this
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frequent alternation of regimes as a suggestion to study the collapse of the peso 
using the approach of second-generation models o f currency crises. However, we do 
not regard our results as conclusive about the causes of the currency crises because 
immediately before the devaluation of the peso realignment expectations belonged 
to the regime of high credibility and were affected only by international reserves, 
a result that does not allow us to argue for a particular cause of the collapse of 
the peso.
In sum, the absence of evidence in favour of an interpretation of the collapse of 
the peso based on the speculative attack approach a la Krugman and the finding 
that, credibility shifted over time and these shifts were more pronounced during the 
troubled 1994, leads us to conclude that a sensible interpretation of the Mexican 
currency crisis may be based on the theoretical framework of second-generation 
models o f currency crises. Such an approach will allow us to consider the effects of 
the abnormal political events that occurred in Mexico during 1994 on the decisions 
of both investors and policymakers, and analyse the results of their interaction on 
the viability of the exchange rate regime.
Chapter 4
Government Finance, Multiple 
Equilibria and Currency Crises
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a model in which the interaction of speculators’ expectations 
and government’s optimal decisions can produce multiple equilibria in the foreign 
exchange market, and a self-fulfilling currency crisis may occur as the result of 
sudden changes in investors’ expectations because the optimal decision of the pol­
icymaker is to validate those expectations and alleviate its budget constraint by 
deflating the public debt denominated in domestic currency.
This model allows us to discuss some features that are specific to the Mexican 
experience in 1994, as the effects of the reaction of the economic authorities to the 
periods of confidence crisis that preceded the devaluation of the peso in December 
1994. In particular, we analyse the effects of the substitution of peso denominated 
assets for dollar denominated and dollar indexed assets in investors’ portfolios that 
occurred before the collapse of the peso.
Our model is based on the work of Obstfeld (1994) but we consider a consoli­
dated government that involves the central government and the Central Bank, an 
interest rate elastic money demand, the maturity structure of public debt, and 
the currency composition of this debt and the sources of the monetary base. The 




Based on our model, we suggest the following account of the events experienced 
by the Mexican economy during 1994 that finally led to the devaluation of the 
peso on December 21st. The level of public debt, its short maturity and possibly 
political conditions might have put the economy in a situation in which a self- 
fulfilling crisis was possible, and the political shocks that produced periods of 
confidence crisis during 1994 repeatedly threatened to coordinate expectations in 
an equilibrium with devaluation. These periods of confidence crisis were resisted 
without increases in domestic interest rates by means of massive substitutions of 
peso denominated assets for dollar denominated and indexed assets in investors’ 
portfolios. However, at the same time, the substitution of assets increased the 
depreciation rate in the equilibrium with devaluation. And the sterilisation of 
reserve losses made it more difficult to eliminate a potential self-fulfilling crisis. 
The collapse of the peso occurred when the resource of asset substitution was 
exhausted and the market coordinated in the equilibrium with devaluation at the 
end of the year.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we set up the 
model. Its equilibria and the possibility of self-fulfilling currency crises are dis­
cussed in section 4.3. In section 4.4 we study some means to avoid self-fulfilling 
crises. Section 4.5 focuses on the particular features of the Mexican experience. 
And section 4.6 presents the conclusions and final comments.
4.2 The model
The model focuses on the interaction of an optimizing consolidated government, 
that includes the central government and the Central Bank, and private investors 
in a two period setting. We assume that no devaluation occurs in period 1, so that 
the domestic nominal interest rate (i) is equal to the international interest rate 
(T) in this period, and focus on the conditions in which a self-fulfilling crisis may 
occur in period 2. Also, we assume that purchasing power parity holds, and hence 
the exchange rate, et, can be equated to the price level, pt, in any period: et =  pt.
The central government enters period 1 with total nominal liabilities, including 
interest payments, equal to D. A fraction 7  o f these liabilities is short term debt 
and is due in period 1 , and the rest is long term debt that will be due in period 2
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(a higher 7  means a shorter average maturity of debt). Real government spending, 
g, is the same in both periods. The central government taxes real output, y, in 
each period at the rate r t, and real output is assumed constant. The tax rate of 
period 1 , 1 7 , is given, so that decisions about the tax rate concern only the second 
period.
We consider a consolidated government, hence we include among its sources of 
revenues the interest earnings obtained from the international assets held by the 
Central Bank and the domestic credit extended to the banking system. Also, we 
assume that the operating cost of the Central Bank is zero and it does not extend 
credit to the central government.
The cash flow constraint of the consolidated government in nominal terms 
in period 1 is expressed in equation (4.1), where N T represents the total issues 
of debt in period 1 that will be repaid in period 2 . 7 D  is the nominal debt 
service in period 1 , ei is the price of foreign currency in period 1 , g is the public 
spending in real terms, and T\ye\ represents nominal tax revenues. We use a 
Cagan type real money demand function that increases with output and decreases 
with the nominal interest rate. The Central Bank charges the domestic nominal 
interest rate to the domestic credit granted to the banking system and receives the 
international interest rate from international reserves. Then, since the domestic 
interest rate is equal to the international interest rate in the first period, the term 
eiim(ky exp(—6im) in equation (4.1) represents the total nominal interest revenues 
that the Central Bank obtains from the sources of the monetary base.
N T =  7 Z? +  e xg -  Tiyei -  i*(ta/exp(-<5i*))ei (4.1)
We express the total nominal liabilities of the central government as a fraction 
of nominal output as i), that is, D =  gye\. And the composition of the debt issued 
in period 1 is as follows. A fraction /  of the debt issued is indexed to the foreign 
currency and yields the international interest rate, while the fraction (1  — / )  is 
denominated in domestic currency and pays the domestic interest rate, i. Then, 
we denote /  * N T =  T  and (1 — f )  * N T — N d.
The cash flow of the consolidated government in real terms in period 1 is:
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(1 -  f )  * nT +  f  * n T =  nd +  t =  7W  +  5 -  i*(fcy e x p (-6 f*)) -  TXy (4.2)
where iii is the value of the international assets held by the Central Bank expressed 
in foreign currency and C  is the amount of nominal domestic credit granted to the 
banking system.
Monetary policy is implemented by means of open market operations involv­
ing international assets, so that if the domestic credit remains constant between 
periods 1 and 2, any change in the value of the international assets held by the Cen­
tral Bank expressed in domestic currency results from changes in the real money 
demand and the exchange rate.
In period 2 the government has to finance the debt service and public expen­
diture in nominal terms with the following sources of income: taxes on output, 
the increase in the nominal money holdings of the private sector, and the interest 
earnings obtained from international reserves and domestic credit. Therefore, the 
cash flow constraint of the consolidated government in period 2  in nominal terins 
is as in equation (4.4).
tional reserves in foreign currency in period 2 as R2e2 =  e2rn2 — C, hence equation
(4.4) can be rewritten as:
where nT =  nd =  t =  J ,  and 7771/ =  denote real magnitudes. 
The nominal money demand in period 1 can be written as:
(ky exp(—6i*))ei =  R\ei +  C (4.3)
<e2(l -I- i*) -I- Nd( 1 +  i) +  (1 -  7 )r]yei +  e2g =
(4.4)
We can write the real money demand in periods 1 and 2 as: mi =  exp^. and 
m2 =  e^ it, respectively, and express the domestic value of the stock of interna­
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te2( 1 +  i*) +  nde i ( l  +  i) +  (1  -  7 )vyei +  ¿29 =
e2r 2y +  e2m2 — eimi +  j*(e2m 2 — C) +  iC  (4.5)
Now we introduce a definition that will allow us to obtain a meaningful expres­
sion of the cash flow constraint of the government in period 2 , and an assumption 
that summarizes the behaviour of speculators. The rate of depreciation of the 
domestic currency is defined as the change in the exchange rate between periods 
1 and 2 divided by the exchange rate of period 2, as in equation (4.6) . 1
£ - e2 ~  e l 
e2
(4.6)
And we assume that rational risk neutral investors require uncovered interest rate 
parity to hold, that is,
l +  i =  (1 -H *)(1  +  7t) =  y t L  (4.7)
where n is the rate of growth of prices between periods 1 and 2 , and £ is as above. 
Hence, the depreciation rate implied by the interest rate parity condition is:
£  =  1 —
1 +  i* 
1 -H
(4.8)
The cash flow constraint of the government in real terms in period 2 is:
t (l +  i*) +  (1 -  e)(n d( 1 +  i) +  (1 -  7 )TO) + 9  =





'Similar definitions of the depreciation rate are used in Obstfeld (1997), Herrendorf (1997), 
and Calvo (1996a).
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where (1 — e) =  ^ , and it can be called the ‘depreciation factor’ , it represents the 
share of debt that is not repudiated through inflation (Calvo (1996a)).
Finally, we define the fraction of the monetary base backed by domestic credit 
in period l a s i o  =  and rewrite the last equation as:
nd(l +  i) +  (1 — 7)77 y +  i ( l  +  i*) +  g =
r 2y +  e [nd(l 4- i) +  (1 -  7 )772/] +  (1 -  e)mi +  (1 +  i*)m2 +  (i -  i*)(l -  e)wmi
(4.10)
The left hand side of (4.10) represents total real spending in period 2, which 
includes the real service payments of the public debt denominated in domestic 
currency, the service of the debt indexed to the foreign currency and the constant 
real expenditure. The right hand side includes real taxes on output in period 2 
and total seigniorage revenues. Total seigniorage revenues means, as in Herrendorf 
(1997), the sum of all sources of real revenues for the consolidated public sector 
resulting from the monopoly to issue money. It includes the depreciation of the 
real service of public debt denominated in domestic currency, the change in real 
money demand, the depreciation of the real balances carried by the private sector 
from period 1 to 2, the international interest rate times all the assets of the Central 
Bank (since domestic credit pays at least the international interest rate), and the 
excess of the domestic interest rate over the international interest rate times the 
real value of the domestic credit granted to the banking system.
The government determines the tax rate and the rate of depreciation of the 
domestic currency for period 2  by minimizing the social loss produced by these 
taxes subject to its real cash flow constraint. The social loss function is quadratic 
in both the tax rate and the depreciation rate, as in equation (4.11) where 0 
represents the relative importance given to the depreciation rate in the preferences 
of the government; that is, 9 indicates the degree of conservatism of the government 
with respect to inflation.2
2 At this point, it is clear that the present model, as well as the ones mentioned in the intro­
duction, could be considered in some extent as belonging to the literature on optimal taxation. A
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(4.11)
Acting with full discretion, the optimal depreciation and tax rates from the 
viewpoint of the government are determined by equations (4.12) and (4.13), where 
I =  (1 +  i) and /* =  (1  4 - im) are the domestic and international interest factors, 
respectively. These two equations are the reaction functions of the government.
Equation (4.12) represents the optimal depreciation rate as a function o f the 
nominal interest rate given the total public debt as a fraction of output, the matu­
rity structure and currency composition of this debt, and the currency composition 
of the monetary base.
The equilibria of the model is determined where the depreciation rate implied 
by the interest rate parity condition (equation 4.8) is equal to the optimal de­
preciation for the government (equation 4.12). The equilibria are shown in figure
4.1 in the (i,e) plane. In the figure, the vertical axis measures the depreciation 
rate, the horizontal axis measures the nominal interest rate, the grey line shows 
equation (4.8), and the black one corresponds to equation (4.12). Figure 4.1 was 
obtained with the following parameter values: y =  1.3, k =  0.1, 6 =  0.8, 7 =  0.9, 
/  =  0.2, 77 =  0.6, w — 0.1, g =  0.0, r  =  0.1, t* =  0.04 and 0 =  1.2. These 
values are intended to describe the conditions of an economy that resembles what 
was observed in Mexico at the beginning of 1994: the debt to output ratio was
[fn l  +  (1 -  7 )yy +  m i ( l - ( i -  7*)rn)]
[ fn l  +  (1 — 7)73/ +  mi(l — (i — i*)tt)]2 +  Oy2
[fn l  +  7733/ +  mi ( l  — (» — i*)w) + t r + g -  m2(l +  i*)] (4.12)
6y [ fn l  +  (1 — 7 )777/ +  77^(1 — (i — i')w ) +  tT  4- g — 77i2(l +  i*)] 
[ fn l  +  (1 — 7 )777/ +  T7i i ( l  — (i — i*)7ij)]2 +  Oy2
(4.13)
survey on optimal seigniorage collection can be found in Herrendorf (1997), and a model focusing 
on seigniorage and inflation in which there may be multiple equilibria can be found in Obstfeld
(1997).
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considered as relatively low, the public debt had a short average maturity, most of 
the monetary base was backed by international reserves and only a small fraction 
of the public debt was indexed to foreign currency. Later, we will modify these 
parameters to describe the developments observed in Mexico during 1994.
4.3 Equilibria and self-fulfilling crises
Figure 4.1 shows that there are two equilibria in the model, one with low expected 
depreciation and interest rates and another with a higher expected depreciation 
accompanied by a higher nominal interest rate. Two features of the equilibria are 
worth noting. The equilibria are self-fulfilling: once the market has settled in one of 
the two equilibria the government will necessarily validate investors’ expectations. 
And the model per-se says nothing about which equilibrium will be chosen by the 
private sector: the coordination of market expectations in one of the two equilibria 
depends on sunspots or unpredictable exogenous news.
Figure 4.2 shows the value of the loss function (on the vertical axis) for differ­
ent interest rates (on the horizontal axis). The grey line shows the value of the 
loss function that is obtained when the government acts with full discretion when 
determining the depreciation and tax rates. The thin black line shows the loss 
function that would be obtained if the government would be able to pre-commit 
itself to maintain a zero depreciation rate and to act only on the tax rate. Compar­
ing these two curves we can observe that there is a time consistency problem. The 
private sector will not believe a government’s announcement of a zero depreciation 
rate because in that case the government will act with discretion and set a positive 
rate of depreciation (and taxes) given that the loss under discretion is less that the 
loss under pre-commitment for any interest rate. Pre-commitment is not credible 
and the private sector will not expect a zero depreciation rate, but one of the two 
depreciation rates that imply equilibrium in Figure 4.1. Which of the two interest 
rates will be chosen depends on sunspots or exogenous news.
The thick black line in Figure 4.2 shows the value of the loss function when a 
depreciation of the domestic currency implies a fixed cost Z which is added to the 
loss of the government. This fixed cost represents a political punishment in terms 
of loss of credibility or reputation; in the figure Z  =  0.2. As can be observed,
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if the market coordinates in the low depreciation equilibrium, there will be no 
depreciation because the loss under discretion plus the reputational cost is higher 
than the pre-commitment loss without depreciation. That is, the reputational 
cost is enough to insure a zero depreciation rate if the market coordinates in 
the low depreciation equilibrium. However, if the market coordinates in the high 
depreciation equilibrium the government will find it optimal to act with discretion 
and depreciate the domestic currency.
The model has a unique equilibrium with devaluation if, for instance, the debt 
to output ratio, 77, raises to 0.68. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show that for this level of 
pubic debt a devaluation must occur because the government’s loss under discretion 
plus the reputational cost are below the loss without depreciation. Also, as we will 
see later, the model can have a unique equilibrium without devaluation, that occurs 
if the ratio of government debt to output is reduced to 0.30 or less.
The model shows three regions for the debt to output ratio in which we find 
different sets of equilibria. For a strong fundamental, a low debt to output ratio, 
there is a single equilibrium without devaluation; if the fundamental is in an inter­
mediate zone, there are multiple equilibria and one of them implies a devaluation; 
and for a very bad condition of the fundamental there is a unique equilibrium in 
which the currency is devalued. Such a partition of the space for the fundamental 
and its relationship with the number of equilibria can be found also in other mod­
els of self-fulfilling crises, for instance in Sachs et al (1996a), Obstfeld (1996) and 
Jeanne (1997), who calls bifurcation the expansion of the set of equilibria when 
the fundamental enters in the zone where a self-fulfilling crisis may occur. In the 
next section we discuss some means to avoid a situation with multiple equilibria or 
the coordination of speculators’ expectations in the equilibrium with devaluation.
4.4 Means to avoid self-fulfilling crises
The different ways to avoid a currency crisis involve changes in the conditions of 
the economy, changes in the preferences of the government, and announcements 
or policy actions that promote the coordination of expectations in the equilibrium
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Table 4.1: Summary of results
Low High Min Z Min 0
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA 0.91 17.0
Depreciation rates 0.21 0.68
Interest rates 0.35 2.30









INCREASE OF DOMESTIC CREDIT 1.10 14.0
Depreciation rates 0.20 0.75
Interest rates 0.17 2.90
INCREASE OF INDEXED BONDS 0.65 1.62
Depreciation rates 0.12 0.73
Interest rates 0.31 2.88
without depreciation.3 For all the cases discussed in this section, the parameter 
values of Section 4.2 constitute the initial situation or the benchmark case. Table
4.1 contains the quantitative summary of all the experiments performed.
Debt reduction. The possibility of a currency crisis can be eliminated if the 
debt to output ratio is under a certain threshold because the set of equilibria is 
determined by the level of public debt. According to Figure 4.1, a self-fulfilling 
currency crisis may happen even for a debt to output ratio of r? =  0.60, but 
if this ratio is reduced to 0.30, no crisis can happen since only the low interest 
rate equilibrium remains and the reputational cost is enough to insure a zero 
depreciation rate (see figures 4.5 and 4.6). This result is similar to some of the 
hypotheses that have been put forward about the causes o f the Mexican crisis. 
Sachs Tornell and Velasco (1996a), Atkeson and Rios-Rull (1996) and Cole and 
Kehoe (1996) have all suggested that the collapse of the peso may be interpreted 
using models with multiple equilibria in which investors’ expectations about the
3See Cooper (1999) for an exposition of the role of strategic complementarities in macroe­
conomics. It includes a discussion of the role played by the government in avoiding a situation 
with multiple equilibria and the coordination of private sector’s beliefs in the bad equilibrium.
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temptation o f the government to deflate outstanding public debt or about its ability 
to honor such debt can create the conditions in which the coordination in the ‘bad’ 
equilibrium produces a self-fulfilling crisis.
Longer average maturity of public debt. The equilibrium with devaluation can 
also be eliminated with an increase in the average maturity of public debt. Given 
the parameter values used, if 7 , the share of debt maturing in the first period, 
decreases from 0.9 to 0.3, the equilibrium with devaluation is again eliminated, 
and in the remaining low interest rate equilibrium the fixed cost insures that there 
is no depreciation of the domestic currency. See figures 4.7 and 4.8. The average 
maturity of debt playing the role of the key fundamental is also suggested in 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990).
Change in government’s preferences. A government facing a situation with a 
potential currency crisis may appoint a new central banker who is known as an 
inflation fighter in order to signal to the market its determination not to devalue. 
In this case the change in the government’s preferences implies an increase in 6, 
the weight given to the depreciation rate in the loss function. A high enough 6 
can eliminate the equilibrium with depreciation. With the parameter values used, 
the value of 6 that can eliminate the possibility of a self-fulfilling crisis is at least 
17.0. This option goes in line with the suggestion of Rogoff (1985) to appoint a 
conservative central banker in order to reduce the inflation bias that arises from 
the time inconsistency problem.
Increase in the reputational cost. This option involves an increase in the polit­
ical or reputational cost such that even for the high interest rate equilibrium the 
government loss plus Z  is above the loss under pre-commitment for the interest 
rates that imply equilibrium. Given the parameter values used above, the value of 
Z necessary to  eliminate the possibility of a devaluation is at least 0.91. As an ex­
ample of this kind of mechanism, we can recall the agreement of several European 
governments to  accomplish the so-called convergence criteria (which included lim­
its to the depreciation of their currencies) that led to the European single currency. 
Later, we will comment on a simple experiment that illustrates how a change in 
the reputational or political cost can also open the possibility of a self-fulfilling 
crisis.
Focal points. Another way to elude a self-fulfilling crisis is to manage investors’
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expectations in order to avoid the coordination of the market in the bad equi­
librium. That is, the government can promote the coordination o f specultators’ 
expectations in the equilibrium without depreciation. Such an option was men­
tioned, but not discussed, by Calvo (1996b) some time ago. Miller et al (1990) also 
mention briefly the importance of the government’s information policy to shape 
market expectations, as do Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina et al (1990). 
Cooper (1999) presents an interesting exposition of the role of strategic comple­
mentarities in macroeconomic issues, which includes a discussion o f the influence 
of the government on the coordination of market expectations.
Some actions and/or announcements by the government can play the role of 
signals that promote the coordination of the market in the equilibrium without 
devaluation when facing a confidence crisis, which is a period in which the expec­
tations of speculators may shift to the equilibrium with devaluation. For instance, 
the announcements of plans of a contingent tightening of fiscal policy, or an agree­
ment with the governments of countries that are willing to support the domestic 
currency by intervening in their exchange markets, or to lend resources in case of a 
confidence crisis, may help to coordinate the market in the equilibrium without de­
valuation. In this respect, Chen and Giovaninni (1997) present empirical evidence 
suggesting that the Basle-Nyborg agreements of 1987, which extended the use of 
short term financing to European countries pursuing intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, contributed significantly to reduce realignment expectations of 
the French franc and the Italian lira.
Another option to avoid the coordination of expectations in the bad equilib­
rium, which is of special importance in the Mexican case, is the substitution in 
investors’ portfolios of assets denominated in domestic currency for assets denom­
inated in or indexed to the foreign currency when a confidence crisis occurs.
Asset substitution allows investors to hedge against a potential depreciation of 
the domestic currency and it also allows the government to resist periods of con­
fidence crisis without noticeable increases in interest rates. This mechanism was 
heavily exercised by the Mexican government during 1994 (March, April, June and 
November) and was triggered by a series of negative political shocks.4 Between
4 In January, a rebellion broke out in the south and peace talks were held until the end of 
February. At the end of March the presidential candidate of the ruling party was assassinated.
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February and December of 1994, the international reserves in the Banco de Mex­
ico decreased by 23.5 billion dollars, and the share o f  government bonds indexed 
to the dollar increased from 3.7 per cent to 55.3 per cent. During 1994 the to­
tal change in investors’ portfolios towards dollar denominated and dollar indexed 
assets amounted to 45.6 billion dollars.
In the next section, we will concentrate on the effects of changing political 
conditions and the substitution of assets in the equilibria of our model.
4.5 Some specific features of the Mexican expe­
rience
In this section we perform some experiments to illustrate features of the Mexican 
experience that deserve close attention. The first experiment is related to the role 
of changing political conditions, and the other two are related to the substitution 
of peso denominated assets for dollar denominated and dollar indexed assets in 
investors’ portfolios.
The first experiment, although being a conjecture, is useful to illustrate that 
changing political conditions may affect the set o f equilibria in the model. The 
experiment is as follows. Suppose that the economy is in a situation like that 
described in Section 4.2 but the reputational cost is above its critical value 0.91, 
so that a depreciation cannot occur. However, in such a situation a decrease in 
the political cost can make a self-fulfilling crisis possible.
For the Mexican case, we can argue that if the prospect o f no approval of the 
NAFTA in the US Congress in November 1993 and the prospect of a defeat for the 
ruling party in the general elections of mid 1994 was part of the reputational cost 
that the government would have faced in case of a devaluation, then Z  should have 
decreased after the agreement was approved and after the ruling party won the 
presidential elections and maintained control of the upper chamber of the national 
Congress in August 1994. Therefore, we conjecture that both the approval of
In June the Minister of the Interior attempted to resign. At the end of September, the General 
Secretary of the ruling party was assassinated, and in November, the Deputy General Attorney 
claimed that some leaders of the ruling party were putting obstacles to the investigation of this 
murder and resigned from his post and the party.
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NAFTA and the outcome of the general elections might have reduced the political 
cost. This could have made feasible a self-fulfilling crisis, or at least could have 
created such a perception among speculators.
The bases for this conjecture are the pressure against the peso observed some 
days before the approval of NAFTA by the US Congress in November 1993 due to 
the bad prospects for the vote, and the public testimonies of a crucial meeting of the 
recently elected President, the President, the Minister o f Finance and the Governor 
o f the Central Bank in November 1994 in which the prospect of a devaluation was 
discussed. The newly elected President argued in favour of a devaluation but the 
opposition of the Minister of Finance was more influential on the existing President. 
Also, it is worth noting that the conjecture of a reduction in the political cost 
after the elections may answer a key question put forward by Sachs et al (1996a): 
why was a devaluation not allowed in March 1994 when the assassination of the 
presidential candidate of the ruling party unchained the first and biggest round of 
financial turmoil of the year.5
The substitution of assets in investors’ portfolios during the periods of con­
fidence crisis in 1994 took two forms. The first and most important was the 
substitution o f bank deposits for assets denominated in dollars, that resulted in 
large reductions of the international reserves in the Central Bank. And the second 
was the increase in the issue of short term dollar indexed bonds (Tesobonos) that 
substituted peso denominated bonds (Cetes) that were maturing. These massive 
asset substitutions were allowed by the economic authorities in order to avoid in­
creases of domestic interest rates. On the one hand, the Central Bank decided to 
sterilize the reserve losses by increasing the credit to the banking system in order 
to avoid the credit squeeze and the increases of interest rates on bank loans because 
that would have further damaged the already weak banking system and economic 
activity in general. And, on the other hand, the substitution of peso denominated 
bonds for dollar indexed bonds in investors’ portfolios allowed a roll-over of the 
maturing public debt without substantial increases in the interest rates paid by
5 A somewhat similar argument has been suggested by Garcia (1999) in his interpretation of 
the crisis of the EMS. In his view, the prospect of no monetary union the future, given the results 
of the Danish referendum and the bad prospects of the French referendum, decreased the cost 
of realignments of European currencies and in this way contributed to create the conditions for 
the crisis of the ERM in September 1992.
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government bonds. The official statements of these policies can be found in Banco 
de Mexico (1995) and Mancera (1995). Werner (1996a) presents empirical evi­
dence of the effects of the substitution of bonds on interest rates, and Calvo and 
Mendoza (1996) and Agenor and Masson (1994) of the sterilisation policy.6
The first experiment concerning the effects of asset substit ution is the following. 
Suppose that the parameters used remain the same as in Section 4.2, but in period 
1 there is a confidence crisis and investors withdraw deposits from the banking 
system that are exchanged for international reserves. Also, in accordance with the 
Mexican experience in 1994, suppose that such a reduction of the international 
assets in the Central Bank is completely sterilized by equivalent increases of the 
domestic credit granted to the banking system. In that case, the money supply 
and the interest rate do not change in period 1 , but there is a new composition of 
the monetary base. What are the consequences for the equilibria described?
Figure 4.9 shows the equilibria of the model when w, the fraction of the mon­
etary base backed by domestic credit, increases from 0.1 to 0.7, and Figure 4.10 
shows the corresponding loss functions. As can be observed, the most noticeable 
change is that both the nominal interest rate and the rate of depreciation in the bad 
equilibrium are higher. This is because a depreciation reduces the real revenues 
that the Central Bank obtains from the domestic credit granted to the banking 
system, and hence a higher depreciation rate is needed to compensate for such a 
decrease by means of a larger reduction in the real service of public debt. The 
effects of the increase of domestic credit can be also recognized by noting that the 
bad equilibrium is eliminated by an increase of the reputational cost for the gov­
ernment: Z  must increase at least to 1.10. And if the possibility of a self-fulfilling 
crisis is eliminated by taking a harder position against inflation, 0 must be at least 
to 14.
The second experiment of asset substitution involves the composition of the
''Werner (1996a) as well as Flood and Marion (1996) considered risk averse speculators and 
a currency risk premium, so that the effect of an increase in the probability of a devaluation on 
the interest rate differential can be offset by a reduction in the share of peso denominated bonds 
in the portfolio of speculators. In our model we assume risk neutral investors, which eliminates 
the effects of the composition of public debt on the domestic interest rate. However, we argue 
that changes in the currency composition of public debt serve to coordinate expectations in the 
low interest rate equilibrium, which yields the same result.
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debt issued in period 1. Suppose that the fraction of the monetary base backed by 
international reserves is as in the benchmark case, w =  0 .1 , but due to a confidence 
crisis in period 1 the government allows a fraction /  =  0.65 of the new debt issued 
to be indexed to the exchange rate. Again, total indebtedness, money supply and 
the interest rate do not change in period 1 , but there are important consequences 
for the equilibria of the model. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show these effects.
The bad equilibrium is characterized by a higher nominal interest rate and a 
higher depreciation rate. The reason for this effect is that the real value of the 
dollar indexed debt is not affected by the depreciation of the domestic currency, 
hence a higher depreciation rate is needed to ensure balance in the real resource 
constraint of the government through seigniorage revenues, which include the re­
duction of the real service of non-indexed debt. The effects of a higher share of 
dollar indexed debt can also be recognized by noting that in this case the bad 
equilibrium can be eliminated if 6 increases at least to 1.62 or the reputational 
cost Z  is at least 0.65.
It is important to note that the values of Z  and 0 necessary to eliminate the 
equilibrium with devaluation when the share of indexed debt increases are both 
lower than in the initial situation even when the interest rate in the bad equilibrium 
is higher. The reason is that by issuing dollar indexed debt, the government has 
internalized to some extent the consequences of a depreciation because the real 
value of a larger share of debt is not affected by a depreciation, and this makes 
the depreciation of the domestic currency less tempting. Such a result can be 
considered as supporting the suggestion of Calvo (1996a), who argues in favour of 
indexed debt.
A very important implication o f  the experiments just discussed is the following. 
Say that the initial situation is the one described in Section 4.2 and there is no 
possibility of a depreciation because the reputational cost Z  is above 0.91 but 
below 1.10 and 0 does not have a big magnitude but is above 1.62. If a confidence 
crisis occurs in period 1 and investors substitute deposits in the banking system for 
assets denominated in foreign currency, and the reduction of international reserves 
is sterilized by increases of domestic credit, the government ends in a situation in 
which a self-fulfilling crisis may occur. However, that would not be the case if the 
government substitutes bonds denominated in domestic currency for dollar indexed
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bonds, because the reputational cost is already above 0.65 and Q is above 1.62, and 
these magnitudes are enough to eliminate the possibility of a self-fulfilling crisis. 
Hence, by allowing the substitution of domestic deposits for international assets 
and sterilizing reserve losses instead of allowing an increase in the share of indexed 
debt, the economic authorities are in fact opening the room for a potential self- 
fulfilling crisis. Therefore, despite the attention given by many analysts to the role 
of indexed debt in the genesis of the Mexican crisis, we argue that the sterilisation 
of reserve losses during 1994 should be considered as more important in the onset 
of the collapse of the peso than the increase of the stock of Tesobonos.
The results of our experiments, and the observation of repeated political shocks 
and asset substitution during 1994, suggest that the conditions that made possible 
a self-fulfilling currency crisis were cumulating during the year, and the collapse 
of the peso occurred when the resource of asset substitution was exhausted and 
the market coordinated in the equilibrium with depreciation in December 21st, 
again in connection with political shocks and following the announcement of a 
prospective 15 per cent increase in the ceiling o f the currency band.7
4.6 Conclusions and comments
In this chapter we presented a model in which the interaction of investors’ expecta­
tions and the optimal decision of policymakers may lead to self-fulfilling currency 
crises, that is useful to investigate some features of the Mexican experience in 1994.
The central feature of the model is that there may be multiple equilibria in 
the foreign exchange market, and a self-fulfilling crisis triggered by exogenous 
unpredictable news or sunspots may occur for certain values of macroeconomic 
fundamentals. This model is useful to study the effects of the substitution of peso 
denominated assets for dollar denominated or indexed assets that was observed in 
Mexico during 1994.
We found that the interest and depreciation rates in the bad equilibrium is
7In December 1994, fears of a renewed outbreak of hostilities in Chiapas followed the contro­
versial inauguration of a new governor of the ruling party in this province because the Zapatista 
Army dismissed the results of the elections and a considerable number of peasants broke through 
an army cordon and took control of 38 municipalities.
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higher after the substitution of assets, and also it is more difficult to eliminate 
the possibility of a self-fulfilling crisis by means of a higher reputational cost or a 
more conservative position against inflation when the asset substitution takes the 
form of a reduction in the international reserves that is sterilized. Even more, in 
some circumstances the substitution of public debt towards indexed bonds may 
eliminate the possibility of a self-fulfilling devaluation. Hence, we consider the 
sterilisation of reserve losses during 1994 as much more important in the genesis 
of the devaluation of the peso than the increase of the stock of indexed bonds.
Based on the results of our model, we can suggest the following account of 
the Mexican experience in 1994 and the collapse of the peso in December 21st. 
The level of public debt and its short average maturity, together with a likely 
decrease of the political cost of a depreciation after the approval o f NAFTA and 
later after the general elections, might have put the economy in a situation in which 
a self-fulfilling crisis was possible, and the political shocks observed during 1994 
triggered periods of confidence crisis that threatened to coordinate speculators’ 
expectations in the equilibrium with devaluation. These periods of confidence 
crisis were resisted without substantial increases of interest rates thanks to the 
substitution of peso denominated assets for dollar denominated or indexed assets 
in investors’ portfolios, but the substitution of assets increased the depreciation 
rate in the bad equilibrium and made it more difficult to avoid a self-fulfilling 
crisis. Finally, the devaluation of the peso occurred when the resource of asset 
substitution was exhausted and the market coordinated in the bad equilibrium at 
the end of the year, when political shocks resumed and the government announced 
a prospective widening of the currency band.
In this chapter we have adopted the approach of second-generation models of 
currency crises, but such an approach has received some criticism and it is worth 
commenting on that. Morris and Shin (1998a,b) argue that multiple equilibria are 
the result of the assumption of common knowledge of the level o f the macroeco­
nomic fundamentals, and propose a model in which individual speculators base 
their decisions whether or not to attack only on private noisy signals about the 
conditions of the economy and the assumption that other speculators are ratio­
nal. In their model, strategic behaviour determines that a speculator decides not 
to attack only if she receives a very good signal of the level of the fundamental
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because only in this way she can be sure that no speculator could have received in­
formation indicating that the exchange rate is not sustainable. And also, strategic 
behaviour makes the share of speculators attacking the currency increase when the 
fundamental weakens. Given that the cost of defending the currency also increases 
as the share of speculators attacking grows, there is a critical level of the funda­
mental that produces the mass of speculators necessary to provoke the collapse 
of the currency. Hence, in their model there is a unique equilibrium in which a 
devaluation occurs, and it is linked to the level of the fundamental.8
On the one hand, we consider that the assumption of private information about 
economic fundamentals postulated by Morris and Shin is hard to accept in the 
case of the foreign exchange market since it is one in which the information is 
most public (see also Jeanne (1999)). And on the other hand, if it is true that 
there is a threshold level for the fundamental, a trend towards such a threshold 
would allow one to determine the timing of the speculative attack in advance. 
Or, in the absence o f a definite trend, given that the fundamental cannot reach 
the threshold in a single dramatic jump and it is usually considered a stochastic 
variable, there should be some signals of an incoming crisis when the fundamental 
approaches the trigger value. However, it is widely accepted that the timing of 
the ERM crises in 1992-93, the Mexican crisis, and the recent crises in East Asia 
has been rather arbitrary, and it seems to be linked to exogenous shocks such as 
political events or contagion. There have been no definitive trends or dramatic 
changes in fundamentals that could explain the eruption of the crises, and there 
were no evident signals of incoming devaluations. Therefore, we consider that 
the hypothesis of self-fulfilling crises resulting from multiple equilibria and sudden 
changes in speculators’ expectations triggered by exogenous unpredictable news is 
plausible.
“Other arguments used to criticize the hypothesis of multiple equilibria that rely on the 
assumption of private information and focus on modelling the strategic behaviour of speculators 
can be found in Caplin and Leahy (1994), Banerjee (1992), and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welch (1992).
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Figure 4.1: Multiple equilibria
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Figure 4.3: Unique equilibrium
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Figure 4.5: Debt reduction
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Figure 4 .7 : Increase of average maturity
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Figure 4.9: Increase of domestic credit
igure 4.10: Increase of domestic credit. Government loss
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Figure 4.11: Increase of indexed bonds
Mgure 4.12: Increase of indexed bonds. Government loss
Interest rate
Chapter 5
Pressure in the Foreign Exchange 
Market and the Collapse of the 
Peso
5.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on the results obtained in the previous two and presents an 
empirical analysis of the causes of the shifts of the Mexican economy between 
states of calm and crisis in the foreign exchange market that led to the collapse of 
the peso in December 21st 1994.
In Chapter 3, we performed various corrections to interest rate differentials to 
construct a series of realignment expectations that was used as an indicator of the 
credibility of the peso. And its empirical analysis suggested that the predictions 
of the traditional approach to balance of payments crises a la Krugman were not 
present in the Mexican case. Also, we found that realignment expectations shifted 
over time between two regimes of relatively high and low credibility, especially 
during 1994, but in the months immediately before the collapse of the peso re­
alignment expectations were relatively low. In Chapter 4 we presented a model 
in which a self-fulfilling currency crisis may occur and argued that the periods of 
confidence in the foreign exchange market observed in 1994 were resisted without 
noticeable increases in domestic interest rates thanks to the substitution of assets 
in speculators’ portfolios. Based on these results, in this chapter we introduce an
89
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alternative indicator of the credibility of the peso that is not based on interest 
rate differentials, and adopt empirical methods that allow the identification of the 
causes of shifts between states of calm and crisis in the foreign exchange market.
The main ingredients of this chapter are the following. First, since it is likely 
that interest rate differentials and realignment expectations did not reflect accu­
rately the pressure in favour or against the peso, we use an index of pressure in 
the foreign exchange market as indicator of the credibility of the exchange rate 
instead of realignment expectations. Second, we use a different type of Markov- 
switching model. Instead of a Markov-switching regression, we estimate mean- 
variance Markov-switching models for the index of pressure and model the transi­
tion probabilities and the probabilities o f the regimes prevailing at each date in the 
sample as functions of macroeconomic fundamentals. Third, we consider an indica­
tor of political news in our estimations in order to formalize the widespread notion 
among academics and official institutions that political events had a considerable 
effect on the confidence in the Mexican peso.
The results obtained using Markov-switching models with time-varying transi­
tion probabilities and different lags of macroeconomic fundamentals and political 
news, point to fiscal matters and political events as the triggers of the shifts of the 
economy between states of calm and crisis. We use a two step approach consisting 
of the use of a Markov-switching model with constant transition probabilities and 
the subsequent modelling of the probability of the crisis state. We show that real 
peso appreciation, the changes in the public debt relative to output and political 
events drove the shifts of the economy between long periods of a slight pressure 
in favour of a revaluation of the peso and shorter periods of stronger and more 
volatile pressure for peso depreciation. These results axe confirmed using a model 
in which the transition probabilities depend on the variables identified with the 
two step approach.
Our results suggest that before 1994 the reduction of the debt-output ratio and 
positive political shocks maintained the economy in a state of calm for long periods 
despite a considerable real appreciation of the peso. However, the termination of 
the declining path of the debt to output ratio and a series of negative political 
shocks shifted the economy towards a state of crisis for most of 1994, and the real 
depreciation of the peso observed in this year was not enough to return the economy
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to a state of calm. In such a state of crisis, large reserve losses accumulated over 
the year and the last period of confidence crisis in late December resulted in the 
collapse of the peso.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2 we discuss the 
reasons why interest rates differentials, which are the basis of the drift adjustment 
method, may have not reflected accurately the credibility of the peso. In section
5.3 we construct an index of pressure in the foreign exchange market. In Section 5.4 
we use mean-variance Markov-switching models with time varying and constant 
transition probabilities to study the behaviour of the index over time. Also, we 
use a logistic transformation of the probability of the crisis state obtained with 
our preferred model and linear methods to study the causes of the shifts of the 
economy between the states of calm and crisis. Section 4.5 presents the conclusions 
and final comments.
5.2 Pressure in the foreign exchange market and 
interest rates
Interest rate differentials are the basic indicator of the credibility o f exchange 
rates, and Svensson (1993) and Bertola and Svensson (1993) proposed the drift 
adjustment method to measure the credibility of currency bands. Both interest 
rate differentials and realignment expectations have been used extensively in works 
devoted to investigating the causes of currency crises, but often these indicators 
seem to be silent alarms for incoming devaluations and do not show strong and 
stable links with macroeconomic fundamentals predicted by models o f currency 
crises a la Krugman. The Mexican experience appeared to be similar in this 
respect and many analysts have remarked that it is puzzling that although the 
peso was known to be under severe pressure in some periods during 1994, the usual 
indicators of exchange rate credibility did not show dramatic increases before the 
devaluation of the peso in December. Various hypotheses have been proposed to 
explain why domestic interest rates did not accurately reflect the pressure against 
the peso prior to its devaluation, and we have illustrated two of them using the 
model of Chapter 4.
The main reason why domestic interest rates in Mexico did not show dramatic
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increases during 1994 is that the monetary authorities were reluctant to reduce 
the monetary base when recurrent confidence crises provoked reductions in inter­
national reserves. Reserve losses were sterilised increasing the domestic credit to 
the banking system in order to avoid large increases in interest rates that would 
have further damaged the already fragile banking system and economic activity. 
See Banco de Mexico (1995) and Mancera (1995), and the empirical studies of 
Calvo and Mendoza (1996) and Agenor and Masson (1999).1
A second explanation indicates that the substitution of peso denominated 
bonds for dollar indexed bonds during 1994 helped investors to hedge against 
a potential devaluation of the peso and hence allowed a roll-over of the matur­
ing debt without considerable increases in the interest rates of government bonds. 
This hypothesis was proposed by Flood and Marion (1996) who considered risk 
averse investors in order to allow portfolio reallocation to have a role in the deter­
mination of interest rates. Werner (1996a) presents empirical evidence indicating 
that during 1994 the reduction of the share of peso denominated bonds in to­
tal government bonds prevented substantial increases in the interest rates of peso 
denominated bonds.
A third reason for the modest response of interest rates is that the currency 
band mitigated the effects of confidence shocks on interest rates because the move­
ment of the exchange rate inside the band took part of the pressure against the 
peso. The empirical evidence for this hypothesis is presented by Werner (1996b), 
who shows that the target zones used in Mexico and Israel contributed to reduc­
ing the variability of interest rates thanks to the movement of the exchange rates 
inside their bands.
In sum, there is a strong case to consider that interest rate differentials and 
realignment expectations may not have accurately reflected the situation of the 
foreign exchange market in Mexico in 1994. Therefore, in the next section we 
introduce an alternative device to measure the credibility o f the peso.
1 Here, it is worth recalling that the sterilization of reserve losses when domestic and foreign 
assets are close substitutes insures small effects of confidence crises on interest rates but at the 
cost of larger reductions of international reserves. This result has been illustrated since some 
time ago with simple monetary models of a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate, see 
Roubini (1989), Boyer (1979) and Argy and Kouri (1974).
5.3 The index of pressure in the foreign exchange
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market
The original idea of the index of pressure in the foreign exchange market comes 
from Mirton and Roper (1977), later Weymark (1998) introduced further devel­
opments, and recently the index has been used in various empirical analyses of 
currency crisis. The aim of the index is to summarize the information about the 
excess demand for foreign currency that can be reflected in three different series: 
the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates, changes in international 
reserves and changes in the nominal exchange rate.
The series we use to construct the index are the monthly changes in foreign 
reserves as a percentage of the monetary base (CRE/M B), changes in the difference 
between the average cost of funds for banks in Mexico and the prime rate in the US 
(CBRD), and monthly changes in the log of the nominal exchange rate (CLNER). 
The period considered starts in May 1988 and ends in December 1994.2 Graph
5.1 shows these series. The figure contains the negative of the changes in foreign 
reserves as a fraction of monetary base and there is a spike in the change of reserves 
in March 1990, which is produced by the disbursement of around 7 billion dollars 
due to the operations related to the renegotiation o f the external debt under the 
Brady Plan.3
Table 5.1 shows some statistics of the series used. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy is not close to one, which indicates that the corre­
lations cannot be considered small, and the Bartlett test indicates that the joint 
hypothesis of zero correlations is rejected. The correlations of the series have the 
expected signs: reserve losses accompany a nominal depreciation of the peso, and 
the correlations of CBRD and the other two series are not significant.
2 For the case of the variation in reserves and interest rate differentials, the observation for 
December 1994 corresponds to the values of the whole month. The depreciation of the exchange 
rate corresponds to that observed before the abandonment of the exchange rate band on Decem­
ber 21st. The nominal depreciation of the peso is set to zero in the period 1998.05 - 1991.10 
because the peso was subject to a predetermined depreciation which did not reflect the conditions 
of the foreign exchange market.
3In the figure, the right axis corresponds to CBRD and CLNER and the left axis to -CRE/MB. 
The observations of CLNER prior to 91.11 were set to zero and are not shown in the figure.
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Figure 5.1: Input series for PC analysis
Table 5.1: Basic statistics for PC analysis
Basic Tests Correlations (p-values)
K-M-O of sampling adequacy: CRE/MB CBRD
0.0503 CRE/MB — —
Bartlett test of sphericity: CBRD -0.02852 (0.400) —
9.54138 (0.023) CLNER -0.33903 (0.001) 0.03513 (0.378)
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Table 5.2: Principal components
Eigenvalues % o f Variance Correlations (p-values) Coefficients
P C I 1.344 44.8 CRE/MB -0.81241 (0.000) -0.60407
PC2 0.994 78.0 CBRD 0.15008 (0.184) 0.11159
PC3 0.660 100.0 CLNER 0.81386 (0.000) 0.60514
The summary of the conditions prevailing in the foreign exchange market is 
obtained by means of principal component analysis. This way o f summarizing 
the information is preferred to those used by Eichengreen et al (1996a,b, 1995, 
1994), Sachs et al (1996b) and Kaminsky et al (1988) because in this way we avoid 
arbitrary decisions about the signs and the weights given to the original series to 
construct the index.4
The results of the principal components analysis are shown in Table 5.2. The 
eigenvalue of the first principal component is well above one and the second one 
is close to one. The first principal component explains 45 per cent of the variance 
of the series and the second one adds only 33 percent. The correlation between 
the first principal component and the interest rate differential is rather small when 
compared to the other two correlations, and it is not statistically different from 
zero at conventional levels. The principal component is a linear combination of the 
standardized variables, which ensures that the index is not dominated by the series 
with the largest variations. The coefficients used to construct the first principal 
component have the right signs and, not surprisingly, the one corresponding to the 
interest rate differential is about one sixth of the other two.
Figure 5.2 shows the plot of the first principal component, which is our index 
of pressure in the foreign exchange market. Positive values of the index indicate 
pressure against the peso, that is, periods in which there were reserve losses, in­
creases in the interest rate differential and nominal depreciation of the peso, while 
negative values indicate pressure in favour of the peso. In the figure, we can 
identify informally the following features. There was an initial period of pressure 
against the peso at the end of 1988, the first year of the stabilisation program, 
that disappeared in 1989. In March 1990 there is a positive spike in the index due
4 For instance, Eichengreen et al impose the negative sign on reserve changes and give weights 
to the series such that the individual conditional variances are equal.
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Figure 5.2: Index of pressure in the foreign exchange market
to the operations related to the debt renegotiation mentioned above. And after 
the conclusion of the debt renegotiation, there was a period of pressure in favour 
of the peso that vanished later. From the beginning of 1992 and up to Novem­
ber 1993 the pressure remained somewhat neutral, although mainly negative. In 
November 1993 there was an increase in the pressure against the peso due to the 
uncertainty surrounding the approval of the NAFTA in the US Congress, and im­
mediately after that there was a short period with strong pressure in favour of the 
peso due to the flow of capital that was awaiting the approval. The negative pres­
sure diminished considerably in January and February of 1994 and was followed 
by a dramatic change towards strong positive pressure in March, April, June and 
July. In May and August the pressure diminished considerably but came back in 
November and December. The aim of the next section is to identify systematically 
the shifts of the economy between states of pressure in favour and against the peso 
and the causes of those shifts.
5.4 Markov-switching models and regime shifts
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The empirical analysis of time series subject to sudden shifts is based on the 
Markov-switching model introduced by Hamilton (1989) in the econometric litera­
ture. This estimation method seems to be the natural counterpart in the empirical 
field of the hypothesis of regime shifts suggested by second-generation models of 
currency crises because the aim of the method is the identification of different 
regimes in the behaviour of a series by allowing changes in the parameters govern­
ing its process. In what follows we use models that allow regime shifts to identify 
systematically in which periods the Mexican foreign exchange market was in calm 
or in a confidence crisis and the factors causing those shifts.
5.4.1 Models with time-varying transition probabilities
Hamilton’s work has concentrated on a class of models in which the probabilities 
of transition between the states or regimes are constant. Later there has been 
a further development of his estimation method by Diebold, Lee and Weinbach 
(1994) involving time-varying transition probabilities that depend on exogenous 
time series.
A mean-variance Markov switching model with time varying transition proba­
bilities (MS-TVTP) can be stated as follows. A variable yt is assumed to be made 
up of a mean that changes between states and a white-noise error with a different 
variance in each state. Suppose the number of states is two. Then, the distribution 
of the series is represented as in expression (5.1), where ps and denote the mean 
and variance of the series in state s =  i , j .  The transitions between regimes are 
state dependent, that is, the first order Markov process governing the transitions is 
assumed to be affected by some explanatory variable by means of an exponential 
function, as in expression (5.2), where xt is the variable affecting the shifts be­
tween regimes; r denotes the lags of the explanatory variable used (up to q)- f3a 0 
are ‘constant’ parameters and /3a r are ‘slope’ parameters. The model is estimated 
using the EM algorithm and the vector of (6  +  2<j) parameters is 0 ' =  (ps, a], P, 0,
0a,l •■■0a,q)'
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V t~  N ( h„<t2,); s = i , j . (5.1)
by] =  b ( s< =  j  I st_i =  ¿)] =
Pn l+exp(/310+ ^ J  0l,r-Xt-r)
P l2  =  1 - P l l
P21 —  1 — P22 
__ exp(P2i0+ E l  Pa.r-^l-r)
" 22  l+exp(/3j,0+ E J  0 2 , r ' * t - r )
(5.2)
We estimated the model represented in expressions (5.1) and (5.2) with the 
index o f pressure in the foreign exchange market as the dependent variable and 
the lags o f the changes of macroeconomic fundamentals and political news as the 
variables determining the transitions between regimes. Two sets of estimations 
were obtained. In the first one, the independent variables are a constant and 
single lags (alternatively the first, second or third lag) of the potential trigger that 
causes the shifts between regimes, that is q =  1. The results are contained in Tables 
5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. In the second set of estimations, a constant and three lags of 
the changes in the macroeconomic fundamentals were introduced simultaneously 
(q =  3). These results are contained in Tables 5.7 and 5.8.
The list of potential triggers causing the shifts is the same as in Chapter 2, 
but excludes the changes in international reserves. Here, we use the lags of annual 
rates o f growth or annual changes of the macroeconomic fundamentals because 
we assume that it takes some time to collect information about the state of the 
economy and the changes in the conditions of the economy that may trigger a shift 
from one state to the other occur in a period of one year. We can be confident that 
the series used are stationary given the results of the unit root tests of Chapter 
2. The index of pressure is also a stationary series: the r t test statistic takes the 
value -7.94 and rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at the one per cent level of 
significance.
A variable intended to represent political events was constructed to capture 
the effects of political events on the shifts between regimes. The variable POL
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takes the value of one for positive political shocks, that is, events that contributed 
to maintain political stability, it takes the value of zero in those months in which 
there were no major political news, and has value of minus one in the months in 
which a political event diminishes the stability or strength of the political system. 
The compilation of political news was based on the information contained in Kess- 
ing’s Record of World Events (Appendix 7.2 presents the political news and the 
associated values of POL) . 5
Two regimes are identified in most of our estimations, that is, both the mean 
and the variance of the index are significant in each regime. One regime has a 
positive mean, which denotes pressure against the peso, and another regime has 
a negative mean, which denotes pressure in favour of peso appreciation. Also, 
the positive mean is often larger in absolute value than the negative one, and its 
corresponding error term has a larger variance. That is, the pressure against the 
peso was stronger and more volatile.
Using one lag of the macroeconomic fundamentals (Table 5.3), we find that 
the changes in the ratio of the public debt to output ratio (PDO) have significant 
effects on the transitions between regimes, but the signs are not consistent since 
they mean that the probability of staying in either of the two regimes increases 
when the debt-output ratio increases. Instead of that, we would expect to find 
opposite signs: positive for the regime of positive mean and negative for the regime 
with negative mean (note that sign o f  (dpu/dxt- T) =  sign o f  /?j r ). The sign of 
the coefficient corresponding to the changes in the ratio of public deficit to output 
(PSBRO) in the regime of negative pressure is contrary to expected. Using the 
second lag o f the fundamentals (Table 5.4), we find a significant positive effect of 
increases of the public deficit and the public debt on the probability of staying 
in the unstable regime, which means that worsening fiscal conditions made more
5Although it is natural to consider that political events affect economic issues, the study of 
those effects is often difficult due to problems in obtaining indicators of the political sphere that 
can be used formally. A recent paper considering the effects of political factors on exchange 
rates is the one by Blomberg and Hess (1997). These authors amended standard exchange 
rate models and included variables representing the partisan characteristics of the government, 
election periods, and approval ratings. They found that their model yields better out sample 
forecasts than the random walk model, which in turn has been largely considered as better than 
standard models in terms of forecasting.
Markov-switching models and regime shifts 100
Table 5.3: MS-TVTP. 1st lag
M 2 O U T R E R C T B O C D U S P S B R O U N E P D O M A T B L S H
Mi 0 . 4 9 6 0 .5 4 6 0 . 5 2 9 0 . 4 3 6 0 . 5 6 2 0 . 5 2 0 0 . 5 3 2 0 . 4 5 2 0 . 5 1 9 0 . 5 3 6 0 .0 1 6
s.e. 2 .5 5 4 0 .2 7 9 0 . 6 0 7 0 . 1 5 8 2 .3 6 5 0 . 2 9 6 2 .2 0 4 0 . 1 8 0 0 . 1 7 7 1 .6 5 7 0 .3 6 1
t 1 .9 5 9 2 .7 6 8 1 . 7 5 8 2 . 5 1 5 2 . 9 3 9
3 . 2 8 5 3 .3 5 2 4 .7 3 6 2 .8 1 9 3 . 4 0 9 4 . 1 2 2 3 . 3 0 9 3 .1 7 1 3 . 2 7 2 3 . 3 6 2 0.001
s.e. 1 .0 0 5 0 .3 4 3 0 .8 0 5 0 . 1 0 6 2 .9 3 8 0 . 3 1 5 3 .0 5 4 0 . 0 8 9 0 . 1 4 0 4 .1 8 1 1.001
t 3 . 2 6 8 9 .7 6 4 5 .8 8 5 2 6 .6 5 6 1 3 .0 9 6 3 5 .7 6 5 2 3 .3 7 3
Pio 1 .2 3 2 1 .6 3 6 1 .6 0 3 2 .6 9 8 1 .1 3 1 1 .0 3 9 1 .5 0 0 - 4 1 . 7 6 2 1 .5 3 9 1 .3 9 5 - 1 9 .7 8 0
s.e. 1 9 1 .4 1 0 1 6 .1 2 2 3 2 .7 2 5 2 .4 5 4 4 1 .2 2 7 3 . 4 6 5 5 0 .7 4 1 0 . 3 4 9 1 .0 2 9 2 9 .1 7 0 l .O x l O 7
t - 1 1 9 . 7 4 9
Pn - 3 5 .6 5 3 - 6 0 .9 7 4 - 3 .2 5 2 0 .5 8 4 1 9 .2 1 4 0 . 2 3 5 1 6 2 .1 4 6 2 9 .3 9 6 - 1 .3 6 5 2 1 .3 4 5 - 3 .8 8 9
s.e. 31 . 7 x 1 0 31 .6 x 1 0 4 4 0 . 4 3 6 1 .3 6 6 37 . 1 x 1 0 0 . 2 9 2 5 . 4 x l 0 ' 3 0 . 3 5 1 2 .1 4 1 3 . 2 x l 0 3 1 2 x 1 0 ^
t 8 3 . 7 5 7
M2 - 0 .1 7 4 - 0 .1 8 2 - 0 .1 1 3 - 0 .1 9 1 - 0 .1 8 1 - 0 .1 3 3 - 0 .1 8 0 - 0 .1 7 1 - 0 .1 8 0 0 . 1 7 8 - 0 .0 3 1
s.e. 0 .3 2 1 0.011 0 .0 4 4 0 .0 0 3 0 . 1 1 2 0 . 0 1 9 0 .2 5 1 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 5 7 2 5 .3 7 6
t - 1 6 .7 3 8 - 2 .5 7 4 - 5 8 .1 3 7 - 7 .0 8 9 - 5 8 . 6 5 3 - 2 4 . 9 3 0
°\ 0 . 1 4 0 0 . 1 3 9 0 .2 1 1 0 .1 3 7 0 . 1 4 3 0 . 1 8 3 0 . 1 4 3 0 . 1 3 6 0 . 1 4 2 0 . 1 4 4 0 .4 4 1
s.e. 0 . 3 1 9 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 3 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 4 0 9 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 3 7 8 1 0 .2 6 0
t 5 .7 2 6 1 8 .2 2 3 4 9 .1 4 8 7 .1 7 1 2 1 .6 1 2 2 3 .4 6 7
Pio 2 . 6 5 4 2 .6 4 8 3 .9 8 1 3 .7 7 2 2 . 6 6 7 2 . 5 4 9 2 .6 6 4 2 . 2 4 9 2 . 6 9 3 2 . 7 8 8 - 1 .0 6 5
s.e. 6 . 5 9 0 4 .1 5 4 1 3 .4 8 4 3 .2 2 5 1 0 .1 6 4 0 . 3 3 8 6 . 0 3 6 0 . 4 5 4 0 . 4 7 8 1 8 .8 7 7 4 6 .0 4 9
t 7 . 5 4 8 4 . 9 5 9 5 . 6 3 0
P21 - 8 .1 0 9 1 4 .5 2 2 - 2 9 .0 7 2 - 2 .9 2 2 - 4 8 . 2 0 3 0 . 0 0 6 - 1 5 .0 0 5 0 . 1 7 7 0 . 4 0 5 - 4 2 . 3 5 5 0 .2 0 2
s.e. 8 5 .9 3 4 2 7 8 .3 2 2 2 1 1 .0 3 8 5 .8 5 6 32 . 2 x 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 31 . 1 x 1 0 0 . 0 5 8 1 .5 0 7 31 . 9 x 1 0 1 0 9 .0 4 8
t 3 . 9 3 5 3 0 .0 6 1
L l ik - 3 .1 7 0 - 3 .7 0 7 - 6 .3 8 9 - 5 .7 0 7 - 5 .1 1 5 - 6 . 5 2 7 - 5 .2 9 6 - 2 . 8 7 3 - 5 .6 1 0 - 5 .4 2 3 - 6 5 .7 4 3
t-M ln tistic*  hIio w ii for  N ignificni o f  a t  le a s t  10 p er  c e n t .
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Table 5.4: MS-TVTP. 2nd lag
M 2 O U T R E R C T B O C D U S P S B R O U N E P D O M A T B L S H
M i 0 . 4 8 7 0 . 5 4 2 0 . 5 3 3 0 . 4 5 3 0 . 5 2 8 0 . 5 1 0 0 . 5 8 0 0 . 5 5 2 0 . 5 1 3 0 . 5 1 8 0 . 0 1 6
s.e . 5 . 8 1 8 0 . 3 9 4 0 . 6 5 9 0 . 3 6 5 8 . 3 7 4 0 . 2 6 5 2 9 .7 4 6 0 . 2 0 5 0 . 1 7 8 3 .4 2 1 0 .0 0 1
t 1 . 9 2 3 2 . 7 0 0 2 .8 8 4
° \ 3 . 0 7 0 3 . 3 8 0 4 . 7 9 0 2 .9 0 4 3 . 2 7 6 3 . 1 9 5 3 . 3 2 8 3 . 7 1 2 3 . 2 3 0 3 .2 3 8 0 .0 0 1
s.e . 1 .1 1 4 0 . 3 7 3 1 .1 9 4 0 . 4 0 9 9 . 8 4 5 0 . 3 4 4 3 9 .4 8 6 0 . 1 2 3 0 . 1 4 3 5 .7 2 3 0 . 0 0 0
t 2 .7 5 4 9 .0 6 1 4 . 0 1 0 7 .0 9 8 9 . 2 9 3 3 0 .2 1 5 2 2 .5 8 2
0 i o 4 . 7 1 2 1 .0 6 5 2 . 5 1 9 2 .3 3 4 0 . 9 8 2 1 . 8 0 7 3 . 1 0 6 - 5 9 . 8 6 3 1 .5 5 0 1 .5 8 4 - 5 .8 6 1
s.e . 1 7 6 .3 9 8 1 5 .3 5 8 4 0 .5 9 0 5 . 2 2 2 2 8 .7 1 1 3 . 7 1 7 1 . 5 x l 0 3 0 . 4 2 3 1 .0 7 8 4 2 .9 2 2 3 . 4 5 3
t - 1 4 1 .3 8 5
0 i i - 1 0 9 . 3 0 4 - 3 1 .0 6 1 - 1 5 . 5 5 6 0 . 5 0 9 7 4 .5 9 1 0 . 0 4 8
3
1 . 1 x 1 0 2 2 .8 1 0 - 1 .6 8 9 9 . 1 2 6 - 4 2 .2 4 7
s . e . 32 . 9 x 1 0 31 . 8 x 1 0 5 5 8 . 4 1 2 1 .7 2 1 1 . 5 x l 0 3 0 . 0 2 3 6 . 9 x l 0 3 0 . 9 2 5 2 . 8 7 8 2 . 7 x l 0 3 1 .0 0 2
t 2 . 1 1 4 2 4 .6 5 6
M 2 - 0 .1 6 7 - 0 .1 7 9 - 0 . 1 1 3 - 0 .1 9 0 - 0 .1 8 2 • 0 .1 8 3 - 0 .1 8 8 - 0 . 1 6 8 - 0 .1 8 1 - 0 .1 8 2 - 0 .0 3 4
s.e . 0 .0 4 1 0 . 1 4 8 0 . 0 3 5 0 . 0 1 7 0 . 5 4 6 0 . 0 2 1 1 .6 6 5 0 . 0 0 6 0 .0 1 1 0 .6 6 2 0 . 0 0 9
t - 4 .0 9 5 - 3 . 2 3 2 - 1 0 .8 6 6 - 8 . 5 9 8 - 2 8 . 7 0 9 • 1 6 .6 8 5
n \ 0 . 1 3 2 0 .1 4 1 0 . 2 1 0 0 . 1 3 7 0 . 1 4 2 0 . 1 4 2 0 . 1 5 1 0 . 1 4 8 0 . 1 4 1 0 . 1 4 2 0 . 4 2 7
s.e . 0 . 0 2 4 0 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 4 9 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 6 4 2 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 8 1 6 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 4 0 .3 7 1 0 . 0 5 2
t 5 . 4 3 9 4 . 2 6 8 3 3 .7 9 2 3 3 .5 1 4 2 0 .1 8 7 3 6 .5 1 0
X
u
to o 2 . 8 3 3 2 .6 9 7 4 . 4 0 6 3 . 5 0 6 2 . 6 3 8 2 . 7 5 5 2 . 8 0 5 2 . 6 0 9
2 . 6 9 6 2 .8 3 1 - 0 .7 1 5
s.e . 2 3 .9 7 0 1 5 .4 3 2 1 8 .8 6 0 6 .3 7 4 7 . 3 9 6 1 . 4 1 9 5 5 .0 0 7 0 . 3 4 0 0 . 4 8 3 2 7 .3 8 5 0 . 1 6 7
t 1 .9 4 1 7 .6 8 1 5 . 5 8 7
0 2 1 - 1 2 .0 2 2 2 5 .3 3 9 - 3 3 . 8 5 4 - 2 .6 7 1 - 3 3 . 1 3 3 - 0 . 0 0 9 3 . 2 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 3 8 7 - 4 4 .8 5 4 0 . 1 4 9
s.e .
t
2 1 4 . 0 0 2 4 8 8 . 6 6 5 2 9 3 . 1 0 4 1 2 .8 7 0 3 . 2 x l 0 3 0 . 0 3 3
4
1 . 5 x 1 0 0 . 0 5 6 1 .7 1 2
3
2 . 6 x 1 0 0 . 7 3 6
U i k - 1 .6 3 6 - 4 .5 8 4 - 5 . 8 4 4 - 5 .4 2 1 - 5 .0 9 1 • 4 . 3 8 5 - 4 . 4 7 5 - 3 . 4 9 9 - 5 .4 9 9 - 5 .5 3 6 - 6 7 .4 1 6
t-Mtnt ¡l it¡cm nIiowii  for Migiiificnnee o f  n t  leant  10 pi
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Table 5.5: MS-TVTP. 3rd lag
M 2 O U T R E R C T B O C D U S P S B R O U N E P D O M A T B L S H
M l 0 . 5 0 7 0 .5 0 4 0 . 5 6 4 0 .4 9 1 0 .5 5 7 0 . 5 2 7 0 .5 8 9 0 . 4 4 9 0 .5 0 0 0 . 4 9 1 0 . 0 1 6
s .e . 4 . 3 8 9 0 .1 7 5 1 .7 3 3 0 . 2 1 4 0 .5 3 1 0 . 2 0 5 2 5 .9 7 4 0 . 1 5 9 0 .1 7 0 5 . 2 2 6 0.000
t 2 .8 7 4 2 .2 9 9 2 .5 6 4 2 .8 1 7 2 .9 4 9
<7j 3 . 2 8 4 3 .1 0 4 4 . 9 0 8 3 .0 6 4 3 .4 3 1 3 .1 6 1 3 .4 5 0 3 .0 8 5 3 .1 5 5 3 . 0 8 9 0.001
s . e . 1 .2 5 9 0 .7 0 1 1 .3 8 7 0 . 2 4 3 1 .9 3 8 0 . 1 2 3 1 1 .2 5 4 0 .0 8 8 0 .1 6 4 7 . 9 8 3 0 . 0 0 2
t 2 . 6 0 8 4 .4 2 6 3 . 5 4 0 1 2 .6 2 4 1 .7 7 0 2 5 .7 5 0 3 5 .2 2 2 1 9 .1 9 2
P io - 0 .4 2 0 1 .8 6 8 2 . 8 9 8 1 .8 5 7 1 .9 1 2 6 . 6 6 6 1 .4 3 8 - 8 2 5 .8 1 5 1 .8 4 6 1 . 8 4 4 - 1 5 .4 3 6
s .e . 1 2 7 .4 9 2 1 9 .2 8 7 4 0 .2 1 2 2 .2 9 4 6 2 .9 2 2 1 8 .1 7 1 1 0 .2 6 0 0 .5 0 6 2 .5 3 7 5 8 .7 8 6 1 . 2 x 1 0 ®
t 1 .6 x 1 0 ®
f i n - 3 6 . 8 4 9 1 .0 2 3 - 2 2 .5 9 5 0 .4 7 3 - 7 9 .7 6 4 - 0 .1 6 0 4 0 4 . 3 9 7 2 5 7 . 3 2 9 - 2 .9 7 9 1 .1 9 1 - 5 .2 0 1
s .e . 31 . 8 x 1 0 8 0 6 . 6 4 4 6 2 8 . 2 5 3 0 . 7 3 6 7 . 5 x l 0 '3 0 . 4 5 6 51 .3 x 1 0 0 . 5 0 6 5 .7 6 9 2 . 3 x 1 0 ® 3 . 8 x l 0 4
t 5 0 8 .0 8 2
M2 - 0 .1 7 7 - 0 .1 8 7 - 0 .1 1 4 - 0 .1 8 8 - 0 .1 7 9 - 0 .1 9 0 - 0 .1 8 4 - 0 .1 7 6 - 0 .1 8 3 - 0 . 1 8 6 - 0 .0 4 3
s .e . 0 . 6 1 8 0 . 1 6 3 0 . 0 6 3 0 . 0 2 0 0 .0 8 4 0 . 0 0 3 2 .0 9 8 0 . 0 0 3 0 .0 1 4 0 . 7 2 8 0 . 1 1 3
t • 1 .8 0 2 - 9 .4 8 9 - 2 .1 3 0 - 6 2 .9 5 1 0 - 5 9 .5 7 1 - 1 2 .6 8 2
o \ 0 . 1 4 0 0 . 1 4 5 0 . 2 1 3 0 . 1 3 8 0 .1 4 2 0 . 1 3 5 0 .1 4 5 0 . 1 3 3 0 . 1 4 0 0 . 1 3 9 0 .4 4 5
s .e . 0 . 6 3 2 0 . 1 5 7 0 . 1 4 2 0 . 0 1 0 0 .2 7 1 0 . 0 0 8 2 .6 2 5 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 5 2 1 0 . 1 4 7
t 1 4 .1 3 4 1 6 .2 9 7 3 4 .7 9 8 2 0 .9 9 8
P io 2 . 6 0 9 3 . 0 9 5 4 . 8 4 8 3 .1 5 9 2 .6 8 9 3 . 2 2 2 2 .6 0 8 2 .2 3 3 2 .7 8 5 3 . 0 2 2 - 1 .3 7 2
s .e . 2 . 8 1 7 2 1 .2 5 8 2 6 .9 6 3 2 .7 7 0 5 .5 7 2 0 .6 7 1 2 5 .0 6 4 0 . 4 5 5 0 .6 2 8 5 3 .3 9 1 0 . 5 5 4
t 4 . 8 0 3 4 .9 0 6 4 .4 3 2
P n - 7 .0 3 9 3 0 .1 2 9 - 3 9 . 9 8 9 - 2 .2 0 5 - 6 3 .9 3 7 - 0 .0 2 9 - 1 4 .6 7 7 0 . 2 1 8 0 . 3 3 4 - 6 1 . 8 3 9 0 . 1 1 8
s .e . 1 9 .2 5 7 8 3 7 . 2 6 2 4 2 6 . 5 6 7 6 . 3 1 7 32 . 6 x 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 1 .7 x 1 0 ® 0 . 0 6 0 2 .1 5 8 34 . 1 x 1 0 0 . 5 4 9
t - 2 .8 7 4 3 .6 5 0
L l ik - 2 .6 8 6 - 5 .5 8 1 - 5 .1 5 1 - 5 .1 1 7 - 4 .9 8 0 - 3 . 6 8 0 - 4 .3 3 1 - 1 .9 7 4 - 4 .8 2 8 - 5 . 2 9 2 - 7 5 .9 7 1
t - s t a t is t i c s  s h o w n  for  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  nt lea st 10 p e r  c e n t .
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Table 5.6: MS-TVTP. Effects of political events.
P O L P O L f _ l * P O L t _ 2 r o L t — 3
M i 0 . 6 5 2 1 .1 4 0 1 . 2 2 9 1 .2 5 1
s . e . 0 . 4 6 6 0 .9 9 8 0 . 0 1 5 0 .9 8 7
t 8 0 .7 6 1
<?ì 3 . 2 5 8 0 .0 8 8 0 . 1 0 0 0 . 1 1 9
s .e . 0 . 1 1 4 2 .2 4 9 0 . 0 0 6 1 .3 0 6
t 2 8 .5 7 9 1 4 .7 0 8
@ 10 1 .3 1 8 - 3 3 .5 7 7 - 3 4 8 . 2 6 7 - 1 7 .0 6 1
s .e . 4 . 5 3 7 1 9 . 1 x 1 0 ° 3 6 . 9 6 9 51 6 .2 x 1 0
t - 9 . 4 2 0
0 n - 7 .2 8 5 - 3 4 .8 4 1 - 9 9 5 . 5 9 7 1 .4 0 4
s .e . 4 2 4 . 4 0 1 51 9 .7 x 1 0 7 . 6 9 9 1 .7 x 1 0 * *
t - 1 2 9 . 3 0 7
M 2 - 0 .2 0 9 - 0 .1 7 1 - 0 . 1 9 0 - 0 .1 8 3
s .e . 0 . 0 1 3 0 .6 0 8 0 . 0 0 4 0 .2 0 7
t - 1 6 .0 7 7 - 5 2 . 2 4 6
° \ 0 .1 4 1 0 .1 4 6 0 . 1 8 3 0 .1 5 9
s .e . 0 . 0 0 7 0 .4 8 7 0 . 0 0 3 0 .2 9 5
t 2 0 .1 4 3 5 5 .9 8 0
@ 20 3 . 5 9 4 1 .5 4 5 2 . 2 4 9 2 .1 7 5
s .e . 1 .4 0 2 1 0 .0 4 7 0 . 2 7 4 5 .6 9 8
t 2 .5 6 3 8 . 2 1 6
@2\ 4 . 3 5 7 - 0 .1 2 6 0 . 9 6 6 0 .0 7 5
s .e . 2 . 4 2 9 1 2 .3 7 0 0 . 8 3 7 7 4 .7 6 3
t 1 .7 9 4
L l ik - 0 .0 3 8 - 9 .6 8 7 - 8 . 6 8 0 - 1 2 .4 3 2
t - a t a t i a t i ica  a h o w n f o r  s i g n i f i c a n c e o f  a t  l e a s t 1 0  p e r  c e n t .
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Table 5.7: MS-TVTP. 3 lags simultaneously (first part)
M 2 O U T R E R C T B O C D U S P S B R O
Mi 0 . 4 8 6 0 . 5 5 6 0 . 4 5 8 0 . 5 6 8 0 . 6 0 7 0 .4 9 8
s.e. 0 . 1 7 1 1 .3 4 2 1 .4 7 4 0 . 5 0 4 8 . 7 2 0 1 8 .0 1 9
t 2 . 8 4 4
3 . 2 4 6 3 . 4 3 8 3 . 1 5 2 3 . 5 5 8 3 . 4 4 7 3 .4 3 4
s.e. 0 . 1 0 3 1 . 4 8 5 0 . 8 6 0 0 . 6 0 6 7 .0 6 1 8 .6 1 4
t 3 1 .6 0 2 2 . 3 1 5 3 . 6 6 7 5 . 8 7 0
Pio 1 1 9 . 9 6 0 1 . 8 7 0 - 0 .4 7 7 - 5 5 4 .2 3 3 2 . 3 4 8 - 7 6 .9 8 8
s.e. 0 . 8 6 8 8 4 .4 5 1 1 4 5 5 .3 8 5 67 . 3 x 1 0 7 8 4 . 0 5 2 43 . 5 x 1 0
t 1 3 8 . 1 8 8
Pn - 9 0 1 . 7 9 7 - 7 3 . 9 4 4 1 6 5 7 .9 6 0 9 4 .1 8 6 7 8 .4 3 6 - 0 .3 9 5
s.e. 0 . 8 6 8 3 1 9 9 .0 7 4 7 1 .9 6 8 61 . 4 x 1 0 51 . 9 x 1 0 3 . 8 8 3 0 .8 7 0
t - 1 0 3 8 .8 4 1 2 3 .0 3 7
Pu - 1 0 9 1 . 0 4 0 - 1 8 . 9 2 5 1 1 9 0 .3 6 2 - 2 7 4 .7 7 2 9 2 9 . 5 8 6 4 4 .7 0 1
s.e. 0 . 8 6 8 1 2 1 9 .4 5 1 2 4 .6 8 4 63 . 5 x 1 0 S . l x l O 5 51 .8 x 1 0
t - 1 2 5 6 . 8 4 3 4 8 .2 2 3
Pl3 - 8 8 1 . 3 0 3 2 0 .2 4 6 6 3 1 . 4 7 7 1 1 1 3 .4 6 3 - 1 1 0 6 . 6 5 3 5 5 .4 3 4
s.e. 0 . 8 6 8 2 5 4 6 .3 8 1 2 5 1 . 8 8 5 1 . 4 x l 0 7 57 . 2 x 1 0 51 . 0 x 1 0
t - 1 0 1 5 . 2 3 2 2 . 5 0 7
Hi - 0 .1 7 5 - 0 . 1 7 9 - 0 .1 7 4 - 0 .1 7 6 - 0 . 1 8 8 - 0 .1 6 0
s.e. 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 1 3 7 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 0 8 6 4 . 5 3 7 1 .3 5 4
t - 7 0 . 1 0 2 - 3 .5 0 8 - 2 .0 4 1
o\ 0 . 1 3 2 0 . 1 3 8 0 .1 3 1 0 .1 3 1 0 . 1 4 1 0 . 1 7 0
s.e. 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 3 1 5 0 . 0 3 5 0 . 1 0 8 2 . 5 5 6 2 .2 0 5
t 5 8 .8 0 7 3 . 7 6 2
Pio 2 . 8 2 0 2 . 6 9 3 3 .5 1 1 2 . 1 0 7 2 . 7 0 4 3 . 0 1 8
s.e. 0 . 3 4 8 8 . 2 0 8 1 1 .8 4 5 2 . 5 0 4 7 8 .6 5 0 1 2 4 .7 8 1
t 8 . 0 9 5
Pii 1 4 .4 8 0 5 . 2 5 7 1 1 6 .4 9 7 8 .0 9 1 - 1 0 0 .5 8 2 0 . 1 3 6
s.e. 0 . 8 8 3 4 4 9 . 7 5 1 6 9 1 . 4 8 5 7 3 .0 0 1 44 . 2 x 1 0 6 .6 9 2
t 1 6 .3 9 4
Pii - 2 6 . 5 4 6 2 4 .3 0 9 - 2 4 4 . 4 3 4 - 6 .5 6 0 1 2 4 .8 5 1 - 0 .3 0 2
s.e. 0 . 9 2 9 5 3 3 . 3 7 6 4 9 5 . 5 2 5 1 2 9 . 2 4 3 47 . 8 x 1 0 2 7 .7 8 0
t - 2 8 . 5 6 3
Pl3 4 . 9 5 9 - 8 . 2 0 0 1 2 2 . 9 9 7 - 1 . 0 7 3 - 8 6 . 7 8 5 0 . 0 4 6
s.e. 0 . 8 7 5 5 9 4 . 7 8 7 1 3 1 1 .2 9 0 6 0 .6 1 2 44 . 0 x 1 0 1 2 .4 3 9
t 5 . 6 6 7
L l ik - 1 .1 5 2 - 2 . 7 9 7 - 1 .7 4 5 - 1 .1 1 7 - 1 .2 3 3 - 4 .4 4 4
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Table 5.8: MS-TVTP. 3 lags simultaneously (second part)
U N E P DO M A T B L S H P O L
M l 0 . 7 0 5 0 . 4 2 8 0 .5 6 2 0 .4 2 4 0 . 5 6 1 0 . 4 9 0
s.e. 1 8 1 .1 2 5 2 . 5 9 7 0 .4 5 3 2 9 .0 2 1 1 2 . 9 0 0 0 . 3 4 2
t
3 .8 1 2 4 . 0 5 8 3 .1 6 1 2 .6 8 5 3 . 4 1 7 3 . 5 4 5
s.e. 7 0 .3 4 1 2 .8 2 1 0 . 5 2 5 6 6 .2 8 3 1 2 . 1 6 3 1 .8 4 8
t 6 0 .0 2 5 1 .9 1 9
010 5 . 7 9 6 - 1 .7 8 0 5 . 0 1 3 5 .0 8 9 0 . 8 1 7 - 8 .3 1
s.e. 43 . 8 x 1 0 49 . 8 x 1 0 8 2 .3 5 3 3 6 2 7 .6 9 3 9 7 . 5 5 4 1 . 7 x l 0 6
t
0 n - 2 7 8 3 .0 5 4 7 . 1 2 3 - 0 .8 9 0 9 8 8 .0 0 1 2 4 . 5 8 2 2 5 .9 1 3
s.e. 72 . 4 x 1 0 7 . 0 x 1 0 ® 1 0 8 1 .0 7 3 7 . 9 x 1 0 ® 41 . 2 x 1 0 55 . 4 x 1 0
t
012 3 3 2 7 .0 3 2 0 . 0 1 7 3 8 .2 0 3 - 1 0 1 9 .3 1 6 - 0 . 2 8 6 - 8 0 .7 9 4
s.e. 2 . 7 X 1 0 5 49 . 4 x 1 0 2 0 8 5 .6 1 7 9 . 0 x 1 0 ® 42 . 2 x 1 0 1 . 6 x l 0 7
t
013 7 8 1 1 .2 7 5 0 . 9 1 8 - 4 2 .8 3 2 8 4 .2 0 2 - 5 3 . 6 0 4 - 3 0 6 . 2 9 8
s.e. 6 . 7 x l 0 7 52 . 0 x 1 0 2 2 3 6 .9 4 8 52 . 0 x 1 0 6 7 4 5 . 8 3 6 76 . 2 x 1 0
t
M 2 - 0 .1 8 5 - 0 .1 1 4 - 0 .1 9 6 - 0 .1 9 9 - 0 . 1 8 1 - 0 .1 5 7
s.e. 4 . 9 0 7 0 .1 2 1 0 .0 8 4 8 . 2 2 9 0 . 2 7 5 0 . 0 2 2
t - 2 .3 9 4 - 7 . 1 7 2
o\ 0 .1 5 1 0 . 2 0 5 0 .1 4 4 0 .1 3 8 0 . 1 4 0 0 . 1 5 0
s.e. 6 . 3 1 9 0 . 6 2 0 0 .0 9 2 0 .7 8 1 1 . 5 6 7 0 . 0 2 0
t 7 . 6 9 2
020 2 . 5 4 4 8 . 2 9 3 3 . 5 3 6 5 .6 4 1 2 . 6 1 6 3 . 1 7 9
s.e. 3 8 2 .9 1 1 3 8 3 . 3 5 4 1 4 .6 8 2 2 4 3 5 .5 4 0 3 2 . 7 7 0 1 .7 6 8
t 1 .7 9 8
021 - 7 3 .9 0 6 1 .0 6 9 4 .0 8 2 3 5 .3 5 0 - 4 . 3 2 2 3 . 2 9 3
s.e. 46 . 7 x 1 0 3 3 4 . 3 5 3 1 3 1 .3 9 5 44 . 8 x 1 0 2 6 3 . 2 6 5 7 . 0 7 7
t
022 1 0 1 .9 1 4 - 0 .9 8 2 - 1 1 .3 6 6 - 1 0 2 .8 5 1 8 . 8 3 8 2 . 2 5 2
s.e. 9 . 0 x 1 0 * 4 2 9 . 1 0 8 2 2 9 . 5 6 5 1 . 7 x 1 0 ® 5 0 4 . 7 7 4 5 . 6 5 3
t
023 - 4 0 .4 4 2 - 1 .9 0 3 9 . 1 7 7 - 1 2 3 .9 9 7 - 7 . 6 9 5 0 . 1 3 8
s.e. 45 . 6 x 1 0 2 1 6 . 4 1 8 1 2 5 .2 7 6 51 . 2 x 1 0 3 4 6 . 3 6 3 1 3 .3 4 9
t
Llik - 2 .4 1 2 - 1 .4 8 9 - 2 .2 3 0 - 3 .3 5 4 - 3 . 7 4 4 - 1 .4 4 2
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persistent the state of crisis. And using the third lag of the fundamentals (Table 
5.5), we observe that the effect of increases of public deficit is significant and has 
the expected sign in the stable regime: higher public deficits made this regime less 
persistent, whereas the signs of changes in public debt are inconsistent. Note that 
in all the cases in which a variable was found to be a significant determinant of 
the transitions between regimes, the regimes are well identified.
Table 5.6 shows the results using contemporaneous and three lags of political 
news as the determinants of the transitions between regimes. Contemporaneous 
political events have the expected effect in the stable regime: positive political 
shocks increase the persistence of this regime, and negative political shocks de­
crease its persistence. And also, using the second lag of POL we find that political 
events affect the probability of staying in the unstable regime with the expected 
signs since negative political shocks make this regime more persistent. Again, in 
both cases the regimes identified have significant mean and variance.
In order to look for cumulated effects of the macroeconomic fundamentals on 
the transitions probabilities, we estimated models using three lags simultaneously. 
These results are shown in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. The growth of M2 seems to have 
significant cumulated effects: the \2 with 6  degrees o f freedom of the likelihood 
ratio test has a value of 11.654 and a p-value of 0.0701, but the signs of the 
effects are not consistent. And the effect of the real exchange rate (RER) in the 
unstable regime has a sign contrary to expected, the means are not identified and 
the likelihood ratio test takes the value of 10.468 with a p-value of 0.106. No 
other variable has cumulated effects and often the standard errors calculated took 
excessively large values.
In sum, using models with time-varying transition probabilities we find that 
most macroeconomic fundamentals do not have significant effects on the transition 
between regimes. However, the results suggest that fiscal and political matters 
drove the transitions between regimes since the changes in the ratio of the public 
deficit to output, the public debt to output ratio and political news have significant 
effects when the regimes are well identified.“
“ Using lags of the changes in the ratio of the consolidated public debt (which includes the 
net debt of the central government, the public enterprises, the official development banks and 
the central bank) to output yielded the following results. Using two lags, the regimes are well
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These results may have two causes. The first is the spike of the index related to 
the renegotiation of the external debt in March 1990. The plot of the probabilities 
of the regimes in each date often changes dramatically and behaves erratically after 
March 1990. And the second is that given that the estimation method is quite 
sophisticated, proposing a general model containing all the fundamentals and their 
lags (that would be subsequently reduced) is intractable. As a results of this, only 
one fundamental was related to the transition probabilities at a time. In the next 
section we adopt an alternative approach aimed to avoid these two problems.
5.4.2 A  two step approach to model regime shifts
The first step o f an alternative approach to model the shifts between regimes con­
sists of identifying the different states over time and obtaining the probabilities of 
each state prevailing at each date in the sample, using a mean-variance Markov- 
switching model with constant transition probabilities. And the second step con­
sists of modelling the inferred probability separately as a function of macroeco­
nomic fundamentals and political news. Using this approach, the spike related to 
the debt renegotiation can be isolated using a simple dummy variable and a gen­
eral model involving the lags of the macroeconomic fundamentals that potentially 
affect the transitions between regimes can be estimated and reduced.
Models with constant transition probabilities
A two-state mean-variance Markov-switching model with p autoregressive terms 
and constant transition probabilities (MS-AR(p)) can be stated as follows. The 
series yt is modelled as an AR(p) process in which the mean and variance are 
allowed to change between states, but the AR  coefficients are the same in both 
states, as in expression (5.3). And the matrix containing the constant transition 
probabilities that describes the first order Markov process governing the shifts 
between regimes is as in expression (5.4). Hence, the vector of ( 6  +  p) parameters 
to be estimated with the EM algorithm is © ' =  (p „  a2,, <pl t <t>p,Pu,Pjj).
identified and the variable has the right sign and is significant in the unstable regime, and the 
other lags are insignificant. Using three lags simultaneously, the regimes are not identified and 
the variable is not significant.
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p
V t-h 'S =  ' £ 2 < t > r ( y t - r - +  N {h„<t2s); s =  i , j  (5.3)
r = 1
\Pij] =  b(*t =  j  I S,_! =  ¿)] = Pii
Pij  =  1  ~ P i i
Pji  1  Pjj  
Pjj
(5.4)
MS-AR(p) models with p =  0 ,1 ,2 ,3  were applied to the index of pressure in the 
foreign exchange market. Table 5.9 shows the results. According to the Schwarz 
criteria, the model with three lags may be preferred. And a likelihood ratio test 
suggests that we cannot use two lags only (the value of the test statistic is 3.596 
and it is distributed as a x 2 with one degree of freedom, so that the corresponding 
p-value is 0.058). However, we note that none of the means are significant when 
using three lags.
A direct comparison of the model with three lags with the most parsimonious 
model indicates that the simplest mean-variance model with no autoregressive 
terms may be preferred: the value o f the test statistic, distributed as a with 3 
degrees of freedom, is 5.364 and its p-value is 0.147. And comparing the plots of 
the probabilities obtained with 0 and 3 lags, Figures 5.3 and 5.4, we observe that 
the MS-AR(O) model seems to distinguish more adequately the different periods 
of negative and positive pressure in the foreign exchange market. In particular, 
the MS-AR(3) model does not capture completely the positive pressure observed 
in 1988 and inid-1994.
We prefer the simplest mean-variance model without autoregressive terms to 
characterize the periods of pressure against to and in favour of the peso because 
the result of the likelihood ratio test favours this model, the characterization of the 
different periods of positive and negative pressure is less sharp with the MS-AR(3) 
model, and none of the means estimated in the model with three lags is significant. 
The only remarks to make about the simplest model are that the mean in the crisis 
state is not significant at conventional levels (although the associated p-value is 
not too big and this problem is shared with the other models) and the model does 
not assign the montlis of December 1993, and January and February of 1994 to 
the stable state.
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Table 5.9: Markov-switching AR(p) models
MS-AR(3) Mi P ii M2 cj\ P22 AR(1) AR(2) AR(3)
E s t  im  a t e 0 . 7 5 9 8 9 6 . 5 1 3 7 0 . 5 4 0 0 - 0 .1 3 3 8 0 .1 6 8 1 0 . 9 2 4 5 0 . 0 9 5 0 0 . 1 8 3 5 0 . 1 8 6 3
0 . 5 2 8 2 4 3 . 4 0 2 0 0 . 2 1 8 8 0 . 1 0 7 7 0 . 0 4 1 0 0 . 0 4 2 0 0 . 0 7 9 7 0 . 0 7 5 8 0 . 0 7 1 8
• 1 .4 3 9 1 .9 1 5 2 . 4 6 8 - 1 .2 4 2 4 . 0 9 6 2 2 .0 0 8 1 .1 9 2 2 . 4 2 0 2 . 5 9 4
p - v a l u c ( 0 . 1 5 5 ) ( 0 . 0 6 0 ) ( 0 . 0 1 6 ) ( 0 . 2 1 8 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 ) ( 0 . 2 3 7 ) ( 0 . 0 1 8 ) ( 0 . 0 1 2 )
d . f . 71 L l i k - 4 . 9 9 7 S c h w a r z  C .. - 2 4 . 1 7 9
MS-AR(2) Mi P u M2 P22 AR(1) AR(2)
E hI im a  l e 0 . 5 1 7 3 3 . 0 2 4 8 0 . 8 9 2 6 - 0 .1 8 9 2 0 . 1 3 6 4 0 . 9 4 2 1 - 0 . 0 1 4 2 0 . 0 3 4
S l a n c i a r l i  e r r o r 0 . 3 9 1 5 0 . 9 8 1 8 0 . 0 9 0 2 0 . 0 5 1 8 0 . 0 2 7 7 0 . 0 3 4 7 0 . 1 1 6 0 . 0 1 0 9
1 1 .3 2 1 3 . 0 8 1 9 . 8 9 6 - 3 . 6 5 3 4 . 9 2 4 2 7 .1 5 0 • 0 .1 2 3 0 . 3 1 3
p - v a l u c ( 0 . 1 9 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 ) ( 0 . 9 0 2 ) ( 0 . 7 5 5 )
d . f . 72 L l ik - 6 .7 9 5 S c h w a r z  C . - 2 4 .0 8 1
MS-AR(l) Mi P ii M2 (T\ P22 AR(1)
E hI im  a t e 0 . 5 1 7 8 2 . 9 6 7 9 0 . 8 7 1 0 - 0 .1 8 4 5 0 . 1 3 9 3 0 . 9 3 9 3 - 0 . 0 2 1 4
H. C. 0 . 3 7 7 6 0 . 9 8 4 5 0 . 1 0 7 8 0 . 0 5 1 3 0 . 0 2 8 8 0 . 0 3 6 1 0 . 1 1 3 4
> 1 .3 7 1 3 . 0 1 5 8 . 0 8 0 - 3 .5 9 6 4 . 8 3 7 2 6 .0 1 9 - 0 . 1 8 9
p - v a l u e 0 . 1 7 5 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 9 1 0
d . f . 7 3 L l ik - 7 . 3 0 9 S c h w a r z  C . - 2 2 . 3 2 6
MS-AR(O) Mi A Pii Ma n \ P22
E hI. in i a t e 0 . 5 3 0 5 5 3 . 0 8 1 2 7 0 . 8 3 4 3 6 - 0 .1 8 1 7 0 0 . 1 4 1 0 4 0 . 9 3 6 0 0
H. c . 0 . 4 0 2 9 9 1 . 0 5 5 4 5 0 . 1 1 6 9 8 0 . 0 5 1 9 6 0 . 0 2 9 4 7 0 . 0 3 6 8 4
• 1 .3 1 7 2 . 9 1 9 7 . 1 3 3 - 3 .4 9 7 4 . 7 8 7 2 5 .4 0 8
p - v a l u c ( 0 . 1 9 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 )
d .f. 74 dik -7 .679 Schw arz C . -20.591
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Figure 5.3: MS-AR(O). Filter sind smoothed probabilités.
Figure 5.4: MS-AR(3). Filter and smoothed probabilities.
Index
Smoothed probability
06 88 11 89 05 89 11 90 06 9011 91 06 9111 92 06 9211 93 05 93 11 94 05 94 11
Vi La  All/ In IV* ill 111 ^ I
•1.00
Markov-switching models and regime shifts 111
Figure 5.5: Andrews test of parameter stability.
In order to check our preferred model, a series of specification tests was per­
formed, as suggested in Hamilton (1996). The results of the Andrews (1993) test 
for an additional shift in the mean o f the series shown in Figure 5.5 do not indi­
cate that a model with three regimes is needed. And the rest o f the specification 
tests, shown in Table 5.10, indicate that there are no major specification errors, 
although there may be some doubts about the presence of crossed ARCH effects, 
because the White test rejects the null of no effects while the same hypothesis is 
not rejected in the Lagrange multiplier version of the test. Given this latter re­
sult, standard errors robust to specification problems were calculated, as proposed 
in White (1982). Table 5.11 shows again the estimates of the MS-AR(O) model, 
the robust standard errors, and the corresponding values of the ¿-statistics and 
p-values. The conclusions about the significance of the parameters estimated do 
not change and the p-value corresponding to the mean of the crisis state remains 
between 0.15 and 0.20.
As in the previous subsection, two states or regimes showing pressure against 
and in favour of the peso are identified. The absolute value o f the mean in the 
crisis state is more than twice that of the mean in the other regime, which denotes 
considerable asymmetry in the pressure, and also the pressure in the state of crisis
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Table 5.10: Specification tests
White Tests
Serial correlation in both regimes F(2, 76) 0.202 (0.818)
Serial Correlation in and across regimes F(4, 78) 0.887 (0.476)
ARCH effects in both regimes F(2, 76) 2.156 (0.122)
ARCH effects in and across regimes F(4, 78) 2.614 (0.042)
LM Tests
Serial correlation in regime 1 F(l, 75) 0.055 (0.815)
Serial correlation in regime 2 F(l, 75) 0.035 (0.852)
Serial correlation across regimes F(l, 75) 0.014 (0.906)
ARCH effects in regime 1 F(l, 75) 0.042 (0.838)
ARCH effects in regime 2 F(l, 75) 1.749 (0.190)
ARCH effects in each regime and across regimes F(l, 75) 0.479 (0.491)
Tests of Markov Specification
P ii depends on own lagged values and own scores of mean F(4, 76) 0.389 (0.852)
P n  depends on own lagged values F(2, 76) 0.636 (0.532)
P n  depends on own lagged values and own scores of the mean F(2, 76) 0.017 (0.983)
P22 depends on own lagged values and own scores of the mean F(2, 76) 0.769 (0.549)
Table 5.11: Robust standard errors of the MS-AR(O) model
Ml Mil M2 ct\ P22
Estimate 0.53055 3.08127 0.83436 -0.18170 0.14104 0.93600
Standard error 0.38476 1.45901 0.10965 0.05647 0.03399 0.03073
t-statistic 1.379 2.112 7.609 -3.217 4.150 30.459
p-value (0.172) (0.038) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
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is much more volatile: its variance is 21 times the other. The crisis state was much 
less persistent than the stable one: the expected time the crisis regime is expected 
to last is (1/(1 — 0.83)) 21 6  months, while the stable regime is expected to last 
more than one year; (1/(1 — 0.93)) =  15 months. These results indicate that the 
Mexican peso had a slight favourable pressure for long periods, but during short 
periods the economy shifted into a crisis state with stronger and more volatile 
pressure for peso depreciation. Not surprisingly, the periods of pressure against 
the peso were present before the fixed rate regime was substituted by a regime 
with predetermined rates at the end of 1988 and during the troubled 1994.
Modelling the shifts between regimes
In this section we estimate the filter probability of the crisis state inferred with 
the MS-AR(O) as a function o f macroeconomic fundamentals and political news 
in order to investigate the causes of the shifts between regimes. We use a logistic 
transformation of the probability as the dependent variable of a linear regression, 
which ensures that the estimated probability remains between zero and one and 
the effects of the fundamentals on the probabilities of each state are symmetric 
by construction.7 We prefer to model the series o f the filter probability because 
it is calculated at each date using the information available up to that date, in 
contrast, the smoothed probabilities are calculated using the information of the 
entire sample.
The hypothesis of a unit root in the process of the transformed probability using 
standard ADF tests cannot be rejected.This is due to the shifts in the probability, 
not, o f course, due to any trend in the series. The variable represents a probability 
that shifts in certain periods, so it is expected to exhibit breaks along time, and we 
know that in such a situation the ADF test tends not to reject the null. Hence, unit 
root tests with breaks in the constant and/or trend were performed as suggested 
by Perron (1989, 1990). The results in Table 5.12 confirm the idea that the series 
is stationary with breaks.8
7See Wallis (1987).
“ In the regressions of Table 5.12, the trend coefficient is not significant in models A and C 
and all the proposed deterministic components are significant in model B. The significance of
the change of the trend coefficient in model B can be considered dubious because the series is 
expected to show shifts not trends. Hence, the preferred model is D since this model considers
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Table 5.12: Unit root tests for the transformed probability
Test statistics
Lags Tt *3 $2
6  -2.84 5.16 3.44 -2.17
Tests with structural breaks 
Alternative processes:
A: 1(0) with trend and change in mean 
B: 1(0) with mean and and change in trend 
C: 1(0) with changes in mean and trend coefficient 
D: 1(0) without trend and change in mean 
** denotes significance at 5 percent level.
The initial and most general estimation of the transformed probability (TProbt) 
included as explanatory variables one lag of itself, three lags of the set of macroe­
conomic fundamentals, a dummy that takes the value of one in March 1990 and 
zero elsewhere (DUM), and the contemporaneous observation and three lags of 
the variable representing political events. After the elimination of insignificant 
lags and variables the results in Table 5.13 were obtained.
The lagged value of the transformed probability, included to capture the per­
sistence in the series after it shifts from one regime to another, has the expected 
sign and is significant; also, its coefficient is not close to one, which reinforces the 
idea that the transformed probability is a stationary series. The cumulated and 
long run effects of both output growth and changes in the ratio of the six-month 
cumulated trade balance relative to output are not significant. The effects of and 
increase in the debt-output ratio have the correct sign and are significant, which 
means that higher public indebtedness increased the probability of the crisis state 
both in the short and long runs. A real depreciation of the peso also increased the 
probability of the crisis state in the short and long runs. Political events have the 
expected effects as well: positive political shocks reduced the probability of the 
crisis state and negative news increased its persistence, and their cumulated and
changes in the mean only and is estimated without a trend term. The breaks considered are 
given by the classification of each date as belonging to the state of crisis or calm using the filter 
probability and the value of 0.5 as threshold.
-9.37**
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long run effects are significant. The specification tests indicate the failure o f the 
functional form test and non-normal errors (the statistics of skewness and kurtosis 
take high values). However, there is no evidence of first (or higher) order serial 
correlation of errors or heteroscedasticity, and the residuals are stationary, which 
suggests that the changes in the level of the dependent variable over time are well 
described by the linear combination of regressors.
To check the robustness of our results, other estimations were obtained as 
well. The first alternative regression was estimated and reduced using the annual 
changes of the ratio of the public debt consolidated with the central bank instead 
of PDO (which considers only the net debt of the central government, the public 
enterprises and the official development banks). The results obtained were almost 
identical given that the paths of both definitions of debt are very similar. Also, 
when the dependent variable in the regression is the transformed filter probability 
of the crisis state obtained with the MS-AR(3) model, we find similar results. The 
lag of the transformed probability has the correct sign and is significant. Output 
growth has neither cumulated nor long run effects, and the lags of the changes in 
the cumulated trade balance are eliminated when reducing the set of regressors. 
The cumulated and long run effects of the changes in the debt to output ratio 
and political news have the expected signs and are significant. The only difference 
is that the cumulated and long run effects of the real appreciation exchange rate 
have the expected signs, but turn out to be marginally insignificant: their p-values 
are (0.131) and (0.137), respectively.
The results in Table 5.13 together with the series in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 suggest 
that the reduction of public indebtedness relative to output and positive political 
shocks helped to maintain the economy in a state of calm for most of the sample 
period, despite a continuous real appreciation of the peso. However, the definitive 
end of the declining path of the debt to output ratio in 1994 and recurrent negative 
political shocks kept the economy in a state of crisis during most of 1994. The real 
depreciation of the peso observed during 1994 was not enough to counterbalance 
these effects.
The two step approach proposed can be considered as a method for model 
reduction. That is, after reducing a general model using the two step approach, 
we can estimate a reduced model with time-varying transition probabilities using
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Table 5.13: Estimation of the probability of the crisis state
Wald tests statistics (p-values)
Coefficient s. e. t (p-values) Cumulated effect Long-run effect
Constant 0.7189 0.7782 0.924 (0.359)
TProb(_i 0.2939 0.0959 3.064 (0.003)
OUT(_2 -17.9041 10.2897 -1.740 (0.086)
o u t (_ 3 37.2005 13.4320 2.769 (0.007) (+ ) 1.4632 (0.226) 1.3937 (0.238)
RER(_3 -34.1368 12.2550 -2.786 (0.007) 7.4596 (0.006)
CTBO(_! -6.2670 2.8260 -2.218 (0.030)
CTBO(_2 6.8233 2.7521 2.479 (0.016) (+ ) 0.4099 (0.522) 0.3974 (0.528)
p d o (_3 0.0088 0.0023 3.713 (0.000) 15.8479 (0.000)
POLt -1.4735 0.6034 -2.442 (0.017)
POL(_r -1.1695 0.6835 -1.711 (0.092) (-) 7.9698 (0.005) 8.3146 (0.004)
DUM 12.4575 2.6781 4.651 (0.000)
79 observations
R squared 0.63228 Adjusted R squared 0.57820
Mean of T Probi-! -1.4148 F(10, 68) 11.6922 (0.000)
Standard deviation of TProbt_i 3.8911 Standard error of regression 2.5271
Residual sum of squares 434.2703 Log likelihood-179.4128
Specification tests
First order serial correlation (h-test): -1.2712 (0.204)
Serial correlation F(12, 56): 0.6986 (0.746)
Heteroscedasticity F (l, 77): 0.00397 (0.950)
Functional form F (l, 67): 11.3671 (0.001)
Normality of errors ^ 2(2): 57.0473 (0.000)
Skewness: 1.4064 Kurtosis - 3 : 3.0689
ADF test for unit root in residuals -4.98** No. of lags: 6
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Figure 5.6: Changes in debt-output ratio and political news
Figure 5.7: Annual changes of the real exchange rate
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Table 5.14: Reduced model with TVTP
Const. PD O t-3 PO Lt RERt—3
State of Crisis
Estimate 0.702 3.812 32.549 31.991 -2155.466 -549.423
s.e. 0.258 0.208 3364.895 769.862 89.400 42.062
t-statistic 2.721 18.345 -24.110 -13.062
State of Calm
Estimate -0.179 0.154 6.661 -1.999 96.589 5.326
s.e. 0.005 0.005 5.548 0.665 32.827 7.221
t-statistic -36.095 32.536 -3.007 2.942
Log likelihood: -5.729
t-statistics shown for significance of at least 10 per cent.
the variables that have significant effects. Hence, we estimated a mean-variance 
model in which the transitions between regimes depend on the debt-output ratio, 
political news and the real exchange rate. Both the parameters and the probability 
estimates add to the robustness of our results. Table 5.14 shows the parameters 
estimated.
As before, we find that the pressure was asymmetric: the state of pressure 
shows a positive mean which has absolute value and variance larger than in the 
state of calm. And the parameters of the transition probabilities estimated indicate 
that the public debt to output ratio made the state of calm more persistent while 
real peso appreciation affected negatively the persistence of this state. Negative 
political shocks made the state of crisis more persistent, and a real depreciation of 
the peso had the opposite effect.
The plot of the probability of the crisis state estimated (shown in Figure 5.8) 
tells us the same history as before. The state of crisis prevailed in the last part of 
1988, and reached a peak in March 1990 due to the disbursement of reserves for 
the renegotiation of the external debt. The economy remained in calm until the 
end of 1993. In November of this year the probability estimated increased due to
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Figure 5.8: Reduced model. Probability estimated
the pressure that surrounded the approval of NAFTA, and then decreased after 
its approval. In 1994, the state of crisis prevails most of the year. After March 
the economy shifted to the state of crisis and remained there several months. The 
state of calm returned in September and October, but the economy shifted again 
to the state o f crisis in November and December.
Given that the two step approach yielded robust results that are confirmed 
using a model with time-varying transition probabilities, we can be confident about 
the identification of the variables causing the transitions of the economy between 
the states of calm and crisis.
5.5 Conclusions and comments
This chapter proposes an index of pressure in the foreign exchange market as 
an indicator of the credibility of the Mexican peso, and using Markov-switching 
models to describe the shifts of the economy between states of calm and crisis. 
Also, we propose modelling the transitions between regimes and the probabilities of 
each regime at each date in the sample as functions of macroeconomic fundamentals 
and political news in order to investigate the causes of those shifts.
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Two states were identified using Markov-switching models with constant or 
time varying transition probabilities. The state o f calm is characterized by a slight 
pressure for peso appreciation and the crisis state by stronger and more volatile 
pressure for peso depreciation.
The results of models with time varying transition probabilities suggest that 
fiscal matters and political shocks significantly affected the transitions between 
regimes, but the results are not conclusive. Hence, we adopted a two step approach 
to obtain the probability of the state of crisis at each date in the sample and model 
this series as a function of macroeconomic fundamentals and political events.
The preferred model with constant transition probabilities indicates that the 
magnitude of the pressure for peso depreciation was more than twice the favourable 
pressure in the state of calm, and it was also much more volatile: the variance in the 
crisis state was 21 times the other. The state o f calm had an expected duration of 
15 months, and the unstable regime an expected duration of 6 months. According 
to the series of the filter probabilities, the economy remained in the state of calm 
most of the time, but shifted to the state of crisis in the last months o f 1988, when 
the fixed exchange rate regime changed to predetermined rates, and most of 1994, 
a year marked by political and financial turmoil.
The logistic transformation of the probability of the crisis state was modelled 
as a function of macroeconomic fundamentals and political news. We found robust 
results indicating that political events, the changes in the debt-output ratio and the 
movements of the real exchange rate directed the shifts of the economy between 
the states of calm and crisis. These results were confirmed using a model with 
time-varying transition probabilities involving the variables mentioned.
During most of the sample, the reduction o f  public indebtedness and positive 
political events contributed to maintaining the economy in a state of calm, despite 
a considerable real appreciation of the peso. However, the ratio o f public debt 
to output stopped its declining path before 1994 and a series of negative political 
shocks followed. This shifted the economy towards the state of crisis for most of 
the year. A real depreciation of the peso was not enough to return the economy to 
the state of calm. In the state of crisis, reserve losses accumulated along the year, 
and the last period of confidence crisis in late December resulted in the collapse of 
the peso.
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Based on this evidence, we conclude that the periods of confidence crisis ob­
served in 1994 and the collapse of the peso on December 21st should be considered 
as the product of a combination of weakening fundamentals, that were not neces­
sarily fatal, and a series of unpredictable shocks that shifted the economy towards 
the state o f crisis and exhausted the mechanisms of defence used by the government 
during that year.
The plots of the probabilities of the crisis state obtained indicate that before 
the devaluation o f the peso, the economy spent some months in a state of crisis 
in which recurrent reserve losses undermined the future defence of the peso. We 
may consider such a pattern as consistent with the hypothesis proposed by Ben- 
said and Jeanne (1997), who suggest that a currency crisis may be a protracted 
period during which there is a war of attrition between monetary authorities and 
speculators before the final speculative attack and the devaluation of the currency.
We found that during 1994 the macroeconomic fundamentals that determined 
the prevalence of the different states acted in opposite directions but most of the 
time the economy stayed in a crisis state. Such a finding is similar to that reported 
by Jeanne (1997) in his study of the speculation against the French franc in 1992- 
93. According to his results, the rise in the rate of unemployment maintained 
the Flench economy in the zone of multiple equilibria despite the improvement of 
other economic fundamentals. Hence, as Jeanne notes, “One may conjecture that 
the difference between the Flench franc [or the peso] and other currencies, if it 
exists, probably lies more in the nature of the determining fundamentals than in 
the presence of animal spirits [sudden shifts towards the state of crisis]” .9
Therefore, when studying other currency crises in which self-fulfilling elements 
may be present, one should not expect to find a typical pattern of fundamentals 
leading the economy to a crisis state, but different configurations of fundamentals 
and shocks for different countries. A clear example of this is the role of contagion 
in the recent crises in East Asia, and probably in the crisis of the ERM as well, 
although this is not the case for Mexico.
9 Page 283.
Chapter 6
The 1989-94 Consumption Boom  
in Mexico: An analysis of 
Cointegration using Regime Shifts
6.1 Introduction
One of the most noticeable consequences of the program for stabilisation and 
economic reform introduced in Mexico in 1987 was a considerable reduction in 
domestic savings and an increased dependence on external savings to finance cap­
ital formation.1 The ratio of domestic savings to gross domestic product (GDP) 
decreased from 21.3 per cent in 1988 to 14.7 per cent in 1994 while the ratio of 
foreign savings increased from 1.3 per cent in 1988 to 7.1 per cent in 1994. And 
later, after the eruption of the financial crisis at the beginning of 1995 and a short 
period of recovery, the savings ratio has returned to values similar to those ob­
served before the program. In 1998 domestic savings amounted to 20.6 per cent of 
GDP, and in 1999 this figure was 20.3 per cent.
In this chapter we analyse the changes in consumption behaviour that con­
tributed to such a reduction in domestic savings using cointegration modelling 
methods that allow shifts in regimes. We will argue that the introduction of the 
program for economic stabilisation and reform implied a temporary structural 
break in the long run relationship between aggregate private consumption and in­
1 See Buira (1994) and Banco de Mexico (1995) for brief discussions of this issue.
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come that led to a consumption boom of considerable magnitude. We will illustrate 
this by modelling the cointegration relationship between consumption and income 
taking into account shifts in regime, which will enable us to date and evaluate the 
structural break.
Structural breaks in economic relationships have long been a subject of study 
(early works include Quandt (1958) and Chow (I960)) because economies are often 
subject to shocks or institutional changes that may change the dynamics of eco­
nomic variables and the pattern of their inter-relationships.2 However, although 
the study of the effects of structural breaks on unit roots tests (Perron (1988), 
(1989), (1990)) came soon after the start of the revolution of unit roots and coin­
tegration (Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988)), the effects of structural 
breaks on cointegration modelling have taken longer to become a focus of the re­
search agenda. See Hansen (1992), Quintos and Phillips (1993), the January 1996 
issue of the Journal of Econometrics, Hoa and Inder (1996), and Seo (1998). Even 
now, there is no well-established approach in the literature to tackle the problem 
of structural breaks in long-run cointegrating relationships.
The focus o f  our analysis is the change in the cointegrating relationship between 
aggregate private consumption and income that resulted in the consumption boom 
observed in Mexico during the period 1989-1994. Specifically, we will argue that 
structural breaks should be taken into account not only in unit root testing, but 
also in cointegration modelling in order to identify and evaluate accurately the 
consumption boom. We achieve this by postulating Markov-switching models for 
the cointegrating relationship that allow shifts in regimes.
Our modelling indicates that the implementation of the program for stabilisa­
tion and economic reform at the end of 1987 and its abandonment at the end of 
1994 produced institutional change-induced structural breaks in the series of pri­
vate consumption and income and also in their cointegrating relationship. Before 
the program was implemented, the long run relationship between consumption 
and income was characterized by the unitary elasticity often found in empirical re­
search. However, the introduction of the program soon led to a sharp regime shift
2 For instance, the stability of money demand equations often receives considerable attention 
given its critical role in the implementation of monetary policy. See for instance, Lutkepohl et 
al (1999), Raj (1995) and Hendry and Ericsson (1991).
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in the cointegrating relationship. In the period of the boom, the income elasticity 
of consumption increased considerably: private consumption was growing almost 
30 percent faster than income. And later, when the program was abandoned at the 
end of 1994, the unitary elasticity was re-established in the middle of a currency 
and financial crisis.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the the­
oretical background for the proposition of a cointegration relationship between 
consumption and income, a review of the main findings in the empirical literature, 
and a brief theoretical background supporting the case of regime shifts in their long 
run relationship. Section 6.3 focuses on the characteristics of the series used and 
highlights the importance of taking into account the effects of structural breaks 
when testing for unit roots. Section 6.4 estimates the cointegrating vector of the 
log of per capita private consumption and the log of income using seasonally unad­
justed and adjusted data and investigates the stability of its parameters over time. 
Section 6.5 estimates long run relationships that allow shifts in the cointegration 
vectors using Markov-switching models, and tests for the existence of cointegrating 
relationships with shifts. Section 6 .6  summarizes and concludes.
6.2 Income, consumption and structural breaks
The theoretical basis of the proposition for a cointegrating relationship between ag­
gregate consumption and income is a result of the rational expectations-permanent 
income hypothesis (RE-PIH) introduced by FViedman (1957). The representative 
individual maximizes a concave twice differentiable utility function which depends 
on consumption, as in equation (6 .1 ), and discounts future utility with the rate of 
time preference <5 (0 <  6 < 1). The accumulation of assets by the individual is 
constrained in each period by the budget constraint in equation (6.3), where r is 
the (assumed constant) real interest rate. Ak+\ is the stock of assets at the end 
of period k, and Yk (=  rAk +  Yk) and Yk denote disposable and labour income in 
period k, respectively.
(6.1)
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Ck > 0 ; Uc >  0; Ucc <  0; lim{/c =  oo; lim Uc — 0 (6.2)
c — »0 c — »oo
-'4*+i =  Ykf +  Ak — Ck =  (1 +  r)Ak +  Yk — Ck (6.3)
The period by period budget constraint gives rise to the intertemporal budget 
constraint in equation (6.4), where the no-Ponzi game condition in expression
(6.5) has been imposed with equality because o f the characteristics of the utility 
function.
k —t
Ck =  ( l + r ) A t + S te ) ' (6.4)
< 6 5 >
Assuming that the rate of time preference equals the real interest rate yields 
a constant level of consumption, Ct. Substituting this result into expression (6.4) 
and solving for Ct yields an expression in which consumption at period t equals 
the annuity value of the consumer’s total discounted wealth.
k — t
Yk (6.6)
Then, substracting disposable income from both sides of (6 .6 ) and rearranging 
yields:
Ct -  Ytd =  - Y t -  rAt + Vl + r (1  +  r)A t + I ( t^ ) Yk (6.7)
Ct -  Ytd =  - Y t + (6.8)
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/  \ °° /  i \ k
c- y‘ = (^ )S  (i^) <“ »
Assuming that labour income, Yk, follows a random walk, Yj — =  A Y ,  =  £j
has an expected value of zero and constant variance. Hence, the factors on the 
right hand side of expression (6.9) are a constant, a summation that converges 
to (1/r )  and sums of covariance stationary terms. As a result, consumption and 
disposable income are cointegrated with a cointegrating vector (1  - l ) ’ .3
Cointegration between consumption and disposable income has been exten­
sively tested and often confirmed. In particular, cointegration vectors with uni­
tary marginal propensity to consume and unitary income elasticity are often found 
(for instance, see King et al (1991), later revised by Han and Ogaki (1997) and 
Villagomez (1994)), or assumed, as in any error correction model containing the 
lagged ratio of consumption to income (see Davidson et al (1978) and some of the 
works reviewed in Church et al (1995)). In fact, it is the absence of cointegration 
between consumption and income that calls for attention: see Hall et al (1997a), 
Cooley and Ogaki (1996), Fuchun (1995) and Engle et al (1993).
The instability of the cointegrating vector due to structural changes is con­
sidered the main cause of a failure to find cointegration where economic theory 
predicts its existence, and this issue has gained considerable attention recently. 
However, there is no single approach in the literature to tackle the issue of unsta­
ble cointegrating vectors, and hence no definitive answer in terms of a complete 
and well defined framework for inference and testing. For instance, Granger and 
Siklos (1997) have suggested that structural breaks may result in a cointegrating
3Note that the result of a constant level of consumption over time C t =  Ce_i in the deter­
ministic version of the model is compatible with the finding that consumption is integrated of 
order one when a random error term is introduced to obtain the stochastic representation of 
the series and Y td is integrated of order one regardless of the order of integration of the stock 
of assets. Also note that other cointegrating vectors may result, depending on the specific form 
of the the utility function and different assumptions about the rate of time preference, the real 
interest rate and the shape of the stream of labor income along the life cycle of the consumers 
(see, Graham and Himarios, (1996)), but we will not elaborate further on this theoretical issue 
since the cointegrating vector which is usually found or assumed to achieve cointegration is the 
one illustrated above.
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relationship existing dining some periods but not in others; Hall et al (1997a) have 
proposed a model that allows shifts in the cointegrating vector; Krolzig (1997) stud­
ied the case of switching constant terms in a vector error correction model; Hall 
et al (1997b) have suggested a switching error correction model; and Hansen and 
Johansen (1993) have studied the case of a change in the number of cointegrating 
vectors over time.
Structural breaks in time series or economic relationships may be due to large 
shocks or institutional changes. The latter case is the one studied in this chapter. 
In what follows, we present empirical evidence indicating that the implementation 
of the program for stabilisation and economic reform in Mexico at the end of 1987 
and its abandonment at the end of 1994 resulted in a temporary change in the 
long run relationship between aggregate private consumption and income that led 
to the consumption boom.
At a theoretical level, the proposition that the relationship between consump­
tion and income may show shifts due to the implementation of a program for 
stabilisation and economic reform is supported by various models and hypotheses. 
Such is the conclusion of Rebelo and Vegh (1995) who made a comparative study 
of the explanatory power of different theoretical hypotheses aimed at explaining 
the stylized facts observed in countries that have implemented exchange rate-based 
stabilisation programs. They concluded that a consumption boom , as well as other 
empirical regularities, can be produced under different, and sometimes opposite, 
theoretical hypotheses. For instance, a model with forward looking expectations in 
which money demand is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint that considers 
the issue of lack of credibility of the stabilisation program (as in Calvo and Vegh 
(1993)) can be used to explain the consumption boom after the implementation of a 
stabilisation program. However, a model with inflation stickiness due to backward 
looking expectations that in addition takes into account the positive supply side 
effects o f the permanent (or at least perceived as such) reduction of the inflation 
rate can also be used to explain a strong surge in private consumption when an 
exchange rate-based stabilisation program is implemented (see, Rodriguez (1982), 
Dornbusch (1982) and Roldos (1995)).
Pill (1995) reached a similar conclusion in his study of the pegging of the British 
Pound to the German Mark between 1986 and 1992 and the economic reforms im­
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plemented during the Thatcher government. Pill concluded that two theoretical 
hypotheses put forward in the literature were able to explain the boom-bust cycle 
and the consumption boom observed in the UK during that period. One of those 
hypothesis, the one postulated by Muellbauer and Murphy ( 1990a,b), suggested 
that the deregulation and liberalization of the financial system and ill designed 
regulations in the housing market made the UK economy enter in a self enforcing 
spiral o f  credit expansion, inflation of asset prices, increases of wealth, consump­
tion growth and expansion of domestic demand that was unsustainable. While 
the other hypothesis, associated with King (1994, 1990), argued that the credit 
financed consumption was generated by the expectation of increases in future in­
come generated by the economic reforms implemented. Like Rebelo and Vegh, 
Pill remarks that in many respects, including the consumption boom, different 
theoretical hypotheses about exchange rate based stabilisation programs are ob- 
servationally equivalent.
One of the explanations of boom-bust cycle in the UK reviewed by Pill -  that 
suggested by King -  is based on the rational expectations-permanent income hy­
pothesis, and can be illustrated with the modelling outlined in section 6.2. Suppose 
that the stabilisation of the inflation rate and the economic reforms are credible 
and make consumers revise their expectations of future income upwards because of 
a future increase in productivity. Since individuals smooth consumption over time, 
the result is that current consumption will rise above current income. Then, if after 
some time it is revealed that, perhaps due to a large unanticipated negative shock, 
the increase in future productivity and income will not occur, consumption will 
adjust downwards. And the result is that the time series of aggregate consumption 
and income show a temporary change in their cointegrating relationship.
As in other countries, financial liberalization was one of the main ingredients of 
the economic reform program implemented in Mexico,4 and such a policy is often 
suggested as a factor that contributes to generate a boom in consumption, see 
for example, Chan and Hu (1997), Agell and Berg (1996), Bayoumi (1993), Miles
4 Financial liberalization in Mexico started in the fall of 1988. It included the abolition of 
controls on interest rates, the obligatory lines of credit to the public sector and priority sectors 
and continuous reductions in reserve requirements. The last stage of the liberalization involved 
the privatization of the banking system and the abolition of reserve requirements. See Aspe 
(1993).
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(1992), Lehmussaari (1990), and the works of Muellbauer and Murphy mentioned 
above.
Consider two types of consumers: a fraction (1  — A) of the population has 
access to financial markets, behaves as stated in equation (6 .6 ) and consumes Cn t 
at period t. Whereas the fraction A of the population is constrained to consume 
each period the amount of the total labour income they receive: CC]t =  AYt. Total 
consumption at time t is Ct =  Cnl +  AV), while total disposable income is as before 
(Ytd =  rA t +  Yt) since unconstrained individuals hold all the assets of the economy. 
Hence, total consumption can be expressed as in equation (6.10), and substracting 
total disposable income from both sides and rearranging yields expression (6 .1 1 ), 
where the right hand side is a random stationary series with an expectation of 
zero, and the vector (1 - 1 ) ’ is the cointegrating vector.
C, “(rb) +  A Yt (6.10)
( \  OO /  1 \  fc~ t k
, 5 , ^  (6U)
Now suppose that the temporary expectation o f a future increase in labour 
income mentioned above is accompanied by a decrease in A due to financial liber­
alization. In that case, the increase of expected future income will have a stronger 
effect on current consumption. That is, the temporary gap between consumption 
and income will be larger because those consumers who were previously excluded 
from financial markets will incur debt to smooth their consumption over time, 
and hence financial liberalization contributes to increase the magnitude of the 
consumption boom.
In the following sections, we show that the program for stabilisation and eco­
nomic reform implemented in Mexico at the end of 1987 and abandoned at the end 
of 1994 provoked structural breaks in the time series of consumption and income 
and a considerable change in their cointegration relationship.
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Figure 6.1: Logs of per capita GDP and consumption expenditure.
6.3 Preliminary analysis of the series
Prior to the cointegration analysis, it is necessary to check the order of integration 
of the series involved. The logs o f real per capita consumption expenditure and 
gross domestic product (GDP) shown in Graph 6.1 have a marked pattern of 
seasonality, hence we check for the order of integration at the zero frequency and 
seasonal frequencies using the unit roots tests proposed in Osborn (1990).5
According to the results in panel a) of Table 6.1, the series of per capita GDP, 
yt, contains a unit root at the zero frequency, but not at the seasonal frequency; 
while the series of per capita consumption expenditure, c(, is integrated at both 
frequencies. The non-stationarity o f  the series at the zero frequency and stationar- 
ity of their first differences is confirmed with the results of the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller tests in panel b).
The results in panel c) of Table 6.1 confirm the presence of a seasonal unit
5We used total consumption expenditures because there are no disaggregated series for non­
durables and durables. The income variable is Gross Domestic Product because quarterly series 
of disposable income are not available. Population data are reported at annual frequency, so the 
figure for each year was assumed to apply to middle of the year and a log-linear extrapolation 
was used to obtain the series at quarterly frequency.
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Table 6 .1 : Unit root tests
a)
Tests for unit roots at zero and quarterly frequencies 
Variable lags /31 F-test
yt 1 -0.8769 -4.6394 6.0153(0.000)




Variable lags Tt $ 3 4>2
Vt 1 -1.1769 1.4338 1.1703 -0.7398
Ct 2 -2.3055 3.0395 2.0574 -1.9355
A yt 1 -6.0367**
A ct 1 -7.4856**
c)
Test for unit roots at all frequencies 
Variable lags n2 773 PI 7t4 c*o Cl Tt\
ct 4 -2.5038 -2.5210 3.4776 3.1547
(-3.56) (-3.49) (8.92) (6.70)
Critical values at 0.05, in parentheses, taken from Osborn (1990).
**Denotes significance at 5 per cent level.
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root in the process of ct and also reveal a disturbing result: it seems that c( 
contains a unit root at all frequencies, which would mean that there are no long run 
relationships between different seasons since the individual series for each quarter 
drives away from the others (Osborn, 1993). However, we know that the failure 
to reject the null o f non-stationarity in unit root tests may be due to structural 
changes in the means or the growth rate of a series (Perron, 1989), its seasonal 
pattern (Otero and Smith, 1995), or all three components (Hall et al, 1997a). 
Therefore, unit root tests that allow for a structural break in the constant, the 
trend and the seasonal pattern were applied to ct in order to explore further the 
conclusion obtained above.
By inspection, it seems that the series c( contains two changes, one in 1988 and 
the other at the end o f 1994. The unit root tests and critical values suggested in 
Hall et al (1997a) are designed for the case of one structural break in the sample, 
hence, we used two sub-samples in which we assume there is only one structural 
break. The first sub-sample starts in 1980 and ends in 1994. We assume that in 
this sub-sample there is a break due to the implementation of the stabilisation 
program and the economic reforms. The second sub-sample starts in 1988 and 
ends in the first quarter of 1999. In this sub-sample, the structural break is due 
to the currency and financial crisis that started in December 1994. The tests were 
also applied to the entire sample available (1980.1-1999.1) although the critical 
values are not strictly applicable for the case of two structural breaks.
The results in Table 6.2 show that ct is not integrated at all frequencies. It 
contains a unit root at the zero frequency, but not at the semiannual frequency 
and there are doubts about its order of integration at the annual frequency since 
the null of a unit root is rejected for the period 1980-1994 but not in the period 
1988-1999. In what follows, we will consider c( and yt to be integrated of order 
one at the zero frequency only and concentrate on their cointegrating relationship 
at this frequency.
6.4 Stability of the cointegration vector
The analysis of cointegration and constancy of parameters is performed using the 
Fully Modified estimators of the cointegration vector suggested in Phillips and
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Table 6.2: Seasonal unit root tests with breaks
Sample lags TTl 7T2 7T3 n  7T4 7T2 n  7T3 n  7r4
1980.1 - 1994.1 none -2.8060 -3.3619 21.4510 46.4439
1988.1 - 1999.1 i -3.0497 -3.2179 10.7115 27.2114
1980.1 - 1999.1 none -3.3313 -3.7334 16.9222 25.8258
(-4.07) (-3.10) (13.6) (10.80)
Critical values at significance 0.05, in parentheses, taken from Hall et al (1997a).
Hansen (1990), the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for cointegration suggested in 
Engle and Granger (1987), and the tests of parameter constancy o f Gregory and 
Hansen (1996), and Hansen (1992).
Table 6.3 shows the results of the estimation of the cointegrating vector for 
different subperiods and the entire sample in panel a), and the results of the tests 
o f cointegration and parameter constancy in panels b) and c). According to the 
results in panel a), the estimate of the income elasticity of consumption varies with 
the sample used. For the first subsample (1980-1994) the elasticity is above one; 
in the second subsample (1988-1999) it is below one; and using the entire sample 
available yields an elasticity close to one.
In panel b), the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null of no cointe­
gration and favours the alternative of cointegration and its implicit assumption of 
constant parameters. But on the other hand, the tests suggested by Gregory and 
Hansen (1996) reject the same null in favour of the alternative o f cointegration 
with a shift in parameters (both the constant and the income elasticity) when ap­
plied to the first subsample (A D F * and Z*) and the entire sample (A D F * and Z*, 
Z*). That is, the tests in panel b) yield conflicting evidence about the constancy 
o f parameters. Therefore, in order to determine if there is a cointegrating vector 
with constant parameters or shifts in those parameters, panel c) presents the re­
sults of the tests proposed in Hansen (1992). In these tests the null hypothesis is 
cointegration with constant parameters and the alternatives indicate a structural 
break in parameters (in the SupF  test) or gradual changes in parameters over time 
(in the M eanF  and Lc tests). The results suggest that the null o f cointegration 
with constant parameters cannot be accepted.
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Table 6.3: FM estimators and tests.
a)
1980.1 - 1994.4 1988.1 - 1999.1 1980.1 - 1999.1
Const Vt Const y t Const Vt
estimates -1.824 1.153 0.032 0.959 -0.504 1.014
s.e. 1.049 0.109 1.433 0.149 0.869 0.090
t-statistic -1.737 10.528 0.022 6.434 -0.578 11.193
p-values (0.087) (0.000) (0.983) (0.000) (0.565) (0.000)
b)
lags statistic lags statistic lags statistic
ADF 0 -5.983** 0 -3.399** 0 -5.429**
ADF* 0 -5.260** 0 -4.520 0 -5.931**
z t* -6.005** -4.458 -6.564**
z* -40.324 -27.791 -51.631**
c )
statistic p-values statistic p  ^values statistic p-values
SupF 14.062 (0.030) 8.420 (>0.200) 11.624 (0.082)
MeanF 5.763 (0.023) 3.296 (0.139) 3.504 (0.119)
Lc 0.720 (0.010) 0.474 (0.047) 0.593 (0.023)
p-values in parentheses. Critical values at significance 0.05: -4.95 for tests 
ADF* and Z*, and -47.04 for test Z^; taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996). 
>0.200 means a p-value equal or larger than 0.2
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The same conclusion about the stability o f the cointegrating vector is obtained 
when seasonally adjusted series are used.6 Table 6.4 shows the Fully Modified 
estimators of the cointegrating vector and the relevant tests. Panel a) of the table 
shows that the estimate of the income elasticity is above one in the first subsample, 
below one in the second and close to one when using the entire sample. In contrast 
to the results obtained with seasonally unadjusted data, the ADF test in panel b) 
of the table does not favour the alternative of cointegration.7 This result may be 
considered as an indication of shifts in the cointegrating vector because the non­
rejection of the unit root hypothesis in the residuals of a cointegrating relationship 
using ADF tests may be due to the presence of shifts in the cointegrating vector, 
as documented by Gregory et al (1996). And such an indication can be confirmed 
by testing the null of no cointegration against an alternative that allows for shifts 
in parameters. In effect, the Z *, and Z* tests indicate that the results of the ADF 
tests are due to the instability of parameters. For the three samples used, the null 
of no cointegration is rejected if the alternative allows shifts in both the constant 
term and the income elasticity.8
FYom the results above, we conclude that the long run relationship between 
consumption and income cannot be characterized by a cointegrating vector with 
constant parameters. If there is a cointegrating relationship it appears to shift 
over time.
6.5 Cointegration and regime shifts
In this section we deal with the issue of stability of parameters by allowing the 
cointegration relationship to shift over time using a Markov-switching model.
The estimation of Markov-switching models pioneered by Hamilton (1989, 
1994, 1996) typically assumes that the variables are stationary. And no theoretical 
elaboration of the distribution theory exists for a Markov-switching regression with 
1(1) variables. Nevertheless, Hall et al (1997a) have performed Monte Carlo exper-
°The seasonal adjustment was performed using the linear approximation of the X I1 filter.
7The same conclusion is obtained when the cointegrating vector is estimated using ordinary 
least squares or if it contains the theoretically plausible values (1 -1)’ .
"Note that the tests of Hansen (1992) were not performed on seasonally adjusted data because 
there is no conflict between the ADF tests and the Z * tests of Gregory and Hansen (1996).
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Table 6.4: FM estimators and tests. Seasonally adjusted data
a)
1980.1 - 1994.4 1988.1 - 1999.1 1980.1 - 1999.1
Const Vt Const Vt Const 2It
estimates -3.289 1.306 0.725 0.887 -1.224 1.089
s.e. 1.277 0.133 2.325 0.242 1.682 0.175
t-statistic -2.574 9.796 0.311 3.665 0.727 6.215
p-values (0.013) (0.000) (0.7570 (0.0010 (0.469) (0.000)
b)
lags statistic lags statistic lags statistic













p-values in parentheses. Critical values at significance 0.05: -4.95 for tests 
ADF* and Z*, and -47.04 for test Z*; taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996).
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iments in order to explore the distribution of the Maximum Likelihood estimates 
of a Markov-switching cointegration vector for the bivariate case. Their results 
indicate that for models such as those used here, ¿-statistics can be used if we also 
use a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust estimator of the covariance 
matrix.9
The Markov-switching cointegration model allows the estimates of the con­
stant term, the income elasticity, the coefficients of the seasonal dummies and 
error variance to shift between the two regimes. Hence, the model for seasonally 
unadjusted data with two regimes involves the following vector of 14 parameters 
9 =  (aa,P a,6qta,a a,paa), where a s is the constant coefficient, p s the income elas­
ticity, 6QiS the coefficient of the quarterly dummy variable, dq t, corresponding to 
quarter q =  2 ,3 ,4 , and cj\ is the variance of the error term. All these parameters 
depend on the regime prevailing at date t, st(=  i , j ) ,  as stated in equation (6.1), 
and the transition between regimes is governed by a first order Markov-chain with 
constant transition probabilities, paa, as in expression (6.2).
Note that in contrast to the analysis in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, here we do not 
make any assumption about the dates of the structural breaks. Instead, they will 
be determined in the estimation. The dates of the breaks will be given by the 
shifts in the series of filter and smoothed probabilities of each regime prevailing at 
each date in the sample that are calculated in the iterations of the EM algorithm 
used to maximize the likelihood function.
9In particular, the authors report that the estimates have a negligible bias in samples of 100 
and 200, and the empirical size of tests based on conventional t-statistics or N(0,1) do not deviate 
significantly from the nominal test size.
4
S  =  l,J. (6.1)
[Py] =  [ p ( s t =  j  I s t - i  =  * ) ]  =
Pii Pji  1  P jj
Pij =  1  Pii P jj
(6.2)
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Table 6.5: Markov-switching cointegration
R egim e 1 OL1 0 1 ¿2,1 ¿3,1 ¿4,1 ° \ Pn
estimate -0.48799 1.00837 0.02399 0.07114 0.02833 0.00022 0.97607
s. e. 0.39693 0.04134 0.00621 0.00550 0.00860 0.00005 0.01757
t-statistic 1.230 24.391 3.864 12.925 3.292 4.163 55.543
p-value 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
R egim e 2 a 2 0 2 ¿2,2 ¿3,2 ¿4,2 ° 2 P22
estimate -3.02977 1.27746 0.01002 0.08507 0.02160 0.00020 0.95384
s. e. 1.29769 0.13497 0.00931 0.00955 0.00938 0.00009 0.07456
t-statistic -2.335 9.465 1.076 8.904 2.301 2.107 12.793
p-value 0.023 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.025 0.039 0.000
Log-likelihood: -209.31
Robust standard errors as in White (1982).
Table 6.5 presents the results of the estimation using seasonally unadjusted 
series.1(1 In regime 1 we find a unitary elasticity, while regime 2 has an elasticity 
well above one (1.28), which means that during the years of the boom consumption 
was growing almost 30 per cent faster than income. Plots o f the filter and smoothed 
probabilities, shown in Graph 6.2, indicate that the change of regime started in 
1988 and regime 2 prevailed from the beginning of 1989 until the end of 1994." 
That is, soon after the stabilisation program was implemented the economy entered 
a consumption boom, and the unitary elasticity was reinstalled at the beginning 
of 1995, when the currency and financial crisis erupted.
It is important to note the coincidence of the dating of the shifts indicated 
by the filter and smoothed probabilities of the Markov-switching model shown in 
Graph 6.2 with the shifts in the paths of the standardized residuals obtained with
1 :l We used robust standard errors as the ones suggested in White (1982) because they can 
overcome the effects of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the error term.
1 'The filter probabilities of each regime prevailing at date t are calculated using the information 
up to that date, while the smoothed probabilities take into account the information of the entire 
sample.
Cointegration and regime shifts 139
Figure 6.2: Filter and smoothed probabilities.
Figure 6.3: Fully modified residuals.
•20
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the Fully Modified estimators in Graph 6.3. The shifts in regimes coincide with 
the step changes of the residuals.
We notice that the variance o f the error term is somewhat smaller in the regime 
of the boom. Such a result may be explained by noting that the left hand side 
of equation (6.11) can be rewritten as Cnit +  AYt — Y d =  Ct — Ytd. Hence, if the 
variances of the consumption of non-constrained individuals and total disposable 
income remain the same, the variance of total consumption may decrease when 
A decreases, because the random error contained in the series of labour income 
affecting current consumption will have a smaller weight attached.
In order to check if a third regime should be considered, a model with three 
regimes was estimated. The most noticeable results were that one of the elasticities 
estimated was not significant, and during the period 1989-1994 the estimate of the 
elasticity was similar to the one shown above and significant. A likelihood ratio test 
applied to the model with three regimes, to test if the additional parameters could 
be considered zero, yielded and adjusted p-value of 0.060, hence the hypothesis of 
two regimes is rejected at the 10 per cent level of significance, but not at the 5 per 
cent level.12
Very similar income elasticities and patterns of the filter and smoothed prob­
abilities are obtained if we apply the Markov-switching cointegration model with 
two regimes to seasonally adjusted data. Table 6.6 presents the results of the es­
timation and Graph 6.4 the plots of the inferred probabilities. Again, the income 
elasticity of consumption was above one during the period 1989 - 1994, and the 
unitary elasticity that prevailed before 1989 was re-established at the beginning 
of 1995. The shifts o f the cointegration relationship described by the filter and 
smoothed probabilities coincide with the marked changes in the series of Fully 
Modified residuals shown in Graph 6.3, and the variance of the error term is again 
smaller in the regime of the consumption boom .13
12 In this test, there are ten nuisance parameters that are not identified under the null hypothesis 
of two regimes, hence, the p-value corresponding to the test statistic, a y 2 with ten degrees of 
freedom, was corrected as suggested in Davies (1987).
13It is worth noting that the preferred tests and estimations are the ones using seasonally 
unadjusted series because the effects of structural breaks in the series on the efficiency of seasonal 
filters are uncertain, and filtering may have undesiderable consequences for some tests we use
here (see Ghysels and Perron (1996), Otero and Smith (1996) and FYanses and McAleer (1998)). 
Also, note that obtaining so similar results using unadjusted and adjusted data is not guaranteed
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Table 6.6: Markov-switching cointegration. Seasonally adjusted data
Regime 1 «1 0\ Pn
estimate -0.48666 1.01150 0.00020 0.97812
s. e. 0.39969 0.04157 0.00004 0.01795
t-statistic 1.218 24.327 4.093 54.482
p-value 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regime 2 «2 02 o\ P22
estimate -3.13913 1.29194 0.00015 0.95591
s. e. 1.09663 0.11410 0.00004 0.07112
t-statistic -2.863 11.323 3.426 13.439
p-value 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000
Log-likelihood: -215.86 
Robust standard errors as in White (1982).
Figure 6.4: Filter and smoothed probabilités. Seasonally adjusted data.
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To test the null of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration 
(both with regime shifts) we apply an ADF test to the standardized weighted 
residuals of the switching cointegration relationship. The weights are given by the 
smoothed probabilities shown in Graphs 6.2 and 6.4 and the weighted residuals 
are shown in Graph 6.5. The outcome of the tests is reported in Table 6.7, and the 
critical values were obtained from Hall et al (1997a).* 14 The models postulating a 
cointegration relationship with shifts in regimes yield stationary residuals.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter highlights the importance of taking into account structural breaks 
when testing for unit roots and the modelling o f long run cointegrating relation­
ships. This has been illustrated with an analysis o f the consumption boom observed
a priori, as is clear from the analysis of the stability of the German money demand function using 
a smooth transition regression model of Lutkepohl et al (1999).
14 We follow the recomendation made in Hall et al (1997a) of leaving in the auxiliary regression 
of the ADF test only the lagged differences of the residuals that have significant t-ratios, because 
the inclusion of redundant terms decreases the power of the test.
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the years of the boom. And later, when the program was abandoned at the end of 
1994 in the middle of a currency and financial crisis, the cointegrating vector with 
unitary income elasticity was re-established.
The results obtained cannot be used to support any particular hypothesis put 
forward in the theoretical literature to explain the effects on consumption of stabil­
isation and economic reform programs because they are observationally equivalent 
in terms of a consumption boom, as well as other empirical regularities. However, 
we can state that the regime with an income elasticity larger than one can not be 
considered an equilibrium relationship in the sense that such an income elastic­
ity can not be sustained in the long run, since it would imply a violation of the 
no-Ponzi game condition.
In summary, this chapter shows that shifts in long run relationships that can 
be rationalized without problems as the result of an optimal decision of consumers 
(or at least a decision that was considered optimal at the time it was made) can be 
accurately dated and evaluated if we allow regime shifts in cointegration models.
Chapter 7 
Conclusions
The empirical analysis of the currency crises of the nineties remains insufficient in 
itself, and the collapse of the Mexican peso in December 1994 opened a debate in 
which there are different explanations based on the theoretical literature, but scarce 
empirical evidence. This is why most o f the thesis was devoted to formulating an 
interpretation of the collapse of the peso using empirical methods.
We started the empirical analysis o f the devaluation of the peso using a series 
of realignment expectations based on the drift adjustment method and linear and 
non-linear methods. The objective was to find empirical evidence that helps to 
characterise the Mexican crisis as either due to bad fundamentals a la Krugman 
or a crisis with self-fulfilling elements a la Obstfeld.
Contrary to the predictions of first generation models o f currency crises, we 
found that the series of realignment expectations do not show a noticeable deteri­
oration of the credibility of the peso before its collapse.
Using linear methods, we found that the set of variables determining realign­
ment expectations was similar to those identified for other countries. In particular, 
the real exchange rate and the changes in international reserves were found to be 
significant. Moreover, an innovative finding was that a worsening of the financial 
health of the banking system significantly affected realignment expectations.
Rolling estimations of the linear model suggested that the relationship between 
realignment expectations and their determinants did not remain stable over time. 
In view of this finding and the apparent shifts in the level of realignment expecta­
tions over time, we postulated a non-linear model that allows shifts in regimes.
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Using a Markov-switching regression model, we found that the credibility of 
the peso shifted over time between two equally persistent regimes of high and low 
credibility but up to 1993 realignment expectations tended to stay in one regime 
or another for long periods. During 1994, a year marked by political and financial 
turmoil, the alternation between regimes was much more marked, and, surprisingly, 
immediately before the devaluation of the peso realignment expectations belonged 
to the regime of relatively high credibility.
In periods of relatively high credibility, realignment expectations were affected 
only by the changes in international reserves. While in periods of relatively low 
credibility realignment expectations were affected by the real appreciation of the 
peso, the health of the banking system and the changes in international reserves.
The instability of the relationship between realignment expectations and macroe­
conomic fundamentals, identified with the rolling estimations and the Markov- 
switching model, indicates that the pattern of a tight relationship between them 
predicted by first generation models of currency crises was absent in the Mexican 
case. And from the set of macroeconomic fundamentals stressed in first genera­
tion models, only real exchange rate appreciation played a significant role in the 
determination of realignment expectations in certain periods.
In Chapter 3 we found that neither the pattern nor the relationship of realign­
ment expectations with macroeconomic fundamentals predicted by first generation 
models of currency crises was present in the Mexican case. We did not regard the 
results obtained in this chapter as sufficiently significant to claim the identification 
of the origins of the collapse of the peso. However, we considered these results as 
a suggestion to study the devaluation of the peso using the approach of second- 
generation models of currency crises in order to take into account sudden shifts in 
market sentiment.
In Chapter 4, we presented a small theoretical model, based on the escape 
clause approach, to discuss some specific features of the Mexican experience. In 
particular, we studied the effects on the equilibria of the model of the substitution 
of peso denominated assets for dollar denominated and indexed assets that allowed 
policymakers to cope with the periods of confidence crisis observed during the 
troubled 1994 and avoid large increases in domestic interest rates.
We found that the depreciation rate in the equilibrium with devaluation is
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higher after the substitution of assets, and it is more difficult to eliminate the 
possibility of a self-fulfilling devaluation when asset substitution takes the form of 
reductions in international reserves that are sterilised. Hence, we argued that the 
sterilisation policy pursued in Mexico diming 1994 was much more important in 
the onset of the devaluation at the end of the year than the increase in the stock 
of dollar indexed bonds.
In this chapter, we suggested the following account of the Mexican experience in 
1994. The level of public debt and its short average maturity (together with a likely 
decrease of the political cost of a devaluation after the approval of NAFTA in the 
US Congress and the general elections in Mexico) may have put the economy in a 
situation in which a self-fulfilling crisis was possible. And a series of political shocks 
provoked periods of confidence crisis in which investors’ expectations threatened 
to switch towards the equilibrium with devaluation. These periods of confidence 
crisis were resisted without noticeable increases in interest rates thanks to the 
substitution of peso denominated assets for dollar denominated or indexed assets in 
investors’ portfolios. However, the substitution of assets increased the depreciation 
rate in the bad equilibrium and made it more difficult to avoid the possibility of a 
self-fulfilling devaluation. Finally, the devaluation of the peso occurred when the 
resource of asset substitution was exhausted at the end of the year, and the market 
coordinated in the bad equilibrium, again in connection with political shocks and 
the announcement of a prospective increase in the ceiling of the currency band.
In Chapter 5 we proposed an index of pressure in the foreign exchange market 
as an indicator of the credibility of the Mexican peso and the use of mean-variance 
Markov-switching models to investigate the relationship between the shifts of the 
economy from calm to crisis and macroeconomic fundamentals and political events.
We found that the pressure was asymmetric: in all our estimations the state 
of calm was characterised by a slight pressure for peso appreciation and the crisis 
state by stronger and more volatile pressure for peso depreciation.
Modelling the transition probabilities dependent on lags of several macroeco­
nomic fundamentals and political news suggested that fiscal matters and political 
shocks caused the transitions between regimes, but these results were not conclu­
sive. Hence, we adopted a two-step approach to obtain the probability of the crisis 
state prevailing in each date in the sample using a mean-variance Maxkov-switching
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model with constant transition probabilities and then modelled this series as a 
function of macroeconomic fundamentals and political events.
The preferred model with constant transition probabilities indicates that the 
pressure for peso depreciation was more than twice the favourable pressure in the 
state of calm, and its variance was 21 times the other. The state of calm had 
an expected duration of 15 months and the unstable regime an expected duration 
of 6 months. That is, the foreign exchange market remained in calm for long 
periods but shifted to the state of crisis for shorter periods. The series of the 
filtered probabilities obtained indicated that the economy shifted to the state of 
crisis in the last part of 1988, when the fixed exchange rate regime changed to 
predetermined rates, and most of 1994.
Modelling the logistic transformation of the probability of the crisis state as 
a function of macroeconomic fundamentals and political news yielded robust re­
sults indicating that political events, the changes in the debt-output ratio and the 
movements of the real exchange rate directed the shifts of the economy between 
the states of calm and crisis.
During most of the sample period examined, the reduction of public indebted­
ness and positive political news maintained the economy in a state of calm, despite 
a considerable real appreciation of the peso. Nevertheless, the ratio of public debt 
to output stopped its declining path before 1994 and a series of negative political 
shocks followed. This shifted the economy towards a state of crisis for most of 
that year, and a modest real depreciation of the peso was not enough to return the 
economy to a state of calm. The state of crisis involved large reserve losses that 
accumulated over the year, and the last period of confidence crisis in December 
resulted in the collapse of the peso.
In sum, the empirical evidence we have found suggests that the periods of 
confidence crisis observed in 1994 and the collapse of the peso on December 21st 
should be considered as the product of a combination of weakening fundamentals 
-  that was not necessarily fatal -  and a series of unpredictable shocks. These 
shifts triggered recurrent shifts in investors’ confidence that finally exhausted the 
mechanisms of defence used by the government.
In Chapter 6 we presented a further application of models with regime shifts, 
devoted to study one of the main consequences of the program for stabilisation
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and economic reform introduced in Mexico in December 1987: the boom in private 
consumption observed in the period 1989-1994. Here, we illustrated how changes 
in long run relationships can be accurately identified and evaluated if we allow 
regime shifts in cointegration relationships.
Using standard cointegration modelling methods, we found that the available 
data rejects a long run relationship with constant coefficients between private 
consumption and income. Hence, we proposed modelling the cointegration rela­
tionship taking into account shifts in regimes.
Using Markov-switching models, we found considerable shifts in the long run 
relationship between consumption and income. These shifts were due to an in­
stitutional change-induced structural break produced by the introduction o f the 
program for stabilisation and economic reform at the end of 1987 and its aban­
donment at the end of 1994.
Before the program, the cointegration relationship between consumption and 
income was characterised by the unitary income elasticity often found in the lit­
erature. However, the program induced a shift in the cointegration vector that 
resulted in a consumption boom of considerable magnitude: per capita consump­
tion expenditure was growing almost 30 per cent faster than gross domestic product 
in the period 1989-1994. And later, at the beginning of 1995, the unitary income 
elasticity was re-established in the middle of a currency and financial crisis.
7.1 Prospective future research
The present analysis of the Mexican currency crisis has been based on empirical 
evidence, a feature that should be desired in the explanations of other currency 
crises, such as the recent crises in Asia. The application of empirical methods 
that allow shifts in regimes to the episodes of speculation in other countries is an 
obvious research agenda for the near future.
The analysis o f realignment expectations in Chapter 3 shows that the share 
of non-performing loans in the banking system affected the credibility of the peso 
in certain periods. And a similar argument has been put forward repeatedly in 
the case of Asia. Hence, we expect that future empirical research ought to give 
more attention to the conditions of the domestic financial system. The availabil­
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ity of indicators of the conditions of financial systems may be a problem for the 
applied researcher, but such a restriction can be relaxed if international financial 
institutions and domestic authorities encourage the publication of information on 
a regular basis.
The two step approach we used in Chapter 5 may be considered a way to tackle 
the issue of model reduction for models with regime changes that involve a large 
number of parameters. However, the empirical analysis of other currency crises 
of the nineties should not be restricted to the use of Markov-switching models to 
study shifts in regimes. Probit and duration models may be used to complement 
the analysis o f  the causes of shifts in the confidence of speculators on exchange 
rates.
We also found that political events played a major role in the collapse of the 
peso, and the use of indicators of political conditions has proven to be useful in 
other empirical works on exchange rates. Hence, considering systematic indicators 
of political conditions -  perhaps not elaborated by economists -  is another element 
that seems to be part of the research agenda in the near future.
In addition, one should stress that when studying other currency crises, it 
cannot be expected that a typical pattern of fundamentals leading the economy to 
a crisis can be found. Rather, different configurations o f fundamentals and perhaps 
other factors in different countries are of relevance. This was neatly illustrated 
by the significant role played by political factors in the Mexican experience and 
the absence contagion effects in our analysis. These two elements should receive 
considerable attention in the case of Asian crises.
With respect to the application of models of cointegration relationships with 
regime shifts, we think that models for the bivariate case may have a rather nar­
row future. However, as we have mentioned, there is no general distributional 
theory for the case of Markov-switching cointegration relationships (single equa­
tion models or systems of equations). Hence, the use of multivariate models to 
study cointegration relationships with regime shifts seems to depend on the de­
velopment of Monte Carlo studies that can support reliable inference. We expect 
that the necessity of modelling structural breaks in more general cointegration 
relationships will encourage the production of the required Monte Carlo studies.
Appendix
Appendix A . Data and sources
• Consumption. Private consumption expenditures in pesos at 1995 prices. Source: 
OECD (Economic Indicators).
• Income. Gross Domestic Product in pesos at 1995 prices. Source: OECD (Eco­
nomic Indicators).
• Indexes o f Consumers Prices in Mexico and the US. Sources: Banco de Mexico 
and IMF (IFS).
• Interest Rates in the US. Interest rate o f  Certificates of Deposit and Prime Rate. 
Source: IMF (IFS).
• Interest Rates o f  Mexican bonds (Cetes, Pagafes and Tesobonos). Source: Banco 
de Mexico.
• Interest Rate in Mexico. Average cost o f funds for commercial banks (CPP). 
Source: Banco de Mexico.
• Maturity o f Public Debt. Average maturity of government bonds. Source: Banco 
de Mexico.
• Monetary Base and International Reserves minus gold. Source: Banco de Mexico.
• M2. Notes and coins held by the public plus cheque accounts and liquid instru­
ments in the banking system. Source: Banco de Mexico.
• Output. Index o f the volume o f industrial production. Source: Instituto Nacional 
de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica.
• Political Events. Discrete variable elaborated with information contained in the 
Kessings’ Records o f  World Events.
• Population. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica.
• Public Sector Borrowing Requirements. Source: Banco de Mexico.
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• Public debt. Broad Economic Debt (net debt of the federal government, public en­
terprises and official development banks) and Debt Consolidated with the Central 
Bank. Source: Banco de Mexico.
• Trade Balance. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática.
• Share of non-performing loans. Non-performing loans as a fraction o f total loans 
o f the banking system. Source: Banco de Mexico.
• Share of dollar indexed bonds (Pagafes and Tesobonos) in total short term gov­
ernment bonds (1 and 3 month maturity). Source: Banco de Mexico.
• Spot Interbank Exchange Rate, pesos per dollar. Source: Banco de Mexico.
• Unemployment Rate. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Infor­
mática.
Appendix B. Political events 1988 - 1994
1988
May (0). The stabilisation program Pact of Economic Solidarity (PSE) is renewed, it is 
planned to last until the end of August.
June (0). The biggest opposition demonstration of the last 20 years takes place in Mexico 
City. The leader is Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, a former member of the Party of the Institution­
alised Revolution, PRI, (the ruling party) and now the presidential candidate of the National 
Democratic Front (FDN), an alliance of five small opposition parties.
July (-1) .  Francisco Ovando, a close collaborator of the opposition candidate Cardenas is 
shot dead together with an assistant. Ovando was on charge of the group aimed to supervise 
balloting in the imminent elections. The minister of the interior announces that there was no 
political motive in the crime. Presidential and Congressional elections took place in the middle of 
an enormous controversy about its legitimacy and results. Due to an alleged computer failure, the 
government-dominated Federal Electoral Commission failed to make public partial results within 
hours of the polling stations closing, as it has been promised. The main opposition candidates 
delivered a joint protest to the Minister of the Interior and president of the electoral commission 
warning that they would not accept the election results or recognize the resulting authorities 
unless the fraud was investigated and legality restored. The PRI’s presidential candidate, Carlos 
Salinas, wins with the smallest ever margin. Large groups claim that Cuauhtemoc Cardenas was 
the real winner.
August (0). The definitive results of the elections are announced and charges of a massive 
fraud are made by the opposition parties. The stabilisation program is renewed, now it is planned 
to last until the end of November.
September ( 0). The recently elected Chamber of Deputies, dominated by the PRI, endorsed 
Carlos Salinas as the elected president..
October (0). More than 100,000 people marched in Mexico City to mark the 20th an­
niversary of the Army’s massacre of hundreds of student protesters in 1968 and to protest for the
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resurgence of political violence. Since July there had been more that 12 murders which suggested 
political motives. The largest of the two state owned airlines is sold to a consortium of private 
investors. This was the first significant privatisation in Latin America. A further renewal, to the 
end of the year, of the Economic Solidarity Pact is announced. The US government agreed to 
lend an unprecedented short-term bridging loan of 3.5 billion dollars linked to loan programs by 
the IMF and the World Bank that was negotiated in secret. The loan was the largest offered to 
a debtor country since the start of the Latin American debt crisis. The formation of the Party 
of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) is announced, this party will be the formalized version of 
the FDN. The formal constitution is planned for early 1989.
November (0). Elections of Governor and municipal councils in the state of Tabasco. Vot­
ing took place amid the heavy presence of troops and paramilitary police. The FDN protested for 
the climate of violence that surrounded the elections and police fired onto a crowd of protesters. 
Official results give the victory to the PRI.
December ( 0). Carlos Salinas inaugurates his six-year presidential term but the entire 
parliamentary opposition walked out during the inauguration. In his speech, Salinas states that 
the most urgent political need is openness in the electoral process and announces his intentions to 
liberalize the economy and to conform to international economic expectations. Salinas announces 
a new anti-inflationary program which is planned to last until July of the next year.
1989
January (0). Joaquin Hernandez, president of the country’s powerful oil workers union 
is arrested and charged with illegal possession of arms, gun smuggling, homicide and resisting 
arrest. The arrest was widely interpreted as a movement of President Salinas to break the power 
of the union and because Hernandez showed some preference for Cardenas, the former most 
important contender for the Presidency. Some 50 union leaders were arrested as well.
February (0). President Salinas ordered the amnesty of 403 prisoners held for political and 
social offences in a move considered as aimed to improve Mexico’s human rights image. On the 
same day, Miguel Nazar the chief of the intelligence of the Mexico City police requested a leave 
of absence.
March ( 1). Nicholas Brady, the US Treasury Secretary introduced a fresh strategy to 
deal with the debt crisis that encourages voluntary debt reductions schemes. The Brady Plan 
replaced the (James) Baker Plan (former US Treasury Secretary) which considered fresh lending 
and economic growth as the key to the solution of the debt crisis.
April (0). Miguel Gallardo, a leading drug trafficker is arrested together with 5 senior 
policemen. A letter of intent is sent by the Mexican government to the IMF asking for financial 
assistance of 3,635 million dollars over the next three years under the IMF’s extended fund facility. 
A considerable proportion would be used to reduce external debt. Mexico began negotiations 
with commercial bank creditors, seeking a comprehensive agreement which would allow to reduce 
the annual debt service burden from 6 to 2 per cent of GNP.
May (1). The IMF approved the extended fund facility to support Mexico’s economic 
program. The IMF also authorized financing to offset the decline in Mexico’s exports earnings 
during 1988. The main package incorporated a support program for debt reduction. Mexico 
signed an agreement with the official creditors of the Club of Paris that considers debt reduc­
tions. President Salinas unveils the national development plan, which contains the political and
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economics objectives of his mandate. The restriction of a maximum of 49 per cent of foreign 
ownership of companies is lifted as well as restrictions on foreign investment.
June ( 0). The world Bank approved three structural adjustment loans to support reforms 
in the fields of finance, industry and public enterprise management. The loans also contained 
a provision for debt reduction (up to 25 per cent of the loans). Japan agreed to provide loans 
to Mexico for 2 billion dollars in order to co-operate with the debt strategy of Mexico, the IMF 
and the World Bank. The economic program is extended until March 1990. Jose Zorrila (former 
chief of agency of the police intelligence agency who resigned in 1985 amid allegations of drug 
trafficking) and other four men are detained in connection with the unsolved killing in 1984 of 
Manuel Buendia, a well known journalist.
July (1). For the first time, the PRI losses a gubernatorial election; the right wing National 
Action Party (PAN) wins in the state of Baja California Norte. A governments spokesman 
remarked that this illustrated the commitment of the government to greater democracy and 
clean elections. The official results were known 4 days after the official deadline. In another six 
states the PRI wins in the elections of state legislators and mayors. Supporters of the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD) blocked several main roads and occupied municipal buildings in 
the state of Michoacan to protest for alleged electoral fraud. It is announced that Spain proposed 
to cancel half of Mexico’s debt to Spanish banks (863 million dollars) and the remainder would 
be transformed into bonds. Mexico and 15 of its main commercial creditors reached the first 
ever agreement under the Brady Plan. The agreement contemplated a reduction of up to 35 per 
cent of the country’s 54 billion dollars of long and medium term debt.
August (0). Its is announced that foreign investment would be allowed in the state- 
controlled oil sector for the first time in order to modernize this industry, and a three year 
plan to privatize the country’s second largest airline, Mexicana, was initiated.
September ( 0). No relevant news.
October (0). No relevant news.
November ( 0). No relevant news.
December (0). PRD supporters occupied town halls in the state of Michoacan, protesting 
for a fraud in the July elections. The stabilisation program is renewed well in advance of its end 
(March of the next year). Its is announced that it will last until July of 1990.
1990
January ( 0). No relevant news.
February (1). A debt reduction agreement is signed between the Mexican government and 
representatives of its 450 foreign commercial creditor banks. The agreement marked the first 
application of the Brady Plan; 49 per cent of the creditor banks chose to convert existing loans 
into par bonds and the conversion to discount bonds was chosen by 41 per cent, the remaining 
chose fresh lending. The World Bank, the IMF and the US Export-Import Bank complemented 
the Mexican resources needed to provide the collateral needed for the new bonds issued.
March (0). Troops bring to an end the occupation of town halls by militants of the PRD. 
The transactions involved in the debt agreement signed in February took place in this month. The 
Mexican central bank lends the government around 7 billion dollars to constitute the collateral 
debt bonds, which resulted in a considerable fall in international reserves.
April ( 0). The government authorized and estimated of 10,000 troops, supported by tanks,
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to bring forcibly to and end the occupation of 19 town halls in the state of Michoacan by 
supporters of the PRD.
May (1). President Salinas presents an initiative to privatize the banking system that is 
approved by the Congress. Business leaders, traders and trade unions expressed support for the 
move. The economic program is renewed in advance. It is planned to last until January of the 
next year.
June ( 0). No relevant news.
July (0). Electoral reforms proposed by Salinas are approved by the Congress. With this 
reform, the President would chose the head of the new electoral commission, and any party 
receiving 35 per cent of the national vote would be guaranteed the majority (50 per cent plus one 
seat) in the Chamber o f Deputies. A further provision banned electoral alliances and coalitions, 
a move designed against the PRD. A debt for equity auction worth 1 billion dollars takes place; 
this mechanism involved issuing bonds at a discount that are exchanged for external debt.
August (0). No relevant news.
September (0). The PRI announces modifications to its statutes. These reforms were 
interpreted as an attempt to transform the image of the PRI and domestic and international 
credibility.
October ( 0). A debt for equity auction is announced and attracted bids for 2.5 billion 
dollars; 85.8 per cent included bonds issued at a 35 per cent discount in exchange for bank loans. 
The Deputy attorney General responsible for the enforcement of antidrug laws is removed from 
his post due to allegations of torture and extortion.
November (1). President Salinas met US President Bush and an agreement to proceed 
with negotiations to achieve an US-Mexico free trade treaty was reached. Bush claimed that such 
a treaty would change the history of North America and would be and example for all nations. 
Bush guaranteed a credit of 1.5 billion dollars for improvements to Mexican oil installations. 
The economic program is renewed for a further year; now it is planned to last until December of 
1991. Official results of the state and local elections in the State of Mexico gave an overwhelming 
majority of seats to the PRI. The opposition claims fraud.
December (0). The very late results of state elections in Hidalgo gave the victory to the 
PRI. The two main opposition parties, PAN and PRD, claimed a scandalous fraud and called 
for mass protests.
1991
January (0). Meeting of Central American leaders: the presidents of Guatemala, Hon­
duras, Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and the foreign ministers of Colombia, Venezuela and 
Mexico agreed to accelerate negotiations for free trade for 1996 at latest. Mexico and Venezuela 
agree to continue supplying oil to the region in favourable terms.
February (0). The Canadian, Mexican and US governments announced that Canada was 
to join the negotiations of the free trade zone.
March(O). President Salinas visits the US and Canada for talks about the free trade 
agreement. A commercial agreement is signed with the European Community.
April (0). President Salinas visited seven United States states and Canadian cities in a 
tour aimed at allaying doubts over the inclusion of Mexico in North American free trade bloc. 
Bush promises to work for an extension of the period in which fast track could apply to a free
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trade agreement.
May (0). No relevant news.
June (0). Opening round of official negotiations of NAFTA.
July ( 0). President Salinas’ tour in Europe. Salinas signed in Italy trade and oil agreements 
worth 1 billion dollar, and German companies pledged 3 billion dollars in new investments in 
Mexico.
August (1). PRI’s overwhelming victory in mid term congressional and gubernatorial 
elections restored PRI’s dominance to levels observed prior 1988. The elections were followed by 
claims of fraud and intimidation. Local elections in six states with close contests in Guanajuato 
and San Luis Potosi. Under domestic and international pressure, President Salinas compelled 
Ramon Aguirre to make the unprecedented announcement that he would not take up office as 
Guanajuato’s Governor and designated Carlos Medina, militant of the PAN, as interim governor. 
The government announced the sale of the largest bank for 3.2 billion dollars.
September (0). A free trade agreement with Chile is signed. The growth of GDP is 
reported to be above previous year but declining. Amnesty International called the US and the 
international community to stop ignoring human rights abuses in Mexico.
October (0). Resignation of the elected governor of San Luis Potosi after a meeting with 
President Salinas. The elected governor was replaced with another PRI member until new 
elections could be held. The government announced the sale of the second largest bank for 2.5 
billion dollars. This was the eighth commercial bank sold.
November ( 0). In his annual report to the nation, President Salinas proposed radical 
reforms in agriculture, the education system and the status of the Catholic Church. The economic 
program is extended to the end of January 1993. As one of the final stages in the governments 
privatization program, three major state owned steel companies were sold for a total price of 885 
million dollars.
December (-1). A significant delay in the signing of the NAFTA occurred after disagree­
ments on specifics, specially about the opening up of the oil industry to US competition. Talks 
between both presidents took place in the US. The US representative for trade negotiations cau­
tioned that the US had no intentions of substituting speed for substance. The week before shares 
on the Mexican stock exchange had fallen sharply on fears that the NAFTA would be postponed.
1992
January (0). Annulment of Tabasco elections, some generals are imprisoned. The Congress 
approved radical constitutional reforms to end the land distribution system called the Ejido (a 
type of communitary property established after the revolution at the beginning of the century); 
other constitutional reforms conferred legal status to the Catholic Church and changed the edu­
cational system. Talks with Canada and the US about the trade agreement resumed.
February (0). The Congress approves reforms to the pensions and housing funds aimed 
to boost domestic savings by an estimated 1 billion dollars. The financial sector welcomes the 
changes but employers express disagreement with the higher labour costs implied.
March (0). No relevant news.
April (0). A series of explosions due to petrol leakages from a pipeline of the state owned 
oil company that filled the sewages killed at least 200 people in Guadalajara.
May (0). Guadalajara’s governor resigns and another PRI official is elected by the state
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Congress as interim governor. Four local executives of the oil company and 5 government officials 
are taken to jail. The IMF extended the for one year the three-year extended agreement granted 
in May 1989. The extension amounts to 653 million dollars.
June (0). A 3.0 billion dollar road privatisation program is approved by the Congress. It 
is announced that 7.17 billion dollars of foreign debt have been cancelled using second market 
operations in the near future.
July ( 0). Elections for governors, state legislatures and town majors in Chihuahua and 
Michoacan. The PRI’s candidate for governor in Michoacan wins with a landslide and the 
PAN’s in Chihuahua. Elections were particularly tense in Michoacan. The debate centred on 
the expenses of the PRI in the campaigns. Some days later Salinas said to the Financial Times 
that he would seek to have ceilings placed on campaign spending. After a meeting of Bush and 
Salinas, the Mexican press announced that Mexico agreed to open up its oil sector to performance 
contracts. This was reported as a concession which US companies had been seeking for some 
time. The last of 18 state-owned banks is privatised. The total sale is worth 12.9 billion dollars.
August (1). A draft of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is agreed 
with the US and Canada. The NAFTA is planned to take place since January 1994. Elections 
of legislators and majors in Durango, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas and Baja 
California.
September ( 0). In Veracruz, protesters of the PRD demonstrate against electoral fraud and 
corruption. The demonstration coincided with the inauguration of the PRI’s elected governor, 
a ceremony attended by President Salinas and protected by 2,000 police and federal troops. 
Diplomatic relations with the Vatican are restored.
October (-1). After months of demonstrations and clashes by supporters of the PRD, the 
governor of Michoacan resigns and is replaced by another PRI member. The economic program, 
planned to expire in January of the next year, is renewed in advance. The extension is for one 
year; now it is planned to last until December 1993. After some weeks of relative pressure on 
the peso, the crawl of the ceiling of the exchange rate band increases from 0.002 to 0.004 pesos 
per day. Analysts considered that the measure averted the danger of a future large one step 
devaluation.
November (0). In his report to the nation, President Salinas proposes that the sources 
of parties financing should be made public in the future, that electoral expenses should have a 
ceiling and that impartiality in the media should be encouraged. The speech is interpreted to 
ease NAFTA ratification in the US Congress. The PRI wins 2 state disputed local elections and 
there are clashes is Oaxaca for the results of the August elections.
December (1). The NAFTA agreement is signed. The forecast of economic growth for
1992 is lowered from 4.0 to 2.8 per cent. The forecast of the current account deficit in 1992 is 
also revised (from 14 to 20 billion dollars), now it is expected to represent 6 per cent of GDP. A 
currency reform takes place, the new peso equals a thousand old pesos.
1993
January (0). Cabinet reshuffle to strength the control over the political system in the 
run up to the denomination of the PRI’s candidate for the 1994 presidential elections. Violent 
clashes are reported in the states of Oaxaca and Michoacan in protests for electoral fraud. PRI’s 
militants evicted PRD members from municipal offices occupied for 18 days; it was reported that
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7 people died.
February (0). No relevant news.
March (0). The PRI announces limits to individual donations to political parties. The 
announcement came in the wake of sustained protests by opposition parties following the dis­
closure that 30 business leaders were asked contributions of 25 million dollars per head to help 
finance the 1994 presidential election campaign. Many of those requested had benefited from 
the privatisation policies. The results of an unofficial plebiscite in Mexico City showed that 85 
per cent of the participants were in favour of the direct election of the Governor in the capital, 
a post designated by the President. The PRI wins elections in Guerrero and Baja California. 
Abstention reached and unprecedented 67 per cent in Guerrero. According to official figures, the 
GDP growth in 1992 was 2.6 per cent, one percentage point below the observed in 1991 and the 
current account deficit in 1992 was 85 per cent higher than in the previous year.
April ( 0). The PRI claims a landslide victory in the extraordinary election held in San Luis 
Potosi. The PAN organized a referendum and a protest in the capital of the state Yucatan to 
protest for the PRI decision to postpone until May 1995 the gubernatorial elections which had 
been set for November. Six of the seven members of the PRI’s executive committee are dismissed 
by the president of the party for involvement in corrupt practices.
May ( 0). The archbishop of Guadalajara, Jesus Posadas’ (second in seniority in the Mexican 
Roman Catholic hierarchy) is shot dead. The authorities stated initially that Posadas was 
caught in crossfire in a battle between drug rings. But the fact that Posadas was 20 years 
older than the allegedly targeted drug trafficker and that he received 14 shots from a distance 
less that 4 feet provoked doubts on this explanation. The Church hierarchy demanded a credible 
explanation. Another theory proposed that drug traffickers had colluded to kill Posadas to show 
his strength. Annual shipments of drugs, mostly from Colombia, across the Mexican border into 
the US were reported to be worth thousands of millions of dollars. Humberto Tirado, a judge 
who was noted for investigating and prosecuting drug traffickers is shot dead in Mexico City. A 
constitutional amendment is submitted to the Congress by President Salinas to make the Central 
Bank independent.
June (0). President Salinas announced the creation of the National Institute to Combat 
Drugs, and independent body dependent of the Attorney General. The institute was the centre­
piece of a new drive against drug traffickers. The attorney general insists on his explanation of 
the killing of Cardinal Posadas.
July (0). President Salinas unveiled a package of electoral reforms. The reforms came after 
the PRI won by a landslide the governor elections in the state of Mexico, the one with the largest 
population.
August (0). No relevant news.
September (0). The electoral reforms introduced in July are approved by the Congress. 
The reforms are said to be designed to bring the country’s antiquated political system in line 
with economic modernisation. The main change consists in separating the organisation and 
supervision of elections from the government and put it on the hands of an independent body. 
The Central Bank announced international reserves of 22.6 billion dollars.
October (0). The economic program two months in advance; now it is planned to last until 
the end of December 1994.A plan for agricultural development is announced. In the capital,
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a demonstration in Mexico City marks the 25 anniversary of the 1968 massacre of university 
students by the Army.
November (-1). The PR] designates Luis Colosio as its candidate for the Presidency. 
Colosio’s candidature was carefully prepared by President Salinas. Manuel Camacho, in charge 
of the government of Mexico City, resigns because he hoped to be the presidential candidate. 
Camacho later accepted the Foreign Relations Portfolio. The PAN designates Diego Fernandez 
as its candidate. The PRI wins with a large minority the local elections in the State of Mexico. 
In the state of Yucatan elections produced controversy and demands for annulment of the poll. 
The uncertainty regarding the NAFTA vote in the US Congress resulted in considerable pressure 
on the peso. As a result, the crawling of ceiling of the target zone was increased from 0.002 to 
0.004 pesos per day, and the horizontal intramarginal band was eliminated.
December ( 0). Jesus Silva is appointed Tourist Minister. His appointment put and end to 
speculation that he might leave the PRI after centre-left deputies of the PRD asked him to run as 
an opposition presidential candidate in August 1994. Economic growth reaches its worst record 
in the Salinas administration, it is reported that the GDP grew 1.2 percent from September 1992 
to the same month in 1993.
1994
January (-1). The first day of the year, a rebellion broke out in the southern State of 
Chiapas. The Zapatista Army for National Liberation, an armed group of indians, took control 
of four towns and issued a series of demands calling for major social and economic change in 
the region. This action coincided with the entry into force of the NAFTA. This was the first 
incidence of guerrilla in two decades and caused considerable embarrassment to the PRI. Two 
power lines are blown up in the states of Puebla and Michoacan and a there is a bomb attack 
in Mexico City. The guerrilla also kidnapped a former governor of Chiapas. Ten days after the 
broke up of the rebellion, the government announced a unilateral cease-fire. Manuel Camacho 
leaves the Foreign Portfolio Ministry and becomes the Commissioner for Peace and Reconciliation 
in Chiapas. The Minister of the Interior is replaced. At the end of the month, an agenda for 
peace talks was agreed between the Government and the Zapatista Army. The conflict had a 
considerable impact on the confidence of the PRI.
February (0). Popular support for the Zapatista Army grows. Peace talks with the Za­
patista Army took place at the end of the month; particular attention is given in the talks for 
proposals of political reform. The Zapatista army demanded the resignation of President Salinas. 
In Chiapas, hundreds of peasants occupied peacefully 10 towns. The National Army backed the 
peace process.
March (-1). Mexico’s political system is plunged into crisis in March 23rd due to the 
assassination of the PRI’s presidential candidate, Luis Colosio. Rumours of a plot by sectors 
within the PRI that worried at signs that Colosio might show greater respect for democratic 
procedures or move away from the free market economic policies widespread. President Salinas 
favoured Ernesto Zedillo, Colosio’s campaign manager, as substitute for the candidature. The 
selection has said to have been taken place in stressed negotiations within the PRI. As a further 
sign of turbulence, Jose Cordoba, Salinas’ powerful chief of staff, was suddenly removed and 
sent to Washington as envoy to the Inter-American Development Bank. It was said that the 
sacrifice of Cordoba was the condition of PRI's officials to accept Zedillo as the new candidate.
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A preliminary agreement for peace with the Zapatista Army was reached in Chiapas at the 
beginning of the month but after the assassination of Colosio, the Zapatista Army remained in 
red alert. The killing of Colosio prompted a sharp fall in Mexican shares and bonds in New York 
and London and pressures against the peso grew dramatically. Bill Clinton announced that the 
US Treasury would be prepared to lend Mexico up to 6.0 billion dollars to stabilise the peso. The 
president of Banamex-Accival, the largest financial group in the country was kidnapped. In an 
attempt to boost the confidence on the economy, it is announced that Mexico would be accepted 
as a member of the OECD next month.
April (-1). The federal judge in charge of the investigation of Colosio dismissed charges 
against the allegedly partners of the murderer of Colosio. The investigations turned obscure 
when the main charge of the confessed assassin, Mario Aburto, was changed from premeditated 
murder to murder with malicious intent. Legal experts and the media considered that by ruling 
out premeditation, the government prepared the ground for the argument that Aburto acted 
impulsively and alone. Opinion pools suggested that most Mexicans believed that the murder was 
organised and had a political motive. The government resorted to an independent commission 
to investigate the assassination. Jose Benitez, the police chief of Tijuana, the city in which 
Colosio was assassinated, was murdered by unidentified gunmen. Benitez was reported to have 
information on the assassination of Colosio.
May (0). The government announced that it had requested the UN to provide technical 
assistance to national observers in the forthcoming presidential election of August. Mexico’s 
first televised presidential campaign debate took place with an estimated audience of 30 million 
people. The candidate of the PAN was considered as the winner of the debate but showed a very 
low profile in the weeks that followed the debate, which caused widespread criticism.
June (-1). Interior Minister, Jorge Carpizo, submitted his resignation but withdrew it days 
later after President Salinas refused to accept it. Carpizo was persuaded to stay following un­
precedented cross-party support and backing from non-partisan groups. The episode highlighted 
the division between hard-liners and moderates within the PRI. Carpizo had reportedly already 
threatened to resign before because of hard-line opposition to electoral reforms. The Zapatista 
Army announced its rejection of the governments peace plan and Manuel Camacho, the Commis­
sioner for Peace in Chiapas, resigned. Zedillo criticised his peace efforts and said that protracted 
negotiations with the Zapatista Army had only produced a prolonged truce. The Zapatista Army 
called for a new dialogue with all progressive forces in the country and the holding of a national 
democratic convention to create a provisional or transitional government.
July ( 0). President Salinas designated Olga Islas a the new special prosecutor in the inves­
tigation of the murder of Colosio. Islas substituted Miguel Montes who reversed his preliminary 
findings of a conspiracy, presented in television, and later concluded that the confessed murderer 
of Colosio had been a lone gunman.
August (1). Presidential and congressional elections took place. The PRI wins the Pres­
idency and the majority in the Congress. Reports of electoral irregularities in the presidential 
and congressional elections emerge. Senior executives of a financial corporation are sentenced in 
connection with loans granted by a group of banks and small investors to the corporation which 
were to support companies which turned out to be non-existent.
September (0). Two days before the end of the month, the Secretary General of the PRI,
161
Jose Ruiz, was is killed in Mexico City. The murderer was arrested at the scene of the crime. It 
was nor immediately clear whether the killing was connected with moves to reform the party, or 
with opposition to the governments fight against drug trafficking because Mario Ruiz, brother 
of Jose Ruiz, w£is in charge of anti-drug law enforcement. The Minister of Finance announced 
that federal regulators had taken over the running another financial group and auditors were 
investigating alleged irregularities; arrest orders are issued against the head of the group and 
other four executives.
October (-1)- Investigations of the killing of the Secretary Generad of the PRI suggested 
links both with drug cartels amd members of the PRI which opposed reforms to the party. 
But there was not a clear resolution of the issue. A drug cartel issued a statement claiming 
responsibility for the assassination of the Jose Ruiz but the same day the Attorney General 
requested that the PRI deputy Manuel Muñoz be stripped of his parliamentary immunity in 
order to bring criminal proceedings against him because he was connected to the killing. Manuel 
Muñoz alleged the following day that the assassination had been masterminded by telephone by 
AbrahEim Rubio, a tourism developer connected with the drug cartel who was serving a sentence 
in prison. The Zapatista Army announced its withdrawal from talks with the government, which 
were stalled since June.
N o v e m b e r  ( - 1 ) .  Mario Ruiz resigned from the PRI and from his post as Deputy Attorney 
General and accused senior party officials of hindering the investigation of his brother murder. 
Mario Ruiz, brother of the murdered PRI’s Secretary General assassinated in September claimed 
to have evidence implicating senior members of the PRI in a cover-up to protect the assassins. 
PRD deputies disrupted the last speech to the Chamber of Deputies of President Salinas. A 
simultaneous demonstration by PRD supporters in Mexico City protesting at alleged PRI in­
volvement in the deaths of more than 300 PRD Eictivists in the previous six years led to violent 
crashes with the police.
December (-1). Ernesto Zedillo inaugurates his presidential term. In his speech Zedillo 
promised to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and to ensure the separation of the gov­
ernment from the PRI. He also proposed a reform of the electoral system to end the controversy 
fuelled by opposition parties which, he said, were intent on denying the PRI’s legitimate success 
in recent elections. Fears of a renewed outbreak of hostilities in Chiapas followed the controver­
sial inauguration of a new PRI governor. The Zapatista Army dismissed the official results of 
the elections and demanded the installation of the candidate of the PRD as governor. A shadow 
government was established by Zapatista and PRD supporters. Members of the Zapatista Army 
broke through an army cordon and gained control of 38 municipalities. There were no reports 
of violence when the federal troops recaptured the municipalities. On December 20th the gov­
ernment announced that the ceiling of the target zone of the peso would be increased by 15 per 
cent. This was taken by financial markets as a surrender to defend the peso-dollar parity and the 
price of the dollar was hitting the new ceiling hours after the announcement. On December 21st 
the government announced that the peso was to float freely. The recently appointed Minister of 
Finance was substituted. At the end of the month, the government reached an agreement with 
the Zapatista Army to end military operations and begin negotiations.
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